Career Service Review Bd. v. Utah Dept. of Corrections

• Decision Date: 22 July 1997
• Docket Number: No. 950409,950409
• Citation: 942 P.2d 933
• Parties: 322 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD, an agency of the State of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. UTAH DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, an agency of the State of Utah, and O. Lane McCotter, in his capacity as Executive Director of the Utah Department of Corrections, Defendants and Appellee.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

Page 933

942 P.2d 933

322 Utah Adv. Rep. 8

CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD, an agency of the State of Utah Plaintiff and Appellant, v. UTAH DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, an agency of the State of Utah, and O. Lane McCotter, in his capacity as Executive Director of the Utah Department of Corrections Defendants and Appellee.

No. 950409.

Supreme Court of Utah.

July 22, 1997.

Neal T. Gooch, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant.

Frank D. Mylar, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for defendants and appellees.

DURHAM, Justice:

The Utah Career Service Review Board ("the Board" or "CSRB") brought this action to enforce its administrative order to the Utah Department of Corrections and to O. Lane McCotter in his capacity as director of the Department of Corrections (collectively, "Corrections" or "UDC"). The district court granted Corrections' motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action. We reverse.

In April 1992, Corrections conducted an internal evidentiary hearing to consider allegations against Tim Parker, a senior correctional supervisor employed by the UDC. Corrections concluded from the evidence at that hearing that Parker had violated UDC weapons policy and had lied to a superior officer. Parker was disciplined and demoted from his supervisory grade 23 position to a nonsupervisory position at grade 21.

Parker appealed Corrections' decision and disciplinary action by filing a grievance with CSRB which granted him an evidentiary hearing before a hearing officer (what the Board calls a "step 5" hearing). The hearing officer considered the evidence of both parties de novo and found, as had Corrections, that Parker had violated department policy. Nevertheless, the hearing officer concluded that Corrections had imposed "excessive discipline" and consequently reduced the sanctions against Parker. The Board approved Corrections' decision to give Parker a ten-day suspension and to place a letter of reprimand in his file, but the Board held that Parker's demotion was unlawful and therefore ordered Corrections to restore Parker to his former rank and pay.

Corrections appealed this decision to the full review board of the CSRB, and Parker cross-appealed. The CSRB, sitting as a board of appellate review ("step 6"), ultimately upheld the decision of the hearing officer and on October 6, 1993, issued a "Decision, Order, and Final Agency Action" ("the 1993 Order"). The 1993 Order stated, "Grievant should be reinstated forthwith to his prior step and rank at Grade 23, and immediately reimbursed for the full amount of any salary and benefits not paid to date as a result of the demotion to Grade 21." Corrections sought judicial review in the Utah Court of Appeals, but upon stipulation of both parties the case was dismissed.

In the meantime, and unknown to the Board, Parker had voluntarily transferred to a grade 17 position as a truck driver at Utah Correctional Industries. Also, Parker's former position was eliminated when Corrections disbanded the Enforcement Bureau in November 1993. Corrections assumed that Parker's acceptance of the grade 17 position excused UDC from any further obligation to him; because the disbanding of the Enforcement Bureau rendered Parker's reinstatement to his former position impossible, UDC took the position that it could fully comply with the Board's 1993 Order merely by reimbursing Parker for the wages and benefits he lost between his dismissal and his subsequent acceptance of the truck-driving job, a period of approximately three months. Corrections calculated that the net difference in salary and benefits between grade 21 and grade 23 for the given period was $362.47. Accordingly, on February 1, 1994, Corrections sent Parker a check in that amount, along with a letter stating that this payment satisfied Corrections' full obligation to him under the Board's 1993 Order. Parker objected to Corrections' position and demanded that they comply with the order as given, but Corrections replied to Parker's objection by insisting that it had already fully complied with the Board's decision. Parker then moved the Board for an order directing Corrections to implement the Board's 1993 Order.

The Board treated Parker's motion for enforcement as a motion for clarification of the 1993 Order. It solicited responses and exhibits from both Parker and Corrections but determined on the basis of these submissions that further oral argument was not needed. On October 20, 1994, the Board issued an "Order Directing Agency to Implement Step 6 Decision" ("the 1994 Order"). The 1994 Order clarified the Board's 1993 Order and altered it in subtle ways. Essentially, the 1994 Order made clear that while Corrections was not required to restore Parker to his former position (which had been eliminated in 1993), it was obligated to restore him to his former rank and salary. The new order also required Corrections to pay Parker the difference in salary and benefits between grade 23 and his current grade 17 position rather than the difference between grade 23 and the grade 21 position to which he had been demoted by Corrections. The order further clarified that Corrections was to continue to pay Parker at his former grade 23 salary until "a legitimate personnel action effectuates a valid change in Grievant's pay."

Upon notification of the 1994 Order, Corrections took the position that the Board had exceeded its jurisdiction and sent the Board a letter indicating that Corrections would not comply. Corrections did not, however, apply to the Board for reconsideration, nor did it seek review of the decision in the Utah Court of Appeals as it had done in the case of the 1993 Order. Instead, insisting that the order was unlawful and void, Corrections ignored it and allowed it to become final. On January 27, 1995, the Board filed a complaint in the Third District Court, seeking enforcement of its 1994 Order. Both parties moved the district court for summary judgment; the Board's motion was denied, and Corrections' motion was granted.

The district court concluded that the Board lacked standing and authority to bring an enforcement action against Corrections and that the Board had exceeded its jurisdiction. The court also characterized the Board's enforcement action as a suit in mandamus and denied relief because it found that enforcement of the 1994 Order--which the court held unlawfully infringed upon Corrections' statutory duty to maintain strict safety and security standards--was not in the public interest and was therefore not compelled by equity. The Board argues that the district court erred in these findings and further maintains that its 1994 Order is res judicata and that many of the issues the trial court found dispositive should have been precluded from that court's consideration because they had already been decided in the Board's previous administrative action, from which Corrections failed to appeal. However, the trial court found that res judicata and collateral estoppel did not apply to the Board's administrative decision because the parties never fully and fairly litigated several issues before the Board.

We must first determine whether the Board had standing and authority to bring an enforcement action in civil court against Corrections, another agency of state government. If we conclude that the Board had standing and was legally authorized to bring this action, we must next decide whether the district court erred by considering issues that should have been precluded as res judicata or collateral estoppel. If estoppel applies to the Board's administrative action, our only other consideration should be whether the Board exceeded its jurisdiction in issuing the 1994 Order. If estoppel does not apply, we may consider the other collateral attacks on the Board's decision. This case was decided on summary judgment below, and "[b]ecause entitlement to summary judgment is a question of law, we accord no deference to the trial court's resolution of the legal issues presented." K & T, Inc. v. Koroulis, 888 P.2d 623, 627 (Utah 1994).

I. STANDING, AUTHORITY, DUE PROCESS

The trial court found that the Board's enforcement action against Corrections should have been barred because (i) the Board was not an "aggrieved party" and therefore did not have standing, and (ii) the Board did not have statutory authority to bring a lawsuit against another agency. Corrections further argues that the action violates constitutional guarantees of due process by combining adjudication and enforcement powers in one agency. We find no merit in any of these contentions.

The Board brought this enforcement action against Corrections under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"), which states, "In addition to other remedies provided by law, an agency may seek enforcement of an order by seeking civil enforcement in the district court." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-19(1)(a) (1993). ¹ The Career Service Review Board is an agency within the meaning of UAPA, which defines "agency" broadly as "a board, commission, department, division, officer, council, office, committee, bureau, or other administrative unit of this state, including the agency head, agency employees, or other persons acting on behalf of or under the authority of the agency head." Id. § 63-46b-2(1)(b) (emphasis added). Also, because the injury alleged by the Board is "within the scope of statutory concerns," Corrections' refusal to submit to the Board's statutory authority constitutes an injury sufficient to establish the Board's standing in this case. See Utah Bankers Ass'n v. America First Credit Union, 912 P.2d 988, 993 (Utah 1996).

Corrections' due process argument concerns the bias that could potentially color an agency's judgment if it is both judge and advocate in an action. Here, however, the Board did not undertake its advocacy role until its judicial function had been completed. That a party seeks enforcement of its administrative...