Card v. Miami-Dade County Florida

• Decision Date: 29 May 2001
• Docket Number: No. 98-0009-CIV.,98-0009-CIV.
• Citation: 147 F.Supp.2d 1334
• Parties: Forest CARD Plaintiff v. MIAMI-DADE COUNTY FLORIDA Defendant
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

147 F.Supp.2d 1334

Forest CARD Plaintiff v. MIAMI-DADE COUNTY FLORIDA Defendant

No. 98-0009-CIV.

United States District Court, S.D. Florida, Miami Division.

May 29, 2001.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Jeffrey Norkin, Miami, FL, for plaintiff.

Jason Bloch, Stephen P. Clark, Miami, FL, for defendant.

ORDER GRANTING MIAMI-DADE COUNTY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

JORDAN, District Judge.

Forest Card sues Miami-Dade County for common law false imprisonment and violation of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleges that, after his arrest in 1993 for reckless driving while under the influence of alcohol, he languished in jail for 27 days waiting for a court-ordered psychological evaluation that was never performed. He further contends that his continued detention was caused by the County's lack of a policy or procedure to ensure timely psychological evaluations for inmates in its custody. Federal jurisdiction exists pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 & 1367.

The County has moved for summary judgment on both claims. Mr. Card, in turn, has filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment on liability. Because no reasonable jury could find that the County was deliberately indifferent to Mr. Card's constitutional rights, or that the County falsely imprisoned Mr. Card, the County is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the County's motion for summary judgment [D.E. 91] is GRANTED, and Mr. Card's cross-motion [D.E. 88] is DENIED.¹

I. RELEVANT STANDARD

Summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A material fact is one that might affect the outcome of the case. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Where the non-moving party fails to prove an essential element of its case for which it has the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is warranted. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Hilburn v. Murata Elecs. North Am., Inc., 181 F.3d 1220, 1225 (11th Cir.1999).

II. RELEVANT FACTS

On December 20, 1993, Mr. Card was arrested in Miami-Dade County by a City of Miami police officer for reckless driving while under the influence of alcohol. See Arrest Form [D.E. 90, Exh B] (Dec. 20, 1993). Mr. Card's blood alcohol level was within the legal limits at .040 and .042 on a breathalyser test administered by the Miami Police Department. See Breath Test Result Affidavit [D.E. 90, Exh. C] (Dec. 20, 1993). Mr. Card was subsequently processed by the County Department of Corrections into a jail facility. See Jail Booking Record at 1 [D.E. 90, Exh. D] (Dec. 20, 1993).

A. MR. CARD'S MEDICAL SCREENING AND INITIAL APPEARANCE

As part of the routine intake procedure, the County conducted a medical screening of Mr. Card. See Medical History and Physical Assessment [D.E. 90, Exh. E] (Dec. 20, 1993). The County contends, and some documents indicate, that Mr. Card was voicing suicidal thoughts, and was therefore placed in protective custody. See id.; Progress Record [D.E. 92, Exh. D] (Dec. 20, 1993); Affidavit of Kim Smith ¶ 2 [D.E. 101] (August 17, 2000). Mr. Card disputes this contention, asserting that he had no suicidal thoughts, much less voiced any in the medical screening. See Deposition of Forest Card at 33-34 [D.E. 36, Exh. 1] (July 22, 1998). In any event, the County placed Mr. Card on suicide watch. See County's Statement of Facts ¶ 5 [D.E. 93] (July 14, 2000).

Bond was set at a hearing on December 21, 1993, but Mr. Card was unable to post it. According to court records, Judge Pineiro appointed a public defender to represent Mr. Card. The public defender demanded discovery on behalf of Mr. Card and requested a jury trial. See Appendix [D.E. 69, Exh. D] (Dec. 21, 1993). Mr. Card, though, maintains that he never went before Judge Pineiro and was not provided with counsel at that time. See Card Deposition at 37, 42, 105. Two additional charges—failure to sign a summons and drunk and disorderly conduct—were filed against Mr. Card on December 23, 1993, and were both dismissed for time served the following day. See Plaintiff's Statement of Facts ¶ 5 [D.E. 89] (Jul. 14, 2000).

B. THE ORDER FOR A PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION

On December 29, 1993, Mr. Card appeared before Judge Deehl, who set the case for trial, and ordered Mr. Card released on his own recognizance. See id. ¶ 6. An unidentified party, however, moved for a psychiatric evaluation of Mr. Card. See id. Without holding a hearing on this request, Judge Deehl ordered that Mr. Card be detained pending an inpatient psychiatric evaluation, which was to be arranged immediately. The examination, pursuant to Judge Deehl's order, was to take place at the County jail or at Jackson Memorial Hospital ("JMH"), "within the discretion" of JMH's staff doctors.² The sheriff was ordered to produce Mr. Card for the evaluation, and following the evaluation, JMH's staff doctors were to submit a report. Judge Deehl's evaluation order indicates at the bottom that copies of the order were sent to the Department of Corrections, JMH, and the staff doctors. See Order for Psychiatric Evaluation [D.E. 90, Exh. F] (Dec. 29, 1993). The booking records from the Department of Corrections contain an entry for Judge Deehl's December 29, 1993, order, together with the phrase "ROR" (released on own recognizance), thereby indicating that the Department was aware of the order. See Jail Booking Record at 1.

The County contends that Mr. Card was found to be competent in a psychiatric examination conducted two weeks later, on January 12, 1994. See Evaluation [D.E. 90, Exh. K] (Jan. 12, 1994). Mr. Card, on the other hand, maintains that no medical examination was ever conducted. See Card Deposition at 84. While he was in custody, Mr. Card did not file any grievances or lodge any complaints concerning his continued detention. See id. at 92-94. Nor, apparently, did his public defender.

On January 24, 1994, Judge Deehl signed an order for Mr. Card's immediate release, and Mr. Card was released the following day. The charges against Mr. Card were nolle prossed by the state attorney in 1996.

C. THE ROLE OF MENTAL HEALTH ADMINISTRATOR'S OFFICE

Bertha Borge, the Assistant Director of the Mental Health Administrator's Office for Florida's Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court, testified that her office is responsible for coordinating psychiatric evaluations of pre-trial detainees such as Mr. Card. See Affidavit of Bertha Borge ¶¶ 1-2 [D.E. 92, Exh. H] (July 17, 2000). According to Ms. Borge, her office contacts JMH, which assigns the case to a staff doctor, who then individually schedules an evaluation. See id. ¶ 3. Ms. Borge says that the County Department of Corrections has no role in scheduling such evaluations and is only responsible for facilitating the evaluations by making the detainee available. See id. In Ms. Borge's view, the lag between the December 29, 1993, order and the January 12, 1994, evaluation of Mr. Card was not unreasonable. See id. ¶ 5.

D. THE POSITION OF THE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

Ronald Kovacs, the Chief of Special Services for the County Department of Corrections, testified that the Department has no control over the provision of court-ordered psychiatric evaluations. See Deposition of Ronald Kovacs at 4 [D.E. 90, Exh. J] (July 5, 2000). John Gagliardi, a Miami-Dade Corrections Captain and Bureau Supervisor, also testified that the Department is not responsible for ensuring that court-ordered psychiatric evaluations are carried out. See Deposition of John Gagliardi at 3, 9 [D.E. 90, Exh. I] (July 5, 2000). Captain Gagliardi, answering a hypothetical question, agreed that it would not be the Department's responsibility if a court-ordered evaluation that was supposed to be performed within five days was not performed for two years. See id. at 10.

III. THE CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIM

Mr. Card asserts that the County is responsible for his continued detention which violated his constitutional rights under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Mr. Card alleges that his rights were violated by the 27-day detention pending the psychiatric evaluation, as well as the one-day delay in processing his release. Mr. Card points out that Judge Deehl ordered his evaluation to take place "immediately," and that the County should have, at a minimum, complied with Florida's involuntary commitment provisions.

Because I find that Mr. Card's constitutional rights were violated, if at all, by the 27-day detention, that is the focus of my analysis. Mr. Card's claim that the one-day delay in processing his release amounts to a due process violation is simply not colorable. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979) (finding that three-day detention due to mistaken identification was not unconstitutional).

The County seeks summary judgment on Mr. Card's civil rights claim. First, the County argues that Mr. Card's constitutional rights were not violated, and that even if they were, it was not the County which violated them. Second, the County asserts that it was not acting pursuant to an official policy or custom, and therefore municipal liability cannot be imposed under § 1983.

As the County correctly points out, the rights of pre-trial detainees are properly evaluated under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Fourth or Eighth Amendments. See City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244, 103 S.Ct. 2979, 77 L.Ed.2d 605 (1983); Lancaster v. Monroe County, 116 F.3d 1419, 1425 n. 6 (11th Cir.1997); Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190, 192-93 (7th Cir.1989). To impose liability on the County for failing to act to...