Caraballo v. Commonwealth

• Decision Date: 07 January 2014
• Docket Number: Civil No. 13–1309(DRD).
• Citation: 990 F.Supp.2d 165
• Parties: Arnold Gil CARABALLO, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Commonwealth of PUERTO RICO, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

990 F.Supp.2d 165

Arnold Gil CARABALLO, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.Commonwealth of PUERTO RICO, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 13–1309(DRD).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

Jan. 7, 2014.

Israel Roldan–Gonzalez, Aguadilla, PR, for Plaintiffs.

Jaime J. Zampierollo–Vila, Puerto Rico Department of Justice, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

DANIEL R. DOMINGUEZ, District Judge.

Plaintiffs Arnold Gil Caraballo (“Gil”), Joel Ramos Beltrán (“Ramos”), and Noel Román Ferrer (“Román”)(collectively, “Plaintiffs”), along with Nanette Guevara and the conjugal partnership of Gil–Guevara, filed an Amended Complaint on June 21, 2013 (Docket No. 11) against Defendants Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (“Commonwealth”), the Secretary of the Department of Correction and Rehabilitation José R. Negrón Fernández (“Negrón”), Captain Ramón López López (“López”), and Lieutenant David Cruz–Fernández (“Cruz”)(collectively, “Defendants”), all in their official and personal capacities, alleging political discrimination. Plaintiffs bring this action under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, Public Law No. 100 of 1959, 29 L.P.R.A. § 146 et seq., Public Law No. 382 of 1950, 29 L.P.R.A. §§ 136–138, and Sections 1, 4, 6, and 7 of Article II of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.¹

I. RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs are all sergeants in the Department of Correction and Rehabilitation in Puerto Rico and had been assigned to the Aguadilla Detention Center for many years.² Plaintiffs are all affiliated with the New Progressive Party (“NPP”) and actively participated in the November 2012 elections. According to Plaintiffs, their political ideologies were well known to all Defendants.

Defendants López and Cruz are high ranking ³ employees in the Department of Correction and Rehabilitation, and, according to Plaintiffs, are active members of the Popular Democratic Party (“PDP”), having expressed their affiliation and support for the PDP on a number of occasions in 2012. Defendant Negrón is the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, and has been occupying said position since the PPD administration was sworn in on January 2013.

Plaintiffs claim that immediately after the results of the November 6, 2012 general election they were subject to political harassment by Defendant Cruz, who later identified himself as a principal aid of Defendant Negrón. Defendant Cruz told Plaintiffs, on several occasions, that he was in charge of identifying all of those Department of Correction's employees that were members of the NPP and ordered, by Defendant Negron, to dismiss or transfer them to other facilities. Defendant Cruz emphasized that, as a result of their political ideology, Plaintiffs would be given hell during the following four years and warned them that they would be the first employees to be dismissed or transferred from the Aguadilla Detention Center. According to Plaintiffs, Defendant Cruz's conduct was continuous and performed in the presence of other Department of Correction's employees.

On February 28, 2013, Plaintiffs were furnished transfer letters signed by Defendant Negrón ordering their transfers from the Detention Center in Aguadilla to the Detention Center of the West in Mayaguez. Said letters were predated January 31, 2013 and neglected to specify a reason for the transfers. These transfer letters were hand delivered to Plaintiffs by Defendant López, who sarcastically informed them that this was their reward for being members of the NPP. Defendant López further stressed, while laughing, that Plaintiffs would learn a lesson now that the PDP was in power and that it should not take them by surprise if they were all transferred to Ponce or San Juan within a week. This conversation allegedly took place in front of other Department of Correction employees.

Plaintiffs aver that they are career employees of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and that their work performance has always been exemplary. Furthermore, they claim that because of their rank, experience, and performance they worked a regular schedule at the Aguadilla Detention Center. However, after being transferred to Mayaguez, Plaintiffs were assigned to work on rotating shifts and are now incurring additional transportation expenses, which they estimate to be approximately $1,000 a month per Plaintiff. Lastly, Plaintiffs maintain that their prior positions at the Aguadilla Detention Center are now occupied by members of the PDP.

On July 29, 2013, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 16) alleging, inter alias, that the claims against the Commonwealth and Defendant Negrón in his official capacity are barred by Eleventh Amendment Immunity. Defendants further argued that Plaintiffs had failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Additionally, Defendants contend that Plaintiff Guevara lacks standing to bring a § 1983 suit and that all state law claims should be dismissed.

On August 27, 2013, Plaintiffs filed their Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 23). Therein, Plaintiffs argued that their Fourteenth Amendment claim cannot be dismissed, as their equal protection rights were violated when the government failed to afford them the same protections as other similarly situated employees. With regards to their First Amendment claim, Plaintiffs advance that they belong to a different political party than Defendants, that Defendants knew the political affiliation, and that they were transferred and demoted as a result of their political preference. However, Plaintiffs do concede that all claims against the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and Negrón, in his official capacity, for monetary damages are barred under the Eleventh Amendment. Plaintiffs further acknowledge that their Complaint does not support a Fifth Amendmentclaim, as there are no federal actors in this case, and that Plaintiff Guevara lacks standing to bring a Section 1983 suit. However, Plaintiffs request leave to file a second amended complaint to include a state law claim under Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code in favor of Plaintiff Guevara.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR MOTIONS TO DISMISS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires plaintiffs to provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Under Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), a plaintiff must “provide the grounds of his entitlement [with] more than labels and conclusions.” See Ocasio–Hernandez v. Fortuño–Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir.2011) (“in order to ‘show’ an entitlement to relief a complaint must contain enough factual material ‘to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).’ ”)(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955) (citation omitted). Thus, a plaintiff must, and is now required to, present allegations that “nudge [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible” in order to comply with the requirements of Rule 8(a). Id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955; see e.g. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

When considering a motion to dismiss, the Court's inquiry occurs in a two-step process under the current context-based “plausibility” standard established by Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, and Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937. “Context based” means that a Plaintiff must allege sufficient facts that comply with the basic elements of the cause of action. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677–679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (concluding that plaintiff's complaint was factually insufficient to substantiate the required elements of a Bivens claim, leaving the complaint with only conclusory statements). First, the Court must “accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint [,]” discarding legal conclusions, conclusory statements and factually threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. “Yet we need not accept as true legal conclusions from the complaint or ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’ ” Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 268 (1st Cir.2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955).

Under the second step of the inquiry, the Court must determine whether, based upon all assertions that were not discarded under the first step of the inquiry, the complaint “states a plausible claim for relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. This second step is “context-specific” and requires that the Court draw from its own “judicial experience and common sense” to decide whether a plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted, or, conversely, whether dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate. Id.

Thus, “[i]n order to survive a motion to dismiss, [a] plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to show that he has a plausible entitlement to relief.” Sanchez v. Pereira–Castillo, 590 F.3d 31, 41 (1st Cir.2009). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’ ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ ” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). Furthermore, such inferences must be at least as plausible as any “obvious alternative explanation.”Id. at 679–80, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567, 127 S.Ct. 1955). “A plaintiff is not entitled to ‘proceed perforce’ by virtue of allegations that merely parrot the elements of the cause of action.” Ocasio–Hernandez, 640...