Cardenas v. Wigen

• Decision Date: 08 April 1996
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 95-3917,95-3500 and 95-3202.
• Citation: 921 F. Supp. 286
• Parties: Jose Labrador CARDENAS, Petitioner, v. George C. WIGEN, Respondent. Arquimedes PEREZ, Petitioner, v. George C. WIGEN, Respondent. Adolfo R. MARTINEZ, Petitioner, v. George C. WIGEN, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

921 F. Supp. 286

Jose Labrador CARDENAS, Petitioner, v. George C. WIGEN, Respondent.

Arquimedes PEREZ, Petitioner, v. George C. WIGEN, Respondent.

Adolfo R. MARTINEZ, Petitioner, v. George C. WIGEN, Respondent.

Civil Action Nos. 95-3917, 95-3500 and 95-3202.

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

April 8, 1996.

Jose Labrador Cardenas, F.C.I. Schyulkill, Minersville, PA, Pro Se.

Brian Carroll, U.S. Attorney's Office, Philadelphia, PA, for George C. Wigen in No. 95-3917.

Arquimedes Perez, F.C.I. Schyulkill, Minersville, PA, Pro Se.

Brian Carroll, U.S. Attorney's Office, Philadelphia, PA, James G. Sheehan, Assistant U.S. Attorney-Civil Division, Philadelphia, PA, Kathleen D. Hallam, U.S. Attorney's Office, Philadelphia, PA, for George C. Wigen in No. 95-3500.

Adolfo R. Martinez, F.C.I. Schyulkill, Minersville, PA, Pro Se Brian Carroll, U.S. Attorney's Office, Philadelphia, PA, James G. Sheehan, Assistant U.S. Attorney-Civil Division, Philadelphia, PA, for George C. Wigen in No. 95-3202.

MEMORANDUM

EDUARDO C. ROBRENO, District Judge.

Petitioners, Jose Labrador Cardenas, Arquimedes Perez and Adolfo R. Martinez are federal prisoners. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241,¹ they have each individually filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Petitioners' claims stem from disciplinary action taken against them after contraband was found in the dormitory unit shared by Petitioners and nine other inmates. In their petitions, Mr. Cardenas, Mr. Perez and Mr. Martinez allege violations of their constitutional and civil rights as well as violations of prison regulations. Specifically, each petition asserts the following claims: (1) denial of due process; (2) denial of equal protection; (3) double jeopardy; and (4) violation by the Board of Prisons of its own rules, regulations, policies and customs. As Petitioners' cases all stem from the same incident and involve common questions of law and fact, Petitioners' claims will be considered together in this memorandum. With regard to Petitioners' equal protection, double jeopardy and violation of prison rule claims, the Court will approve and adopt the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge assigned to each case. The Court will also approve and adopt each Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation regarding Petitioners' due process claims, but not for the reasons set forth therein and only as qualified by this memorandum.² Petitioners will be denied habeas corpus relief.

I. BACKGROUND

On December 13, 1994, Correctional Officer Robert Wright was conducting a routine room search of Room 215 in Building 5741 at the Federal Correctional Institute, Fort Dix, when he discovered a five-inch sharpened metal rod with a two-inch taped handle attached to the end along with a quart of nickel grey paint in the common area shared by Petitioners and nine other inmates. Mr. Cardenas, Mr. Perez, Mr. Martinez and their nine cellmates denied any responsibility for the materials discovered.³ After a hearing on the matter, Petitioners, as well as each of their cellmates were found guilty of violating prison Codes 104 ("Possession of a Sharpened Instrument or Weapon") and 305 ("Possession of Anything Not Authorized"). The disciplinary hearing officer imposed a sanction on each Petitioner consisting of 60 days disciplinary segregation with 30 days suspended pending 180 days of clear conduct on the weapons offense and 15 days disciplinary segregation with 15 days suspended pending 180 days of clear conduct for the unauthorized material violation.

Although there was no direct evidence that any individual inmate was responsible for the forbidden materials, Petitioners and their cellmates were adjudged guilty of the charged offenses based upon Program Statement 5270.7 ("Inmate Discipline and Special Housing Units"), which provides that when contraband is discovered, all inmates residing in the room are mutually responsible if the contraband cannot be identified as belonging to a specific individual. The principle embodied by Program Statement 5270.7, known as "constructive possession," see White v. Kane 860 F.Supp. 1075 (E.D.Pa. 1994), aff'd, 52 F.3d 319 (3d Cir.1995), is grounded in notions of collective guilt, i.e., all members of a group are responsible for an offense when the specific offender can not be identified. See Hamilton v. O'Leary, 976 F.2d 341, 347 (7th Cir.1992) (Posner, J., dissenting); Ustrak v. Fairman, 781 F.2d 573, 575 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 824, 107 S.Ct. 95, 93 L.Ed.2d 47 (1986).⁴

After exhausting their administrative remedies, Mr. Cardenas, Mr. Perez and Mr. Martinez filed the habeas corpus petitions here at issue.

II. DISCUSSION

Although a prisoner's rights "may be diminished by the needs and exigencies of the institutional environment, a prisoner is not wholly stripped of constitutional protections when he is imprisoned for a crime." Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2974, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). Among the constitutional protections prisoners retain are those safeguarded by the Due Process Clause. Id. at 556, 94 S.Ct. at 2974-75. Consequently, while in custody, prisoners may not be further deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Id. (citations omitted).

A violation of a prisoner's liberty interests may be redressed by writ of habeas corpus. The "Great Writ" is "an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody." Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 1833, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973). Procedurally, it supplies the mechanism by which prisoners may challenge "the length of their custodial terms." Fields v. Keohane, 954 F.2d 945, 949 (3d Cir.1992); Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 478-79 (3d Cir.1991) (habeas corpus petition actionable when prisoner "is in custody and he attacks the term of that custody"). Therefore, to the extent that Petitioners here argue that the punishments imposed on them by the disciplinary board lengthened the terms of their confinement, their claims are the proper subject of a habeas corpus petition. Martinez v. Wigen, 95 CV 3202, doc. no. 7 at 3-5 (Order Memorandum dated Aug. 16, 1995) (Robreno, J.).

Petitioners contend that the sanctions imposed on them by the disciplinary board affected their liberty interests in the following ways: (1) their custodial classifications were changed; (2) they were transferred to another federal correctional institution; and (3) their ability to earn good time credits in the future was negatively impacted.⁵ Petitioners argue that the disciplinary board impinged upon these liberty interests without affording them due process of law and, therefore, that they are entitled to habeas corpus relief.⁶

When an imprisoned person is the subject of a disciplinary hearing that may result in the loss of a liberty interest subject to protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,⁷ that prisoner must be afforded the following safeguards: (1) advance written notice of the disciplinary charges; (2) an opportunity, when consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals, to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense; and (3) a written statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-67, 94 S.Ct. at 2978-80.

In the present case, Petitioners do not claim that they were denied any of the procedural requirements set forth in Wolff. Rather, Petitioners argue that their liberty interests have been violated because they were each disciplined based on evidence insufficient to link them to the contraband found in their cell. See supra note 4. As discussed below, the Court finds that Petitioners do not have a liberty interest in maintaining their custodial classifications or in serving their sentences at a particular correctional facility. While the Court agrees that Petitioners' claims regarding the effect of the discipline on their already earned good time credits do implicate their liberty interests, in that the revocation of good time credits necessarily lengthens the term of a sentence, nothing in the record indicates that any good time credits which Petitioners may have already earned were impacted in any adverse way.

The Supreme Court has held that an inmate has "no legitimate statutory or constitutional entitlement" to any particular custodial classification which is sufficient to invoke due process even if a change in classification would impose a "grievous loss" on the inmate. Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n. 9, 97 S.Ct. 274, 279 n. 9, 50 L.Ed.2d 236 (1976). According to the Court, Congress has given federal prison officials full discretion to control the classification of prisoners residing in their institutions. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 4081). Therefore, both under the Constitution and by statute, to the extent that Petitioners seek restoration of their former custodial classifications as a remedy in itself, they are not entitled to habeas corpus relief and their petitions will be denied.

Similarly, the claim by Petitioners that their transfer from FCI, Fort Dix to FCI, Schuylkill was in violation of their constitutional rights also must fail. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b), the Bureau of Prisons has the power to direct the confinement of federal prisoners "in any available facility and may transfer a prisoner from one facility to another at any time." Prows v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 981 F.2d 466, 469 n. 3 (10th Cir.1992), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 98, 126 L.Ed.2d 65 (1993).⁸ The authority placed in the Bureau by § 3621(b) invests the Bureau with "wide discretion to designate the place of confinement for purposes of serving federal sentences of imprisonment." Barden, 921 F.2d at 483.⁹ Moreover, prisoners have "no liberty interest in remaining at a particular institution." Ali v. Gibson, 631 F.2d 1126, 1135 (3d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1129, 101 S.Ct. 951, 67...