Carbajal Acevedo v. McCalla

• Decision Date: 27 January 2023
• Docket Number: Civil Action MJM-22-1157
• Parties: JAMIE ALBERTS CARBAJAL ACEVEDO, Plaintiff, v. TRACY ANN MCCALLA, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

JAMIE ALBERTS CARBAJAL ACEVEDO, Plaintiff,
v.
TRACY ANN MCCALLA, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. MJM-22-1157

United States District Court, D. Maryland

January 27, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Matthew J. Maddox, United States Magistrate Judge

Jamie Alberts Carbajal Acevedo (“Plaintiff”) commenced this civil action against Handyman At Your Command LLC (“HAYC”) and Tracy Ann McCalla (“McCalla”) (collectively, “Defendants”) for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (“FLSA” or the “Act”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq.; the Maryland Wage and Hour Law (“MWHL”), Md. Code, Lab. & Empl. §§ 3-415 and 3-427; and the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law (“MWPCL”), Md. Code, Lab. & Empl. §§ 3-505 and 3-507.2.^[1] Currently pending is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or, Alternatively, for Summary Judgment (the “Motion”). (ECF 11). Defendants filed a memorandum in support of the Motion (ECF 11-1) with several exhibits attached (ECF 11-2). Plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to the Motion (ECF 15) and attached several exhibits (ECF 15-1 through 15-6), and Defendants filed a reply memorandum (ECF 16). The Court has reviewed the filings and finds that no hearing is necessary. Loc. R. 105.6. For the reasons stated below, the Motion will be GRANTED, and the Complaint will be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE and with leave to amend.

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I. Background^[2]

Plaintiff, a Maryland resident, alleges that from March 2021 to the end of March 2022, Defendants employed him as a handyman performing various jobs at residences in Maryland, the District of Columbia, and Virginia. (Compl. ¶ 1). McCalla, allegedly “an owner, officer, and/or member of HAYC,” is significantly involved in HAYC's business operations. (Compl. ¶ 2). Specifically, McCalla “is responsible for creating and enforcing HAYC's policies and procedures governing employee pay, compensation and benefits.” (Id.) She “controls the corporate funds.” (Id.) McCalla hired Plaintiff, “set and approved [Plaintiff's] hourly rate[,]” and “had authority to . . . fire and discipline Plaintiff[.]” (Id.) McCalla “supervised Plaintiff, made Plaintiff's schedule and sent Plaintiff to various job sites to perform his handyman work.” (Id.) She “maintained Plaintiff's employment records in the corporate offices of HAYC which are located in her home.” (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that “[d]uring the one-year timeframe when Plaintiff performed work for the Defendants, his hours fluctuated.” (Compl. ¶ 5). Plaintiff “typically worked between 35 and 50 hours per week and sometimes he worked more.” (Compl. ¶ 5). “Defendants paid Plaintiff an hourly wage of $40 per hour for all of his work hours.” (Compl. ¶ 6). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants misclassified him as an independent contractor, “made no withholdings from his pay and failed to pay him for overtime.” (Compl. ¶ 6). Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants did not pay him for all of his work hours and “deducted $600 from his paycheck due to a leak from a dishwasher.” (Compl. ¶¶ 6, 7).

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The Complaint contains three counts:

(1) Count I: Violations of the FLSA, pursuant to 29 U.S.C §§ 201 - 216(b)

(2) Count II: Violations of the MWHL, pursuant to Md. Code, Lab. & Empl. § 3-420; and

(3) Count III: Violations of the MWPCL, pursuant to Md. Code, Lab. & Empl. §§ 3-501 -3-507.2.

(Compl.). Plaintiff seeks unpaid wages, liquidated damages, and award of attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to the FLSA, MWHL, and MWPCL. (Id. at 6-7).

Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or, alternatively, for Summary Judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on all three counts on the ground that Plaintiff was not an employee within the meaning of the FLSA, MWHL, or MWPCL, and therefore not entitled to the relief he seeks under those statutes. (ECF 11-1).

II. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion

A. Legal Standard

Under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). This rule is to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) constitutes an assertion by a defendant that, even if the facts alleged by a plaintiff are true, the complaint fails as a matter of law “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead enough factual allegations “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. A claim satisfies the facial plausibility standard when the plaintiff pleads sufficient factual content to permit a reasonable inference that “the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged” and the

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plaintiff is “entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A complaint need not include “detailed factual allegations” to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2). Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Still, it must set forth “enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest” a cognizable cause of action, “even if ... [the] actual proof of those facts is improbable and . . . recovery is very remote and unlikely.” Id. at 556 (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, federal pleading rules “do not countenance dismissal of a complaint for imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted.” Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. 10, 11 (2014) (per curiam). However, “a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action's elements will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted). A complaint must contain factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level[,]” id., and “tender[ing] ‘naked assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual enhancement'” does not suffice, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to “test the sufficiency of a complaint,” not to “resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.” King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999)). Thus, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court must take the factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Id. at 212. At the same time, “a court is not required to accept legal conclusions drawn from the facts.” Retfalvi v. United States, 930 F.3d 600, 605 (4th Cir. 2019) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). “A court decides whether [the pleading] standard is met by separating the legal conclusions from the factual allegations, assuming the truth of only the factual allegations, and then determining whether those allegations allow the court to reasonably infer”

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the defendant's liability for the alleged wrong and the plaintiff's entitlement to the remedy sought. A Society Without a Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 346 (4th. Cir. 2011). Moreover, a plaintiff cannot cure the deficiencies in a complaint by way of a memorandum in opposition to a motion to dismiss. See Mylan Laboratories, Inc. v. Akzo, 770 F.Supp. 1053, 1068 (D. Md. 1991), aff'd, 2 F.3d 56 (4th Cir. 1993); Zachair Ltd. v. Driggs, 965 F.Supp. 741, 748 n.4 (D. Md. 1997), aff'd, 141 F.3d 1162 (4th Cir. 1998).

B. The FLSA Count

The FLSA was enacted to protect “the rights of those who toil, of those who sacrifice a full measure of their freedom and talents to the use and profit of others.” Schultz v. Cap. Int'l Sec., Inc., 466 F.3d 298, 304 (4th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). “[B]ecause the Act is remedial and humanitarian in purpose, it should be broadly interpreted and applied to effectuate its goals.” Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). “The two central themes of the FLSA are its minimum wage and overtime requirements.” Monahan v. Cnty. of Chesterfield, Va., 95 F.3d 1263, 1266 (4th Cir. 1996). The Act requires that employers pay employees the minimum hourly wage “for all hours worked.” Harbourt v. PPE Casino Resorts Md., LLC, 820 F.3d 655, 658 (4th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). Additionally, employers must pay each employee “at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate” for each hour worked in excess of forty per work week. Schultz, 466 F.3d at 304 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a)(1), 207(a)(1)). The FLSA provides a right of action for employees to recover unpaid wages (including unpaid overtime compensation), liquidated damages, and reasonable attorneys' fees and costs from employers who fail to comply with the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). In this respect, the FLSA protects employees but does not protect independent contractors. Schultz, 466 F.3d at 305.

An “employee” is defined in the FLSA as “any individual employed by an employer,” and

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an “employer” includes “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.” Id. at 304 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(d), 203(e)(1)). The verb “employ” is defined “expansively to mean ‘suffer or permit to work.'” Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 203(g)). These definitions broaden “the meaning of ‘employee' to cover some [workers] who might not qualify as such under a strict application of traditional agency [or contract] law principles.” Schultz, 466 F.3d at 304 (citation omitted).

The FLSA “conditions liability on the existence of an employer-employee relationship, and the employee bears the burden of alleging...