Caramini v. Tegulias

• Decision Date: 10 July 1936
• Citation: 186 A. 482,121 Conn. 548
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: CARAMINI et al. v. TEGULIAS et al.

186 A. 482

121 Conn. 548

CARAMINI et al. v. TEGULIAS et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

July 10, 1936

Appeal from Superior Court, Fairfield County; John A. Cornell Judge.

Action by Spiro Caramini and others against Stephen Tegulias and others for the cancellation of a deed, an injunction, and ejectment. From a judgment for the plaintiffs, the defendants appeal.

No error.

George E. Beers, of New Haven, and Nathan M. Levy, of Ansonia, and William L. Beers, of New Haven, for appellants.

George A. Saden and David Goldstein, both of Bridgeport, for appellees.

Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HINMAN, BANKS, AVERY, and BROWN JJ.

BANKS Judge.

The plaintiffs are the parents of the defendant Mary Tegulias who is the wife of the other defendant, Stephen Tegulias. On July 25, 1921, the plaintiffs deeded to the defendants the property described in the complaint, reserving to themselves the use, income, and profits of the same during their natural lives. The only consideration for the deed, and the inducement to the plaintiffs to execute it, was the promise of the defendants that they would support and care for the plaintiffs as long as the latter should live. The parties all lived together in the second floor apartment of the property conveyed. The plaintiff Spiro turned over all of his wages to the defendant Stephen, who collected all the rents and income from the property, out of which he paid the interest on mortgages, taxes, and expenses of upkeep of the property. Some time in 1932 Spiro lost his job and has not been employed since. Up to that time the defendants furnished ample food of good quality to the plaintiffs, but otherwise failed to fulfill their promise to support and care for them, failing to supply either of them with sufficient clothing or the means of satisfying their reasonable needs according to their status in life. Since that time the plaintiffs complained of lack of food and insufficiency of clothing, and, following events which are detailed in the finding, the plaintiffs and defendants ceased eating their meals together and neither spoke to the other except in anger and insult. Since September, 1934, defendants have furnished no care or support whatever to the plaintiffs, who have no other source of income, and have been supported by another daughter. The trial court found that defendants were not entitled to remain in occupancy of the premises or to collect the rents therefrom; that they had failed to support and care for the plaintiffs within the intendment of their undertaking so to do, and had repudiated the same; that the plaintiffs were justified in rescinding the agreement and had done so; and that they were entitled to a cancellation of their deed of the premises to the defendants.

The court's conclusions that the defendants were not entitled to remain in occupancy of the premises or collect the rents, and that they had breached their contract to support and care for the plaintiffs, appear not to be seriously questioned. The defendants advance two contentions: First, that plaintiffs' sole remedy for defendants' breach of the agreement for support is an action for damages; and, second, that in no event were the plaintiffs entitled to a cancellation of their deed except upon terms and after an accounting between the parties. The defendants rightly assume that this was a continuing contract, entire in its character, and that the plaintiffs were entitled to treat the conduct of defendants as a total breach of the contract giving a right of action in damages for such breach. They deny that plaintiffs are entitled to the alternative remedy of cancellation, claiming that the mere failure by a grantee to perform a promise which forms the consideration for a deed gives no such right.

A right to recover money damages is not always the sole remedy of one aggrieved by the breach of a contract. A right of rescission and restitution may exist as an alternative remedy when the aggrieved party has performed fully or in part, and wishes to recover what he has given or its value. 3 Williston, Contracts, § 1455. Such a right may exist when land has been conveyed and the grantee fails to keep a promise made in consideration of the conveyance. The grantor in such case may get a decree, on such terms as justice may require, for the specific restitution and retransfer of the property, if the circumstances are such that other remedies are inadequate. American Law Institute Restatement Contracts, § 354; 3 Williston, Contracts, § 1456. When the grantee commits a total breach of his contract after the transfer of the land to him, the grantor's remedies by way of specific performance or judgment for the purchase price are ordinarily adequate. There are cases where such remedies are unavailable or inadequate. A...