Card v. Nickerson
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
| Writing for the Court | Before MERRILL; FELLOWS; WEBBER |
| Citation | Card v. Nickerson, 104 A.2d 427, 150 Me. 89 (Me. 1954) |
| Decision Date | 19 March 1954 |
| Parties | CARD v. NICKERSON. |
John G. Marshall, Auburn, for plaintiff.
Frank W. Linnell, Auburn, for defendant.
Before MERRILL, C. J., and THAXTER, FELLOWS, WILLIAMSON and TIRRELL, JJ.
This is an action on the case brought in the Superior Court for Androscoggin County, for damages caused by the obstruction by defendant of a water course, where water flowed from the plaintiff's property in Auburn to and through the adjoining property of the defendant and thence by pond and brook into the Little Androscoggin River. The case comes to the Law Court on defendant's exceptions.
The record shows, and the jury might property find, that the plaintiff Bertron L. Card acquired his property in 1919, and that the defendant Elmer Nickerson purchased a portion of his premises in 1937, and then purchased of the plaintiff the remainder in 1949.
The purchase of the lot by the defendant of the plaintiff was made by exchange of deeds. The defendant at the same time sold to the plaintiff, (or exchanged) another lot in another location. The defendant testified that he bought the land from plaintiff 'to straighten out my line'. The deed was made by the attorney for the defendant.
The natural water course existed on plaintiff's and defendant's land wherein the water flowed in a particular direction by a regular channel, having a bed with banks and sides. It had a well defined and substantial existence from within the plaintiff's property through the defendant's property and was rarely, if ever dry. It discharged itself into other bodies of water on its way to the river.
On that portion of the defendant's property which he had purchased from the plaintiff, the defendant constructed a long dam or fill. This dike or obstruction was started by defendant in 1951 and (according to the defendant's testimony) intended to be permanent. It is 132 feet long and is of rock, telephone poles, gravel and loam. It is about 6 feet high and has at one point a twelve inch drain pipe through it to permit the passing of water, although the drain pipe proved to be very inadequate.
This dam or fill constructed by the defendant causes the water to back up and to overflow the plaintiff's land, which land is slightly higher than the defendant's land. The resulting damage was injury to a natural fresh water spring on the plaintiff's property. Water also covered plaintiff's cess pool, which cess pool was connected with plaintiff's cellar, and water was forced into the plaintiff's cellar, with a total loss to valuable personal property stored in the cellar.
The jury had the benefit of a view, and were instructed that if the verdict was for the plaintiff, the verdict should state whether or not an award was made on the basis of temporary injury or a permanent injury to the plaintiff's property. The verdict stated that the finding was for a permanent injury and assessed damages in the sum of $1,500.
During the trial the defendant took exceptions to the above portion of the charge and to certain rulings by the Presiding Justice, and the case is before the Law Court on these exceptions
There is a public or natural right in and to a water course which belongs to all persons whose lands are benefited by it, and it cannot be stopped up, or diverted, to the injury of other proprietors. To constitute a water course as defined by the law, it must appear that the water in it usually flows in a particular direction by a regular channel having a bed with banks and sides, and usually discharging itself into some other body or stream of water. It must have a well defined and substantial existence but need not flow continuously or never be dry. Goodwin v. Texas Co. (Stewart v. Texas Co.), 133 Me. 260, 176 A. 873, Goodwin v. Texas Co. (Stewart v. Texas Co.), 134 Me. 266, 185 A. 695; Morrison v. Bucksport & Bangor R. Co., 67 Me. 353: 56 Am.Jurisprudence, 'Waters,' 495, Sec. 6. See also for discussion of rules regarding riparian rights, Kennebunk, Kennebunkport and Wells Water District v. Turnpike Authority, 145 Me. 35, 71 A.2d 520, Id., 147 Me. 149, 84 A.2d 433. See also In re Opinions of the Justices, 118 Me. 503, 106 A. 865. Equity may enjoin obstruction in proper case. Lockwood Co. v. Lawrence, 77 Me. 297; Wilson & Son v. Harrisburg, 107 Me. 207, 77 A. 787; Warren v. Westbrook Mfg. Co., 88 Me. 58, 33 A. 665, 35 L.R.A. 388.
In the second case above cited, of Goodwin v. Texas Co. (Stewart v. Texas Co.) 134 Me. 266, 185 A. 695, it is held that there can be no recovery for permanent damage in an action on the case for the obstruction of a water course, because successive suits may be brought. Evidence of permanent injury is not admissible. Damages are recoverable only to the date of the writ. See also Cumberland & O. Canal Corp. v. Hitchings, 65 Me. 140, and Caron v. Margolin, 128 Me. 339, 147 A. 419 where many cases are cited.
Where the description in a deed of the premises intended to be conveyed is clear and free from ambiguity, it cannot be varied, controlled or contradicted by parol or extrinsic evidence. In such a case, the deed must be held to be conclusive evidence as to what land and what rights in and to land are intended by the grantor to be conveyed, the quantity of land, and the intention of the grantor to include or exclude from the instrument particular land or particular rights in land. Lincoln v. Avery, 10 Me. 418, Bartlett v. Corliss, 63 Me. 287, Wellington v. Murdough, 41 Me, 281, Lothrop v. Foster, 51 Me. 367, Pelletier v. Langlois, 130 Me. 486, 157 A. 577. See Chandler v. McCard, 38 Me. 564 holding that acts and declarations of the parties 'are not sufficient to destroy or vary their legal rights as exhibited by the deed'.
It is an established principle, that parol evidence is inadmissible to explain, enlarge, vary or control a written instrument. Every one must be sensible of the danger of controlling written evidence, which is immutable, by that which depends upon memory, and which may be materially varied by the addition, omission, or even transposition of a single word. This principle is applicable to all written contracts, but especially to those by which real estate is conveyed.
If the defendant could avail himself of parol evidence, he could prove title, not by deed or any instrument in writing, but by parol; and if he could hold a particular tract by parol, he might hold any other tract, directly in the teeth of the statutes, that direct the mode of transferring real estate by deed. The admission of such evidence to explain and vary the deed, and establish title, would shake the security of all the real property in the State, and overturn a sound principle of evidence. Lincoln v. Avery, 10 Me. 418.
In an action at law parol evidence is not admissible to show that a deed was intended to be a mortgage. Reed v. Reed, 71 Me. 156. See Brown v. Thurston, 56 Me. 126, holding that at common law parol reservation of crops inadmissible. 'If the agreement was before the execution and delivery of the deed it is merged in the final determination as evidenced by the deed'.
Brown v. Allen, 43 Me. 590. 'Where a tract of land is granted in clear and unmistakable terms, the grantor, and those claiming under him, are estopped to say in a court of law, that the land thus described in the deed was inserted by mistake, and parol evidence is inadmissible to show that another piece of land was intended to be conveyed'. Which case also holds that mistakes or errors can be corrected if at all only in...
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Gosselin v. Better Homes, Inc.
...or to subtract from or add to, the language of written instruments. Norton v. Benjamin, 1966, Me., 220 A.2d 248; Card v. Nickerson, 1954, 150 Me. 89, 104 A.2d 427; Spaulding v. American Realty Co., 1922, 121 Me. 493, 118 A. 322; Bryant v. Mansfield, 1843, 22 Me. 360. The parol evidence rule......
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Pettengill v. Turo
...the obstruction of the natural flow of surface water, one act of the defendant (obstructing a water course) actionable, Card v. Nickerson, 150 Me. 89, 104 A.2d 427, and the other (obstructing flow of surface water) nonactionable, Morrison v. Bucksport & Bangor Railroad Company, 67 Me. 353, ......
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Everett v. Rand
...or writings so adopted.' Restatement, Contracts, Secs. 228, 232. The parol evidence rule therefore became applicable. Card v. Nickerson, 150 Me. 89, 104 A.2d 427; Bartlett v. Newton, 148 Me. 279, 92 A.2d 611; Hoyt v. Tapley, 121 Me. 239, 116 A. 559; 32 C.J.S., Evidence 901, 959, at page 896......
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Maddocks v. Giles
...be dry. It need not flow continuously; but it must have a well defined and substantial existence. Id.; see also Card v. Nickerson, 150 Me. 89, 91, 104 A.2d 427, 429 (1954); Johnson v. Whitten, 384 A.2d 698, 701 (Me.1978). [¶ 7] The absolute dominion rule is now the minority rule in the Unit......