Carcia Sanchez v. Roman Abreu

• Decision Date: 10 July 2003
• Docket Number: Civil No. 01-1543(JAG).
• Citation: 270 F.Supp.2d 255
• Parties: Rafael GARCIA SANCHEZ, et als., Plaintiff, v. Jose R. ROMAN ABREU, et als., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

270 F.Supp.2d 255

Rafael GARCIA SANCHEZ, et als., Plaintiff, v.Jose R. ROMAN ABREU, et als., Defendants.

Civil No. 01-1543(JAG).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

July 10, 2003.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Pablo Landrau-Pirazzi, Ivan M. Castro-Ortiz, Eliezer Aldarondo-Ortiz, Claudio Aliff-Ortiz, Alice M. Velazquez, Aldarondo & Lopez Bras, Hato Rey, PR, for plaintiffs.

Yldefonso Lopez-Morales, Jose J. Sanchez-Velez, O'Neill & Borges, Jose A. Santiago-Rivera, Rafael A. Robles-Diaz, Maria L. Santiago-De-Vidal, Francisco L. Acevedo-Nogueras, San Juan, PR, Ismael Rodriguez-Izquierdo, Santurce, PR, for defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

GARCIA-GREGORY, District Judge.

Plaintiffs, all present or former employees of the Municipality of San Lorenzo, brought suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the First Amendment alleging that the Municipality, the Mayor, Jose R. Roman-Abreu("Roman") and the Director of Public Works, Juan Norat("Norat")(collectively "defendants"), discriminated against them on the basis of their political affiliation by demoting, terminating, or failing to renew their employments.On April 17, 2003, defendants filed a motion for partial summary judgment(DocketNo. 143) seeking the dismissal of the claims by plaintiffsRafael Garcia-Sanchez("Garcia"), Melvin Diaz-Flores("Diaz"), Harvey Lopez-Sanchez("Lopez"), Jose Cruz-Pinero("Cruz"), Enrique Rodriguez-Flores("Rodriguez"), Felicita Gonzalez-Munoz("Gonzalez"), Brenda Flores-Vega("Flores"), Joselito Vazquez-Vazquez("Vazquez"), Reinaldo Maldonado del Valle("Maldonando"), and Santos De Jesus-Rivas("De Jesus")(collectively "plaintiffs").Plaintiffs were transitory employees of the Municipality under Law 52.¹They allege that the defendants failed to renew their contracts based on their political affiliation.

In addition, defendants seek the dismissal of the claims by co-plaintiffAna E. Figueroa("Figueroa"), who they allege was a trust employee such that her employment could be terminated at will.Defendant Norat also seeks the dismissal of all claims against him for lack of personal involvement as required under § 1983.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

The standard for summary judgment is governed by Fed.R.Civ.P. 56.The court should grant summary judgment only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c);seeSantiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp.,217 F.3d 46, 52(1st Cir.2000).The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265(1986).A contested fact is "material" when it has the potential to change the outcome of the case.Vega-Rodriguez v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co.,110 F.3d 174, 178(1st Cir.1997).An issue is genuine if a reasonable jury could resolve the dispute for the nonmoving party.Cortes-Irizarry v. Corporatión Insular,111 F.3d 184,187(1st Cir.1997);Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202(1986).

In order to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the party opposing the motion must "present definite, competent evidence to rebut the motion."Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez,23 F.3d 576, 581(1st Cir.1994).The non-moving party must show that a trial-worthy issue exists and must point to specific facts that demonstrate the existence of an authentic dispute.Mesnick v. General Elec. Co.,950 F.2d 816, 822(1st Cir.1991)."The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence is insufficient to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment."Anderson,477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.Furthermore, the Court"must view the entire record in the light most hospitable to the party opposing summary judgment, indulging all reasonable inferences in that party's favor."Griggs-Ryan v. Smith,904 F.2d 112,115(1st Cir.1990).Nonetheless, the Court must never "weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter,"Lipsett v. University of P.R.,864 F.2d 881, 895(1st Cir.1988)(quotingAnderson,477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505), and "[n]o credibility assessment may be resolved in favor of the party seeking summary judgment."Woodman v. Haemonetics Corp.,51 F.3d 1087, 1091(1st Cir.1995).The Court may safely ignore "conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation."Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,896 F.2d 5, 8(1st Cir.1990)."If, after this canvassing of the material presented, the district court finds that some genuine factual issue remains in the case, whose resolution one way or another could affect its outcome, the court must deny the motion."Lipsett,864 F.2d at 895.

A.Local Rule 311.12

In order to aid the court in the daunting task of searching for genuine issues of material fact in the record, this district has adopted Local Rule 311.12.See, e.g., Corrada Betances v. Sea-Land Service, Inc.,248 F.3d 40, 43-44(1st Cir.2001);Morales v. Orsleffs EFTF,246 F.3d 32, 33-35(1st Cir.2001);Ruiz Rivera v. Riley,209 F.3d 24, 27-28(1st Cir.2000).This rule requires that a party moving for summary judgment submit, in support of its motion, "a separate, short concise statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue to be tried and the basis for such contention as to each material fact, properly supported by specific reference to the record."D.P.R.R. 311.12.The rule also provides that these facts shall be admitted "unless controverted by the statement served by the opposing party."Id,

Compliance with Rule 311.12 is critical, given that the Court will only consider the facts alleged in the parties' 311.12 statements when entertaining the movant's arguments.SeeRivera de Torres v. Telefonica de Puerto Rico,913 F.Supp. 81(D.P.R.1995).Here, defendants properly submitted a statement of uncontested facts (SeeDocketNo. 143).Plaintiffs, however, have blatantly ignored the mandates of Local Rule 311.12 stating they"deem it unnecessary to set forth their own statement of uncontested facts."The Court is confounded that plaintiffs would not find it imperative to submit their own statement of contested facts in accordance to the local rule when the burden is on them to prove a political discrimination claim.Plaintiffs cannot dispense with the requirements of the rule by stating general objections to defendants' proposed facts.

Instead of filing their own statement of contested facts to preclude summary judgment, plaintiffs' filed a document entitled Answer to defendants' statement of uncontested facts in support of their motion for summary judgment, and plaintiffs' statement of uncontested facts in support of their opposition thereto(DocketNo. 150).The same simply enumerates the defendants' facts and states plaintiffs accordance or disagreement thereto.Plaintiffs object to only twelve of the sixty-five statements of fact submitted by defendants, merely by stating that the evidence proffered by defendants, mostly deposition testimony, does not support the statement (SeeDocketNo. 150 at ¶ 9, 17, 18, 22, 25, 26, 37, 39, 47, 63, 64, and 65).Plaintiffs, however, fail to make any references to the record or point out conflicting testimony.They rather allege, in a conclusory manner, that defendants are misstating the evidence.

The First Circuit has encouraged district courts to adopt anti-ferreting rules to warn parties opposing summary judgment that, to preclude judgment as a matter of law, they must identify factual issues buttressed by record citations.Rivera Velez v. Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority,170 F.Supp.2d 158(D.P.R.2001)(citingStepanischen v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Corp.,722 F.2d 922, 927(1st Cir.1983))."The anti-ferret rules serves one crucial purpose.It lays out the material facts in dispute clearly for a district court that is swamped with an overwhelming number of civil and criminal dispositive motions."Dominguez v. Eli Lilly and Co.,958 F.Supp. 721, 727(D.P.R.1997).

Plaintiffs cannot expect the Court to "ferret through the record, read all the answers to interrogatories, study all the attached documents and carefully scrutinize all the depositions for lurking genuine issues of material fact."Id.It is wellestablished that "a list of facts with no specific references to the record is of no use to the Court."Hogar Club Paraiso, Inc. v. Varela Llavona,208 F.R.D. 481, 482(D.P.R.2002)."Forgiving plaintiffs noncompliance with the local rule would undercut out efforts over the years to enlist counsel as aides to the court."Morales,246 F.3d at 35.

Plaintiffs have ignored Rule 311.12 at their own peril, Hogar Club Paraiso,208 F.R.D. at 482(citingRivera Velez,170 F.Supp.2d at 162), and their failure to comply can be grounds for judgment against them.Nieves Ayala v. Johnson & Johnson,208 F.Supp.2d 195, 198(D.P.R.2002);Morales,246 F.3d at 33;Stepanischen,722 F.2d at 931.Accordingly, the Court hereby admits all the facts, submitted by defendants, which have been adequately supported by references to the record as follows.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On November 7, 2000, following the general elections in Puerto Rico, the Popular Democratic Party("PDP") candidate for Mayor of the Municipality of San Lorenzo, Jose R. Roman-Abreu("Roman-Abreu") defeated incumbent Mayor, Victor Figueroa Orozco("Figueroa-Orozco") who was affiliated to the New Progressive Party("NPP").On January 9, 2001, Roman-Abreu took office as Mayor of the Municipality of San Lorenzo.

Since the enactment of the Employment Opportunities Development Fund created by Section 2 of LawNo. 52 of August 9, 1991, 20 P.R. Laws Ann. 711(c)(hereinafter "Law 52"), the Municipality of San Lorenzo has applied for and...