Carder v. Graco Children's Prods., Inc.

• Decision Date: 31 August 2021
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:20-CV-00137-LMM
• Citation: 558 F.Supp.3d 1290
• Parties: Kellie CARDER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, et al., Plaintiffs, v. GRACO CHILDREN'S PRODUCTS, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia

558 F.Supp.3d 1290

Kellie CARDER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.GRACO CHILDREN'S PRODUCTS, INC., Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:20-CV-00137-LMM

United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Gainesville Division.

Signed August 31, 2021

Daniel K. Bryson, Martha A. Geer, Pro Hac Vice, Patrick M. Wallace, Pro Hac Vice, Milberg Coleman Bryson Phillips Grossman, PLLC, Raleigh, NC, Gary Edward Mason, Pro Hac Vice, Mason Lietz & Klinger LLP, Washington, DC, Gregory Frederic Coleman, Pro Hac Vice, Jonathan Betten Cohen, Pro Hac Vice, Rachel Soffin, Milberg Coleman Bryson Phillips Grossman, PLLC, Knoxville, TN, Harper Todd Segui, Milberg Coleman Bryson Phillips Grossman, PLLC, Mount Pleasant, SC, Melissa Robin Emert, Kantrowitz, Goldhamer & Graifman, P.C., Chestnut Ridge, NY, David James Worley, Evangelista Worley, LLC, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff Kellie Carder.

Gary Edward Mason, Pro Hac Vice, Mason Lietz & Klinger LLP, Washington, DC, Martha A. Geer, Pro Hac Vice, Patrick M. Wallace, Pro Hac Vice, Daniel K. Bryson, Milberg Coleman Bryson Phillips Grossman, PLLC, Raleigh, NC, Melissa Robin Emert, Kantrowitz, Goldhamer & Graifman, P.C., Chestnut Ridge, NY, David James Worley, Evangelista Worley, LLC, Atlanta, GA, Rachel Soffin, Milberg Coleman Bryson Phillips Grossman, PLLC, Knoxville, TN, for Plaintiffs Lisa Francoforte, Leticia Rivera, Silvia Tehomilic, Emilio Pensado, Jr., Shannon Hager.

Gary S. Graifman, Melissa Robin Emert, Kantrowitz, Goldhamer & Graifman, P.C., Chestnut Ridge, NY, Gary Edward Mason, Pro Hac Vice, Mason Lietz & Klinger LLP, Washington, DC, Gayle M. Blatt, Pro Hac Vice, Casey Gerry Reed & Schenk (Herman Mathis Casey & Kitchens), James McCorkle Davis, IV, Pro Hac Vice, Patricia Camille Guerra, Pro Hac Vice, Casey Gerry Schenk Francavilla Blatt & Penfield, LLP, San Diego, CA, James M. Evangelista, David James Worley, Evangelista Worley LLC, Atlanta, GA, Mark P. Chalos, Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein LLP, Nashville, TN, Martha A. Geer, Pro Hac Vice, Milberg Coleman Bryson Phillips Grossman, PLLC, Raleigh, NC, for Plaintiff Jennifer Murphy.

Carl V. Malmstrom, Pro Hac Vice, Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLC, Chicago, IL, James M. Evangelista, Kristi Stahnke McGregor, David James Worley, Evangelista Worley LLC, Atlanta, GA, Martha A. Geer, Pro Hac Vice, Milberg Coleman Bryson Phillips Grossman, PLLC, Raleigh, NC, Matthew M. Guiney, Pro Hac Vice, Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz, New York, NY, Melissa Robin Emert, Kantrowitz, Goldhamer & Graifman, P.C., Chestnut Ridge, NY, for Plaintiff Elizabeth Davis-Berg.

Aaron M. Sheanin, Pro Hac Vice, Robins Kaplan LLP, Berkeley, CA, J. Austin Hurt, Pro Hac Vice, Stacey P. Slaughter, Pro Hac Vice, Michael J. Pacelli, Pro Hac Vice, Robins Kaplan, LLP, Minneapolis, MN, James M. Evangelista, David James Worley, Evangelista Worley LLC, Atlanta, GA, Martha A. Geer, Pro Hac Vice, Milberg Coleman Bryson Phillips Grossman, PLLC, Raleigh, NC, Melissa Robin Emert, Kantrowitz, Goldhamer & Graifman, P.C., Chestnut Ridge, NY, Samuel J. Strauss, Turke & Strauss, LLP, Madison, WI, for Plaintiff Rejenna Chavez.

Christopher E. Coleman, Mark P. Chalos, Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein LLP, Nashville, TN, James M. Evangelista, David James Worley, Evangelista Worley LLC, Atlanta, GA, Jonathan D. Selbin, Pro Hac Vice, Lieff, Cabrasher, Heiman & Bernstein, LLP, New York, NY, Jonathan Shub, Kevin Laukaitis, Shub Law Firm LLC, Haddonfield, NJ, Martha A. Geer, Pro Hac Vice, Milberg Coleman Bryson Phillips Grossman, PLLC, Raleigh, NC, Melissa Robin Emert, Kantrowitz, Goldhamer & Graifman, P.C., Chestnut Ridge, NY, for Plaintiff Cheryl Varlaro.

David C. Scott, Pro Hac Vice, Joseph J. Krasovec, III, Pro Hac Vice, Schiff Hardin, LLP, Chicago, IL, Jennifer A. Adler, Nicholas Peter Panayotopoulos, Weinberg Wheeler Hudgins Gunn & Dial, LLC, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant.

ORDER

Leigh Martin May, United States District Judge This case comes before the Court on Defendant Graco Children's Products, Inc.’s ("Graco") Motion to Dismiss [67]. After due consideration, and with the benefit of a hearing and supplemental briefing, the Court enters the following Order.

I. BACKGROUND

In this putative class action, Plaintiffs from fifteen states allege that Defendant Graco made false and misleading representations about the TurboBooster Highback Booster Seat and the AFFIX Highback Booster Seat (the "Booster Seats"), two models of children's car seats manufactured and sold by Defendant. See generally Dkt. No. [60]. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant labeled and marketed these Booster Seats in the United States as being (1) "side-impact tested" and (2) safe for children as small as thirty pounds and as young as three years old. Id. ¶ 3. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant has known since 2002 that these representations are false and misleading—namely, that the Booster Seats do not appreciably reduce the risks associated with side-impact collisions (and that there are no federal safety standards for side-impact testing), that Defendant's own testing does not show that the Booster Seats are safe in side-impact collisions, and that the Booster Seats are in fact not safe for children under forty pounds or younger than four years old—but that Defendant omitted or concealed this information from its marketing of the Booster Seats. Id. ¶¶ 3–4. Plaintiffs also allege that they purchased Booster Seats based in part on Defendant's representations that these seats were safe for children under forty pounds and as young as three years old, and that they were side-impact tested (and would offer protection in side-impact collisions). In their Consolidated Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs maintain that, had they known that no federal side-impact testing existed, that the seats did not provide "any appreciable safety" to children in a side-impact collision, and that the seats were in fact not safe for children under forty pounds and as young as three years old, Plaintiffs would not have purchased their respective Booster Seats or would have paid less for them. See id. ¶¶ 19–81.

Plaintiffs assert claims for (1) violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301, et seq. ; (2) common law fraud; (3) unjust enrichment; (4) negligent misrepresentation, and (5) violations of state-specific breach of warranty and consumer protection statutes. Id. ¶¶ 182–773. Defendant has moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Amended Complaint in its entirety, arguing that Plaintiffs (1) lack standing and (2) otherwise fail to adequately state claims for relief. Dkt. No. [67]. The Court held a hearing on July 29, 2021, and the parties have submitted supplemental briefing. See Dkt. Nos. [75, 77, 78, 83, 84].

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a pleading contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While this pleading standard does not require "detailed factual allegations," the Supreme Court has held that "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ).

To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). A complaint is plausible on its face when the plaintiff pleads factual content necessary for the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the conduct alleged. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).

At the motion to dismiss stage, "all well-pleaded facts are accepted as true, and the reasonable inferences therefrom are construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." FindWhat Inv'r Grp. v. FindWhat.com, 658 F.3d 1282, 1296 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Garfield v. NDC Health Corp., 466 F.3d 1255, 1261 (11th Cir. 2006) ). However, this principle does not apply to legal conclusions set forth in the complaint. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant makes two overarching arguments for dismissing Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Amended Complaint. First, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs lack standing (including that they lack standing to seek injunctive relief). Dkt. No. [67] at 27–35.¹ Second, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed under Rule 9(b) or Rule 12(b)(6). Id. at 35–61. The Court addresses each of Defendant's arguments below.

A. Standing

Defendant first argues that Plaintiffs lack standing. Id. at 27–34. To have standing, "[t]he plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision." Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547, 194 L.Ed.2d 635 (2016) (citation omitted). "Where, as here, a case is at the pleading stage, the plaintiff must clearly allege facts demonstrating each element." Id. (quotation marks, alterations, and citation omitted).

Defendant focuses primarily on the "injury in fact" element, arguing that Plaintiffs have failed to allege that they have suffered an injury. Dkt. No. [67-1] at 27–34. "To establish injury in fact, a plaintiff must show that he or she suffered an invasion of a legally protected interest that is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548 (quotation marks and citation omitted). "A ‘concrete’ injury must be ‘de facto ’; that is, it must actually exist." Id. (citation omitted). "Economic harm and physical injury are well-established injuries-in-fact under federal standing jurisprudence." Adinolfe v. United Techs. Corp....