Cardwell v. Americal River Bridge Co

• Citation: 113 U.S. 205,5 S.Ct. 423,28 L.Ed. 959
• Parties: CARDWELL v. AMERICAL RIVER BRIDGE CO. 1
• Decision Date: 19 January 1885
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

113 U.S. 205

5 S.Ct. 423

28 L.Ed. 959

CARDWELL v. AMERICAL RIVER BRIDGE CO.¹

January 19, 1885.

The American river is a branch of the Sacramento river in California. It is entirely within the state, and navigable for small steam-boats and barges from its mouth to the town of Folsom, a distance of 30 miles. By its junction with the Sacramento river, vessels starting upon it can proceed to the bay of San Francisco, and thence to adjoining states and foreign countries. It is therefore a navigable water of the United States, and, as such, is under the control of the general government in the exercise of its power to regulate foreign and interstate commerce, so far as may be necessary to insure its free navigation.

The defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of California, and, pursuant to the authority conferred by an act of its legislature, has constructed a bridge over the American river, of 20 feet in width and 300 feet in length, which is used as a roadway, across the stream. Its floor is about 14 feet above extreme low water, and about 5 feet above extreme high water; and the bridge is without a draw or opening for the passage of vessels. Steam-boats and other craft are therefore obstructed by it in the navigation of the river.

The complainant alleges that he is the owner of a large tract of land, bordering on the river, below Folsom, and raises many tons of grain each year; that he is also the owner of a steam-boat and other vessels by which he could ship his grain down the river but for the obstruction caused by the bridge; that there are also large quarries of granite on his land sufficient to supply the markets of Sacramento and San Francisco for years, and also large deposits of cobble-stone which have a value for paving, and, but for the obstruction, he could ship the granite and cobble-stone by his vessels and sell them at a profit, whereas the expense of sending them by rail or other means open to him are such as to deprive him of all profit on them. He therefore files his bill against the company, and prays that it may be enjoined from maintaining the bridge across the river until a draw shall have been placed in it sufficient to allow steam-boats, vessles, and water-craft, capable of navigating the stream, to pass and repass, freely and safely. A demurrer to the bill was sustained, and the bill dismissed, and the case is brought here on appeal.

J. J. Scrivner, for appellant.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 206-208 intentionally omitted] A. T. Britton and J. B. Haggin, for appellee.

Mr. Justice Field delivered the opinion of the court. He recited the facts as stated above, and continued:

The questions thus presented are neither new nor difficult of solution. Except in one particular, they have been considered and determined in many cases, of which the most important are Willson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co. 2 Pet. 245; The Wheeling Bridge Case, 13 How. 564; Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713; Pound v. Turck, 95 U. S. 459; Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 678; S. C. 2 SUP. CT. REP. 185; and Miller v. Mayor of New York, 109 U. S. 385; S. C. 3 SUP. CT. REP. 228. In these cases the control of congress over navigable waters within the states so as to preserve their free navigation under the commercial clause of the constitution, the power of the states within which they lie to authorize the construction of bridges over them until congress intervenes and supersedes their authority, and the right of private parties to interfere with their construction or continuance, have been fully considered, and we are entirely satisfied with the soundness of the conclusions reached. They recognize the full power of the states to regulate within their limits matters of internal police, which embraces among other things the construction, repair, and maintenance of roads and bridges, and the establishment of ferries; that the states are more likely to appreciate the importance of these means of internal communication and to provide for their proper management, than a government at a distance; and that, as to bridges over navigable streams, their power is subordinate to that of congress, as an act of the latter body is, by the constitution, made the supreme law of the land; but that until congress acts on the subject their power is plenary. When congress acts directly with reference to the bridges authorized by the state, its will must control so far as may be necessary to secure the free navigation of the streams.

In Willson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co. a dam had been constructed across a small navigable river in the state of Delaware, by authority of its legislature; and this court held that the obstruction which it caused to the navigation of the stream was an affair between the government of the state and its citizens, in the absence of any law of congress on the subject. In the case of Gilman v. Philadelphia a bridge across the Schuylkill river, connecting East and West Philadelphia, had been constructed by authority of the legislature of Pennsylvania. It was without a draw, and prevented the passage of vessels to wharves above it although the river was tide-water and navigable to them, and commerce had been carried on to them for years in all kinds of vessels. The owner of the wharves filed a bill to prevent the erection of the bridge, alleging that it would be an unlawful obstruction to the navigation of the river and an illegal interference with his rights, and claimed that he was entitled to be protected by an injunction against the progress of the work, and to a decree for...