Carcieri v. Salazar
| Decision Date | 24 February 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 07–526.,07–526. |
| Citation | 555 U.S. 379,77 USLW 4113,129 S.Ct. 1058,172 L.Ed.2d 791 |
| Parties | Donald L. CARCIERI, Governor of Rhode Island, et al., Petitioners, v. Ken L. SALAZAR, Secretary of the Interior, et al. |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
The Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), enacted in 1934, authorizes the Secretary of the Interior, a respondent here, to acquire land and hold it in trust “for the purpose of providing land for Indians,” 25 U.S.C. § 465, and defines “Indian” to “include all persons of Indian descent who are members of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction,” § 479. The Narragansett Tribe was placed under the Colony of Rhode Island's formal guardianship in 1709. It agreed to relinquish its tribal authority and sell all but two acres of its remaining reservation land in 1880, but then began trying to regain its land and tribal status. From 1927 to 1937, federal authorities declined to give it assistance because they considered the Tribe to be under state, not federal jurisdiction. In a 1978 agreement settling a dispute between the Tribe and Rhode Island, the Tribe received title to 1,800 acres of land in petitioner Charlestown in exchange for relinquishing claims to state land based on aboriginal title; and it agreed that the land would be subject to state law. The Tribe gained formal recognition from the Federal Government in 1983, and the Secretary of the Interior accepted a deed of trust to the 1,800 acres in 1988. Subsequently, a dispute arose over whether the Tribe's plans to build housing on an additional 31 acres of land it had purchased complied with local regulations. While litigation was pending, the Secretary accepted the 31–acre parcel into trust. The Interior Board of Indian Appeals upheld that decision, and petitioners sought review. The District Court granted summary judgment to the Secretary and other officials, determining that § 479's plain language defines “Indian” to include members of all tribes in existence in 1934, but does not require a tribe to have been federally recognized on that date; and concluding that, since the Tribe is currently federally recognized and was in existence in 1934, it is a tribe under § 479. In affirming, the First Circuit found § 479 ambiguous as to the meaning of “now under Federal jurisdiction,” applied the principles of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694, and deferred to the Secretary's construction of the provision to allow the land to be taken into trust.
Held: Because the term “now under federal jurisdiction” in § 479 unambiguously refers to those tribes that were under federal jurisdiction when the IRA was enacted in 1934, and because the Narragansett Tribe was not under federal jurisdiction in 1934, the Secretary does not have the authority to take the 31–acre parcel into trust. Pp. 1063 – 1068.
(a) When a statute's text is plain and unambiguous, United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 4, 117 S.Ct. 1032, 137 L.Ed.2d 132, the statute must be applied according to its terms, see, e.g.,Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 359, 125 S.Ct. 2478, 162 L.Ed.2d 343. Here, whether the Secretary has authority to take the parcel into trust depends on whether the Narragansetts are members of a “recognized Indian Tribe now under Federal jurisdiction,” which, in turn, depends on whether “now” refers to 1998, when the Secretary accepted the parcel into trust, or 1934, when Congress enacted the IRA. The ordinary meaning of “now,” as understood at the time of enactment, was at “the present time; at this moment; at the time of speaking.” That definition is consistent with interpretations given “now” by this Court both before and after the IRA's passage. See e.g., Franklin v. United States, 216 U.S. 559, 569, 30 S.Ct. 434, 54 L.Ed. 615;Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308, 310–311, 81 S.Ct. 1336, 6 L.Ed.2d 313. It also aligns with the word's natural reading in the context of the IRA. Furthermore, the Secretary's current interpretation is at odds with the Executive Branch's construction of § 479 at the time of enactment. The Secretary's additional arguments in support of his contention that “now” is ambiguous are unpersuasive. There is also no need to consider the parties' competing views on whether Congress had a policy justification for limiting the Secretary's trust authority to tribes under federal jurisdiction in 1934, since Congress' use of “now” in § 479 speaks for itself and “courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.” Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–254, 112 S.Ct. 1146, 117 L.Ed.2d 391. Pp. 1067 – 1068.
(b) The Court rejects alternative arguments by the Secretary and his amici that rely on statutory provisions other than § 479 to support the Secretary's decision to take the parcel into trust for the Narragansetts. Pp. 13–15.
497 F.3d 15, reversed.
Theodore B. Olson, Washington, D.C., for petitioners.
Deanne E. Maynard, Washington, D.C., for respondents.
Claire Richards, Special Counsel, Providence, RI, Theodore B. Olson, Counsel of Record, Matthew D. McGill, Amir C. Tayrani, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Washington, D.C., for Petitioner Donald L. Carcieri.
Patrick C. Lynch, Attorney General, Neil F.X. Kelly, Counsel of Record, Assistant Attorney General, Providence, RI, for Petitioner State of Rhode Island.
Joseph S. Larisa, Jr., Assistant Solicitor for Indian Affairs, Town of Charlestown, Providence, RI, for Petitioner Town of Charlestown, Rhode Island.
Gregory G. Garre, Acting Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, Ronald J. Tenpas, Assistant Attorney General, Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Deanne E. Maynard, Assistant to the Solicitor General, William B. Lazarus, Elizabeth Ann Peterson, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for respondents.
The Indian Reorganization Act (IRA or Act) authorizes the Secretary of the Interior, a respondent in this case, to acquire land and hold it in trust “ for the purpose of providing land for Indians.” § 5, 48 Stat. 985, 25 U.S.C. § 465. The IRA defines the term “Indian” to “include all persons of Indian descent who are members of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction.” § 479. The Secretary notified petitioners—the State of Rhode Island, its Governor, and the town of Charlestown, Rhode Island—that he intended to accept in trust a parcel of land for use by the Narragansett Indian Tribe in accordance with his claimed authority under the statute. In proceedings before the Interior Board of Indian Appeals (IBIA), the District Court, and the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, petitioners unsuccessfully challenged the Secretary's authority to take the parcel into trust.
In reviewing the determination of the Court of Appeals, we are asked to interpret the statutory phrase “now under Federal jurisdiction” in § 479. Petitioners contend that the term “now” refers to the time of the statute's enactment, and permits the Secretary to take land into trust for members of recognized tribes that were “under Federal jurisdiction” in 1934. The respondents argue that the word “now” is an ambiguous term that can reasonably be construed to authorize the Secretary to take land into trust for members of tribes that are “under Federal jurisdiction” at the time that the land is accepted into trust.
We agree with petitioners and hold that, for purposes of § 479, the phrase “now under Federal jurisdiction” refers to a tribe that was under federal jurisdiction at the time of the statute's enactment. As a result, § 479 limits the Secretary's authority to taking land into trust for the purpose of providing land to members of a tribe that was under federal jurisdiction when the IRA was enacted in June 1934. Because the record in this case establishes that the Narragansett Tribe was not under federal jurisdiction when the IRA was enacted, the Secretary does not have the authority to take the parcel at issue into trust. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
At the time of colonial settlement, the Narragansett Indian Tribe was the indigenous occupant of much of what is now the State of Rhode Island. See Final Determination for Federal Acknowledgement of Narragansett Indian Tribe of Rhode Island, 48 Fed.Reg. 6177 (1983) (hereinafter Final Determination). Initial relations between colonial settlers, the Narragansett Tribe, and the other Indian tribes in the region were peaceful, but relations deteriorated in the late 17th century. The hostilities peaked in 1675 and 1676 during the 2–year armed conflict known as King Philip's War. Hundreds of colonists and thousands of Indians died. See E. Schultz & M. Tougias, King Philip's War 5 (1999). The Narragansett Tribe, having been decimated, was placed under formal guardianship by the Colony of Rhode Island in 1709. 48 Fed.Reg. 6177.1
Not quite two centuries later, in 1880, the State of Rhode Island convinced the Narragansett Tribe to relinquish its tribal authority as part of an effort to assimilate tribal members into the local population. See Narragansett Indian Tribe v. National Indian Gaming Comm'n, 158 F.3d 1335, 1336 (C.A.D.C.1998). The Tribe also agreed to sell all but two acres of its remaining reservation land for $5,000. Ibid. Almost immediately, the Tribe regretted its decisions and embarked on a campaign to regain its land and tribal status. Ibid. In the early 20th century, members of the Tribe sought economic support and other assistance from the...
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