Caraker v. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp.

• Decision Date: 04 September 2001
• Docket Number: No. 96-CV-4113-JPG.,96-CV-4113-JPG.
• Citation: 172 F.Supp.2d 1018
• Parties: Alisa Ann CARAKER and Keith Allen Caraker, Plaintiffs, v. SANDOZ PHARMACEUTICALS CORP. and Sandoz AG, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois

172 F.Supp.2d 1018

Alisa Ann CARAKER and Keith Allen Caraker, Plaintiffs, v. SANDOZ PHARMACEUTICALS CORP. and Sandoz AG, Defendants.

No. 96-CV-4113-JPG.

United States District Court, S.D. Illinois.

September 4, 2001.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

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Ellen Relkin, Richard S. McGowan, Catherine T. Heacox, Jerry Kristal, Jill

Mandell, Denise Denleavy, Weitz & Luxenberg, New York City, Martin L. Perron, Perron Law Firm, St. Louis, MO, for Plaintiffs.

Dennis P. Orr, Grant J. Esposito, Mayer, Brown, et al., New York City, Suzanne P. Galvin, Fox, Galvin, LLC, St. Louis, MO, Steven P. Sanders, Williams, Venker, et al., St. Louis, MO, for Sandoz AG.

Deirdre C. Gallagher, Katherine R. Latimer, Armstrong Teasdale, LLP, St. Louis, MO, Joe G. Hollingsworth, Gary Rubin, Rona Endlich, William J. Cople, Jonathan M. Weinrieb, Spriggs & Hollingsworth, Washington, DC, Steven P. Sanders, Williams, Venker, et al., St. Louis, MO, for Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp.

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

GILBERT, District Judge.

Plaintiffs Alisa and Keith Caraker have sued the defendants, Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corporation and Sandoz A.G.,¹ alleging products liability claims. Before this Court are:

1.) Sandoz' motion for reconsideration of this Court's denial of its Motion for Summary Judgment filed February 17, 1999, along with Sandoz' supporting memorandum, the Carakers' response, and Sandoz' reply (Docs.201, 202, 209, 219);

2.) Sandoz' motion for summary judgment as to the Caraker's products liability claims based on the recent Supreme Court case of Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Committee, 531 U.S. 341, 121 S.Ct. 1012, 148 L.Ed.2d 854 (2001), along with Sandoz' supporting memorandum, the Carakers' response, and Sandoz' reply (Docs.254, 255, 256, 258);

3.) Sandoz' motion for order to preclude reference to Dr. Karl Engelman's Conviction on Misdemeanor Charges in August 1978, along with Sandoz' supporting memorandum, the Carakers' response, and Sandoz' reply (Docs.274, 275, 278, 300)

4.) The Carakers' motion to supplement their memorandum in opposition to Sandoz' motion in limine to exclude causation testimony and to include new exhibits, along with Sandoz' response (Docs.304, 309)

5.) Sandoz' unopposed motion to strike the Caraker's response to Sandoz' notice of affirmance of previously cited authority (Doc. 305).

I. BACKGROUND

This is a products liability case that involves the drug Parlodel, a postpartum lactation-control drug manufactured, delivered and sold by Sandoz.

On the evening of May 9, 1988, after an uneventful pregnancy, 24-year-old Alisa Caraker delivered her infant at Memorial Hospital of Carbondale ("Carbondale Memorial") via a normal cesarean section (i.e., an incision through the abdominal and uterine walls for delivery of a fetus) because her infant was too large for her birth canal. The surgery was uneventful. Mrs. Caraker did not have obstetrical (i.e., the branch of surgery dealing with the management of pregnancy and labor) risk factors for her stroke.

On May 10, 1988, Mrs. Caraker began taking Parlodel, prescribed at 2.5 mg twice per day for 14 days because she had elected not to breast feed. On May 11, 1988, while still in the hospital, Ms. Caraker reported developing headaches. During her hospitalization, she also experienced some transient elevated blood pressure. On May 13, 1988, Mrs. Caraker was discharged in good health, but, after returning home, Mrs. Caraker's headaches progressively became much worse.

On May 15, 1988, she awoke with a severe headache and vision problems and was rushed back to Carbondale Memorial. It was noted on admission that Mrs. Caraker was a healthy 24 year old woman, one week postpartum, with no complications during pregnancy, and a normal blood pressure before, during, and after delivery. She reported that the only medication she was currently taking was Parlodel. That day, a CT scan (i.e., a method of examining the body's soft tissues using X-rays, with the beam passing repeatedly through a body part and a computer calculating tissue absorption at each point scanned) revealed a large, left-sided intra-cerebral hematoma ("ICT")² due to intra-cerebral hemorrhaging/bleeding. Mrs. Caraker was then transferred to St. Francis Medical Center ("St. Francis") where she underwent brain surgery to remove the hematoma and stop the bleeding. Before operating, the surgeon, Dr. Kim, noted that X-rays indicated no pre-existing blood malformation, but that either a cryptic AVM or a postpartum hemorrhage was a possibility. The operation records indicate again the possibility of a cryptic AVM. On May 17, 1988, St. Francis sent a letter to Carbondale Memorial reporting that Mr. Caraker had indicated that the labor was stressful and prolonged, that they assumed Mrs. Caraker had suffered from intracerebral hemorrhage during labor, but also that the stroke could be completely unrelated to the delivery. Upon her discharge on May 23, 1988, it was noted that her recent labor was delayed but that the cesarean delivery was normal. The Carakers spoke with Dr. Kim, who could not identify the cause of the stroke; nor could Dr. Smaga explain the stroke to Mrs. Caraker at a follow-up visit.

The Carakers filed their complaint on March, 25, 1996, against Parlodel manufacturer Sandoz, in which they assert design defect, failure to warn, and negligence theories claims.

II. DISCUSSION

Before this Court are Sandoz' motion for reconsideration of this Court's ruling on its previous filed Motion for Summary Judgment filed over two years ago on February 17, 1999, a summary judgment motion based on of Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Committee, 531 U.S. 341, 121 S.Ct. 1012, 148 L.Ed.2d 854 (2001), and other miscellaneous motions. This Court will first address the reconsideration motion, then the Buckman summary judgment motion, and lastly the miscellaneous motions.

A. Reconsideration Motion

On June 7, 1999, this Court denied a summary judgment motion filed by Sandoz (Docs.107, 109, 119, 122). On November 9, 2000, almost a year and a half later, Sandoz filed a motion to reconsider that June 7, 1999, Order (Doc. 202), claiming that "new law" and "new facts" justify a reversal of this Court's June 7, 1999, Order denying summary judgment on the statute of limitations issue.³ The Carakers responded arguing that there is nothing "new" in the Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 209).⁴ They note that Sandoz' "new cases" actually support this Court's denial of summary judgment, and that its "new facts" were previously available and thoroughly discussed in the June 7, 1999, Order.

A motion to reconsider is not designed to relitigate issues previously decided on summary judgment. In Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole v. CBI Industries, Inc., 90 F.3d 1264 (7th Cir.1996), the Seventh Circuit outlined the proper standard for motions to reconsider:

Motions for reconsideration serve a limited function: to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence. Such motions cannot in any case be employed as a vehicle to introduce new evidence that could have been adduced during the pendency of the summary judgment motion. To support a motion for reconsideration based on newly discovered evidence, the moving party must "show not only that this evidence was newly discovered or unknown to it until after the hearing, but also that it could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced such evidence during the pendency of the motion." Disposition of a motion for reconsideration is left to the discretion of the district court, and its ruling will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.

* * * * * *

Belated factual or legal attacks are viewed with great suspicion, and intentionally withholding essential facts for later use on reconsideration is flatly prohibited. Reconsideration is not an appropriate forum for rehashing previously rejected arguments or arguing matters that could have been heard during the pendency of the previous motion.

Id. at 1269-70 (citations and internal quotations and brackets omitted). See Rothwell Cotton Co. v. Rosenthal & Co., 827 F.2d 246, 251-52 (7th Cir.1987). This standard applies to both grants and denials of summary judgment motions. See Caisse, 90 F.3d at 1270 ("Disposition of a motion for reconsideration is left to the discretion of the district court, and its ruling will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion."); see also Davidson & Schaaff, Inc. v. Liberty Nat. Fire Ins. Co., 69 F.3d 868, 871 (8th Cir.1995); Mustafa v. Clark County School Dist., 157 F.3d 1169, 1178 (9th Cir.1998); Xerox Corp. v. Genmoora Corp., 888 F.2d 345, 355 n. 62 (5th Cir.1989).⁵

1. The June 7, 1999, Order Denying Summary Judgment

On February 17, 1999, Sandoz Pharmaceuticals filed a motion for summary judgment arguing for the second time that the Carakers' claims were barred by the statute of limitations (Doc. 107). They claimed that because Mrs. Caraker suffered from an injury resulting from a "traumatic event," the statute of limitations began to run on the date of injury, May 15, 1988, and could not be tolled under the discovery rule. Sandoz contended that, even if the discovery rule did apply to this case, the Carakers knew or should have known by 1989, at the latest, that the stroke had a wrongful cause. The Carakers responded that they could not have learned of the wrongful cause of the injury until Mrs. Caraker read a magazine article in June of 1994 (Doc. 119). They claim that a genuine issue of fact existed precluding summary judgment. Sandoz replied, arguing that the facts were inadequately disputed and that many of the Carakers' arguments were unsupported by Illinois law (Doc. 122).

In rejecting Sandoz Pharmaceuticals' statute of limitations argument yet again, this Court noted that the discovery rule tolls the running of the statute of limitations until a plaintiff reasonably should have known of her injury and that it was...