Cardona v. Aramark Services of Puerto Rico, Inc.

• Decision Date: 22 June 1998
• Docket Number: No. CIV. 97-1756(HL).,CIV. 97-1756(HL).
• Parties: Leonor Rosas CARDONA, Plaintiff, v. ARAMARK SERVICES OF PUERTO RICO, INC., et al, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

9 F.Supp.2d 92

Leonor Rosas CARDONA, Plaintiff, v. ARAMARK SERVICES OF PUERTO RICO, INC., et al, Defendants.

No. CIV. 97-1756(HL).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

June 22, 1998.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

George Uzdavinis-Velez, Mayaguez, PR, for plaintiff.

Pedro J. Manzano-Yates, Fiddler, Gonzalez & Rodriguez, San Juan, PR, for Defendant ARA Service.

Luis A. Lopez-Lopez, Mayaguez, PR,. for Defendant Star Kist Caribe, Inc.

OPINION AND ORDER

LAFFITTE, District Judge.

Before the Court is a motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant Aramark Services of Puerto Rico, Inc. Aramark operates the cafeteria at a Star Kist plant in Mayagüez, Puerto Rico. Plaintiff Leonor Rosas Cardona ("Rosas") was an employee in the cafeteria from 1989 until her termination in May 1992. Rosas alleges that she was subjected to sexual harassment while she worked for Aramark. She claims that she was terminated from her position in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), and in violation of Puerto Rico's Law 100, 29 L.P.R.A. §§ 146-151 (1995). Although it is unclear, it appears from her complaint that she may also be claiming damages under Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5141 (1991).

The Court reviews the record in the light most favorable to Rosas and draws all reasonable inferences in her favor. See LeBlanc v. Great American Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 841 (1st Cir.1993). While the Court must afford Rosas this preferential review of the record, her opposition to Aramark's motion for summary judgment suffers from serious defects. First, she has not submitted any evidence to support her opposition. Second, her opposition does not contain a statement of contested material facts. When a party opposing a motion for summary judgment fails to submit a statement of contested material facts, the court must deem to be admitted the movant's properly supported statement of material facts. Local Rule 311(12); Ayala-Gerena v. Bristol Myers-Squibb Co., 95 F.3d 86, 95 (1st Cir.1996); Dominguez v. Eli Lilly and Co., 958 F.Supp. 721, 727 (D.P.R.1997), aff'd, 141 F.3d 1149, 1998 WL 112515 (1st Cir.1998). Thus, the Court must balance the reasonable inference to which Rosas is entitled with Aramark's statement of properly supported material facts, which must be taken as true.

Rosas began working at Aramark as a cafeteria cashier in 1989.¹ Her supervisor at the time she started was Rafael Ramírez.² She claims that Ramírez was the perpetrator of the sexual harassment against her. She alleges the following conduct by him: in October 1989, Ramírez was giving her a ride home from work when, instead of taking her directly home, he told her that he was taking her to a motel. She protested vehemently, and he drove her to her house.³ He made crude comments to the effect that her breasts could be used as pillows, that he had erotic dreams about her, and that the shape of her derrière indicated what sexual position she was using.⁴ He would ask her what she did in the bathroom, and on one occasion he followed her into the bathroom.⁵ In one incident which took place in 1991, while she was on break and standing in line to buy something to eat, Ramírez brushed his crotch against her backside in a suggestive manner.⁶ Around May 1991, he showed her a crude drawing on a napkin.⁷ Lastly, while Rosas was working the cash register, Ramírez would repeatedly stand close behind her and ignore Rosas' protestations that he was making her uncomfortable and requests that he move away.⁸

Rosas complained to Ramírez' supervisor, Rubén Sierra, that this conduct constituted harassment.⁹ The first time she complained was in May 1991. Sierra confronted Ramírez with these accusations, who denied them. Sierra challenged this denial because he had seen Ramírez do some of the things that Rosas claimed he did.¹⁰ After consulting with his supervisors, Sierra changed Rosas shift so that she would not be working at the same time that Ramírez was. Rosas did not object to this remedy.¹¹ On June 11, 1991, Rosas' shift was changed so that she would not have to work with Ramírez.¹²

Once her shift changed in June 1991, Rosas did not have any more contact with Ramírez until May of the next year.¹³ The record does not contain any other evidence of harassing conduct from the time Rosas' shift was changed on June 11, 1991, until May 20, 1992, the date of the final incident of which Rosas complains. On this latter date, Sierra changed Rosas to Ramírez' shift for one day so that she could cover for a co-worker who had to take a day off.¹⁴ While on break, Rosas was standing by a register and waiting for a sandwich that she had ordered from a co-worker. Ramírez approached her and told her that she could not eat her sandwich there.¹⁵ An argument between Ramírez and Rosas ensued over where and when she could eat her sandwich during her break. Rosas stated that Sierra let her eat sandwiches on break while she was next to the register; Ramírez said that Sierra could not deprive him of his authority.¹⁶ The dispute culminated in Ramírez' telling Rosas to clock out and leave for the day. He called a security guard to have her escorted off the premises.¹⁷

The following day, Rosas met with Sierra to discuss the incident. He told her that Star Kist had instructed him to fire either Ramírez or Rosas; that he would be unable to find another supervisor to work as cheaply as Ramírez; and that therefore he was firing her.¹⁸ On May 29, 1992, Rosas filed a complaint with the Anti-Discrimination Unit of the Puerto Rico Department of Labor and Human Resources ("ADU"). In her complaint she recounted some of the harassing conduct that took place before her shift was changed. She also stated that on May 20, 1992, Ramírez had fired her without justification.¹⁹

In its motion for summary judgment, Aramark argues that Rosas' claim is timebarred because her administrative complaint was filed more than 300 days after the last alleged incident of harassing conduct by Ramírez. Rosas has opposed the motion. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Aramark's motion for summary judgment.

DISCUSSION

Summary judgment is appropriate if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." See Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once the moving party has satisfied this requirement, the nonmoving party has the burden of presenting any facts that demonstrate a genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at 841. The nonmovant must do more than show "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). An issue is genuine when, based on the evidence, a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512.

In the present case, Rosas claims that she was the victim of sexual harassment by Ramírez. Sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination which Title VII prohibits. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 998, 1001, 140 L.Ed.2d 201 (1998); Provencher v. CVS Pharmacy, 145 F.3d 5, 13 (1st Cir.1998). Sexual harassment may take two forms. Quid pro quo harassment consists of threats of unfavorable treatment or promises of favorable treatment which are intended to coerce a worker into submitting to unwelcome sexual advances. Lattimore v. Polaroid Corp., 99 F.3d 456, 463 (1st Cir.1996). The second type of harassment-hostile work environment-exists when discriminatory intimidation, insult, or ridicule permeate the work environment in a manner that is so severe and pervasive as to alter the plaintiff's employment conditions and to create an abusive working environment. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 370, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993); Morrison v. Carleton Woolen Mills, Inc., 108 F.3d 429, 436-37 (1st Cir.1997). In the present case, Rosas does not specify which type of claim she is bringing. There is no evidence that Ramírez tried to coerce Rosas into submitting to sexual advances in exchange for favorable treatment. Rather, her litany of misconduct by Ramírez sounds in a claim for a hostile work environment, and the Court will treat Rosas' claim as such.

In determining whether a plaintiff faces a hostile work environment, a court should consider the frequency and severity of the discriminatory conduct; whether the conduct unreasonably interferes with the plaintiff's work performance; whether the conduct is of a physically threatening or humiliating nature, or is merely an offensive utterance; and the conduct's effect on the plaintiff's psychological health. Harris, 510 U.S. at 23, 114 S.Ct. at 371. A variety of different forms of offensive behavior may fall within the ambit of what constitutes a hostile work environment. Morrison, 108 F.3d at 441. The behavior must alter the employee's work conditions and create an abusive work environment. Oncale, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. at 1003. At the very least, the overtones of the behavior must be recognizable as sex-based discrimination. Morrison, 108 F.3d at 441. However, conduct which is merely overbearing or boorish will not, by itself, be sufficient to constitute a hostile work environment, unless there are underlying motives of a sexual or gender discriminatory motive. Id.; see also Hidalgo v. Overseas...