Cardenas Et Ux. v. Ortiz.

• Decision Date: 21 April 1924
• Docket Number: No. 2806.,2806.
• Citation: 226 P. 418,29 N.M. 633
• Parties: CARDENAS ET UX.v.ORTIZ.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

29 N.M. 633

226 P. 418

CARDENAS ET UX.

v.ORTIZ.

No. 2806.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

April 21, 1924.

Syllabus by the Court.

In a case brought by persons aged, infirm, and mentally weak, to cancel a deed because procured without consideration and by undue influence, evidence tending to establish ignorance of law is admissible, where the grantee in such deed, while occupying a position of trust and confidence, states and represents that certain illegalities have occurred in the manner of acquiring the land under the provisions of the federal Homestead Laws (U. S. Comp. St. § 4530 et seq.), and that such aged, infirm, and mentally weak persons are liable to lose their entire house and home. Such evidence is not to escape contractual responsibility, but to establish the mental condition brought about in the mind of the person to whom such statements and representations are made.

A person who, while occupying a position of trust and confidence, acquires something of value from the person so trusting and confiding, has the burden of affirmatively showing that the transaction was not the result of undue influence, and that the parties were dealing at arm's length, or that the transaction was fair and had in the utmost good faith, and that it was free from fraud or undue influence.

Where facts and circumstances are proven by substantial evidence, from which an inference, deduction, or conclusion may be and is drawn by the trial court, it will not be disturbed on appeal.

Evidence reviewed, and held to sustain the findings of the lower court that the deed in question was obtained through undue influence.

Appeal from District Court, Colfax County; Leib, Judge.

Action by Encarnacion Cardenas and wife against Gerardo Ortiz. From a decree for plaintiffs, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Person who, while occupying a position of trust and confidence, procures execution of deed, from person so trusting and confiding has burden of affirmatively showing that transaction was not result of undue influence, and that parties were dealing at arm's length or that transaction was fair in utmost good faith, free from fraud or undue influence.

H. A. Kiker and H. L. Bickley, both of Raton, for appellant.

L. S. Wilson, of Raton, for appellees.

BRATTON, J.

The appellees, Encarnacion Cardenas and wife, Paz L. Cardenas, acquired 320 acres of land situated in Colfax county through conveyance to them by a patent from the United States dated August 2d, 1920, pursuant to proof of their compliance with the federal Homestead Laws (U. S. Comp. St. § 4530 et seq.). On March 30, 1920, they conveyed by warranty deed 160 acres of said land to the appellant, Gerardo Ortiz, who is a nephew of the appellee, Paz L. Cardenas. Upon this was situated all of the improvements constituting the dwelling and home of the appellees. This suit was instituted by the appellees to cancel, annul, and set aside said deed upon the theory that it was executed without consideration and that its execution was induced by duress and undue influence, in that the appellant had threatened to report to the federal officials certain irregularities and illegal acts committed in homesteading said land and making final proof thereon, and that thereby he could and would take the entire tract or homestead away from them; that the appellees, being aged, infirm, weak mentally and physically, uneducated, and ignorant of the laws of the United States and of this state, believed such statements to be true, that appellant further told and represented to the appellees that he had and held their certain promissory note in the sum of $800 and that, unless they conveyed to him one-half of said land, he could and would, by virtue of said note, take from them the entire tract; that said note was fraudulent, fictitious, and forged, and that the appellees owed the appellant nothing whatsoever; that the appellees were aged, infirm, weak mentally and physically, and the appellant was their superior mentally, and had for a long time advised them, and that they had great confidence in him, and that he exercised great influence over them; that, by virtue of said statements and representations, the appellees were induced to and did execute and deliver to the appellant the deed in question. As a further element of actionable fraud it was specifically pleaded that the parties agreed that the lands to be so conveyed would not contain the improved or cultivated portions of said tract, but that in violation of said agreement the appellant caused the deed to be prepared conveying to himself all of such improved and cultivated parts thereof.

The appellant answered, denying that the deed was procured by duress or undue influence, or that it was executed without consideration, and affirmatively pleaded that it was executed and delivered to him in settlement and discharge of a promissory note which the appellees owed him.

The trial court made many findings, among them being that all of the material allegations contained in the complaint were true; that both of the appellees are aged persons, unable to read or write either the English or Spanish language, and unable to speak the English language; that they were mentally and physically feeble, and hence easily susceptible to influence; that the appellant is a nephew of the appellee Paz L. Cardenas, about 35 years old, much stronger mentally then either of the appellees, and that for a number of years prior to the execution of said deed the appellees had been accustomed to depend largely upon him for advice, and that by reason of these facts he had thereby acquired a great influence over them; that at the time said deed was executed the land in controversy was worth $2,400; that the appellant had the use of all of said lands 4 years, during which time the rental value of the pasture land was 35 cents per acre per annum, and the rental value of the cultivated land was $2 per acre per annum; that the appellant had put into cultivation about 30 acres of said land, the value of his services therefor being $100; that he had constructed three-fourths of a mile of fence thereon, and the value of his services therefor was $80; that he had erected on said land a small house, the value of his services and the materials furnished therefor being $25; and that by the use of said lands the appellant was fully compensated for all his outlay of said services and materials; that said deed was procured without any consideration whatever; and that its execution was obtained through undue influence. Other specific findings were made adversely to the appellant upon every issue in the case, but we think this statement is sufficient to understand the conclusion we have reached.

A decree was entered, canceling, annulling, and vacating the deed in question, and enjoining appellant from trespassing on said lands or otherwise interfering with the appellees' possession and enjoyment thereof. From this decree the appellant has perfected this appeal.

[1] 1. The first complaint made by the appellant is that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of the appellee Encarnacion Cardenas to the effect that he did not understand the laws of the United States or of this state. It is urged in this connection that ignorance of law affords no escape from a person's contractual obligations, as every person is presumed to know the law. The witness had previously testified that the appellant told him he intended to report to the federal authorities certain irregularities and illegalities in the manner the appellees acquired said land under the homestead laws, and that he, appellant, would thereby take the entire tract from the appellees. Following this, the witness was asked if he knew the law, to which he responded in the negative. Keeping in mind that the theory of the case then being developed was that the deed in question was executed as the result of undue influence, it becomes at once apparent that the testimony complained of was neither tendered nor considered as an escape from the contractual obligations of the appellees, but rather to establish the effect such statements and threats had upon the mind of the witness; that is, to establish fear or undue influence. Certainly such testimony was relevant to show that the witness became uneasy, and feared he might lose his homestead as the result of something illegal in his method of residence, improvement, or final proof. Such mental condition might be produced in the mind of a person unfamiliar with the law, and who might be uncertain concerning whether or not he had complied with its provisions and hence had a good title to his homestead, whereas, the mind of a person who was reasonably familiar with the law applicable, and who firmly believed he had complied with its provisions, would not be calculated to be disturbed by such a threat. To illustrate, had such a statement been made to an experienced attorney at law, he would not be alarmed, but would feel secure in his belief that he had complied with the legal requirements, and that his title could not be disturbed. An entirely different result would easily and naturally be produced in the mind of an ignorant, uneducated person, who could not even speak or read the English language, and who could not read the language of his native tongue, and who knew nothing concerning the laws of the land, and hence did not know whether he had complied with their provisions with respect to his homestead. The testimony was relevant, not to escape contractual liability, but as a circumstance tending to establish the mental condition produced by the threats of the appellant.

[2] 2. The next question which commands our consideration is the appellant's contention that the deed was not executed as the result of undue influence upon either of the appellees. As we...