Capuano v. Fairfax Cnty. Pub. Bd.
| Decision Date | 29 October 2013 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:13-cv-00568-GBL-TRJ |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
| Parties | SUSAN CAPUANO (TORDA), Legal Guardian for Joseph Torda Michael Torda, Plaintiff, Pro Se, v. FAIRFAX COUNTY PUBLIC BOARD, Defendant. |
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff Susan Capuano's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 31) and Defendant Fairfax County Public Board's Motion for Summary Judgment on the Administrative Record (Doc. 33). Plaintiff, the mother of Joseph Torda, a disabled student who attended Fairfax County Public Schools ("FCPS"), challenges an administrative hearing officer's finding that Plaintiff was prohibited from seeking review of her son's disability eligibility categories because the claims were barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel.
There are two issues before the Court. The first issue is whether Plaintiff's previously litigated disability claims are barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel where Plaintiff provided no new evidence of a change in circumstances. The second issue is whether Plaintiff's claim regarding the disability category of "visual impairment" is barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, or alternatively, barred due to Plaintiff's failure to exhaust her administrative remedies.
First, the Court holds that Plaintiff's autism, auditory processing disorder, and multiple disabilities claims are barred by collateral estoppel because the issues were previously litigated in anadministrative hearing and in subsequent judicial appeals between 2010 and 2013. Additionally, Plaintiff has failed to show a material change in circumstances warranting rehearing the issues.
Second, the Court holds that Plaintiff's visual impairment claim is barred by collateral estoppel because the issue was litigated in a 2010 administrative hearing which Plaintiff chose not to appeal. To the extent there exists new evidence regarding a change in Joseph Torda's vision, consideration of the issue is barred because Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. Plaintiff did not raise the issue in her 2012 due process hearing request ("2012 DPH Request") despite being given the opportunity to amend her Request.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Fairfax County Public Board's ("FCPB") Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record (Doc. 33) and DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 31).
Joseph Torda is a 22 year-old male with Down syndrome, significant cognitive deficits, communication difficulties, and motor skills problems. (Doc. 24, Administrative Record [hereinafter "AR"] 7E at 2.) Joseph Torda functions significantly below his age level in all academic and adaptive behavior areas. Id. His IQ has been measured at 51, and his cognitive ability falls within the "extremely low" range, i.e., below the first percentile. Id. Joseph Torda has significant difficulty analyzing and synthesizing abstract concepts and can only retain very limited sets of information in his short-term memory. Id. at 4. Joseph Torda is eligible for special education as a student with cognitive/intellectual disabilities. Id.
Over the years, there have been many disagreements between Plaintiff Susan Capuano Torda ("Ms. Capuano") and Defendant Fairfax County Public Board ("FCPB"), the legal entity representing Fairfax County Public Schools ("FCPS"), over the diagnosis of Joseph Torda's disabilities, hiseligibility for disability categories, his educational placement, and the services he has received under his various annual individualized education plans ("IEPs").
The appeal currently before the Court stems from a September 2010 eligibility committee meeting decision which found Joseph Torda eligible for special education services in the areas of intellectual disability and speech/language impairment and not eligible in the categories of autism, specific learning disability (relating to auditory processing disorder ("APD")), visual impairment, and multiple disabilities. AR 7F. Ms. Capuano disagreed with this eligibility finding and provided FCPS with a statement dissenting from the results of the eligibility committee meeting. AR 7F. Ms. Capuano also expressed dissatisfaction to FCPS with regard to Joseph Torda's January 24, 2011 IEP. Pl.'s Reply Br. Ex. 5. In September of 2012, two years after the eligibility committee meeting, Plaintiff filed a request for a due process hearing ("2012 DPH Request") asserting Joseph Torda's eligibility under the categories of (a) autism, (b) specific learning disability, because of his alleged APD, and (c) multiple disabilities. AR 1 at 2. The only evidence Plaintiff provided in her request was the following:
Defendant filed a twelve page Motion to Dismiss, accompanied by fourteen exhibits, with the assigned Hearing Officer, Mr. Alvey ("HO Alvey"), stating that Ms. Capuano's claims were barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel. Defendant argued that Plaintiff's 2012 DPH Request alleged the same disability categories previously decided in an administrative hearing (2010 HO Aschmann Decision) and subsequent judicial appeal. Defendant contended that the five pieces of evidence thatPlaintiff relied on in her DPH Request were previously considered by this Court in its 2012 decision Torda ex rel. Torda v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., No. 1:11CV193, 2012 WL 2370631 (E.D. Va. June 21, 2012), aff'd, 517 F. App'x 162 (4th Cir. 2013) (hereinafter "Torda I"). Therefore, Defendant asserted that Plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. AR 7. HO Alvey directed Plaintiff to amend her DPH complaint to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and to respond directly to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. The parties agreed to waive oral argument on the Motion to Dismiss. AR 8.
Plaintiff amended her 2012 DPH Request to add a claim that "FCPS failed to offer Joseph Torda an IEP that confers FAPE [free appropriate public education] in the 2010-2011 school year (and beyond)" because of the failure to "properly" identify the three eligibility categories listed. AR 34 at 3. Additionally, Plaintiff amended her requested relief to include compensatory education including remediation for APD and services to address autism. Id. Plaintiff opposed the Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the eligibility determination on APD and multiple disabilities was not subject to res judicata or collateral estoppel because the previous case was on appeal to the Fourth Circuit and therefore there was no final decision regarding eligibility. AR 35. Nowhere in her Amended 2012 DPH Request did Plaintiff mention any facts relating to vision difficulties or visual impairment eligibility, nor did Plaintiff request relief for multiple disabilities or vision. Plaintiff now asserts that FCPB mislead HO Alvey by characterizing her claim as intending to rely on the same evidence. Despite this belief, and her own legal training,1 Ms. Capuano's 2012 Amended DPH Request did not cite any further evidence upon which she intended to rely to support her claims.
Based on the doycuments submitted to HO Alvey, the Defendant's Motion was granted. Specifically, Mr. Alvey found that the 2010 DPH on autism and this Court's decision in Torda I as tothe remaining issues of auditory processing disorder and multiple disabilities warranted dismissal of the 2012 DPH Request. Mr. Alvey found that Plaintiff had fully litigated the issues and received a final decision on the merits and intended to rely on the same evidence that this Court had already evaluated.
Plaintiff appealed HO Alvey's decision to the Circuit Court of Fairfax County. Defendant subsequently removed the matter to this Court. The parties filed cross-motions for judgment on the administrative record on July 19, 2013, and oral argument occurred on August 23, 2013.
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a motion for summary judgment will be granted if it is shown that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-324 (1986). Once a motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported, the opposing party has the burden of showing that a genuine dispute exists. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,247 (1986). The moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law unless a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party on the evidence presented. See id. at 247-48.
Among the purposes of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA") is "to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education ["FAPE"] that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living[.]" 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2010).
Under IDEA, reevaluations of a child's disability and IEP services shall occur at least once every three years, and, at times annually. Id. § 1414(a)(2)(B) (2010). IDEA establishes these review procedures in order to "assess, and ensure the effectiveness of, efforts to educate children with disabilities." Id § 1400(d)(4) (2010). Under IDEA, parents are afforded the opportunity to present a due process complaint with respect to any identification,...
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