Carey v. Kitson
Citation | 461 N.Y.S.2d 876,93 A.D.2d 50 |
Parties | In the Matter of Martin T. CAREY, Petitioner, v. Donald KITSON, as acting Judge of the County Court of Suffolk County, Respondent. |
Decision Date | 04 April 1983 |
Court | New York Supreme Court Appellate Division |
Andrew M. Lawler, P.C., New York City (Moses Silverman, Kenneth Roth and Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, New York City, of counsel), for petitioner.
Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen., New York City (John Michael Ryan, Asst. Atty. Gen., New York City, of counsel), for respondent.
Before LAZER, J.P., and MANGANO, THOMPSON and WEINSTEIN, JJ.
In this original proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, petitioner seeks to, inter alia, prohibit respondent from trying him under Indictment Number 3131/81 on the ground that he had been granted immunity from prosecution based on his testimony before a Suffolk County Grand Jury in April, 1980 "directly relating to the transactions charged in the indictment".
The two issues to be resolved on this proceeding are as follows:
(1) Can petitioner's claim of transactional immunity be raised in an original proceeding under CPLR article 78 for a writ of prohibition? and if it can,
(2) Did petitioner's testimony before the Suffolk County Grand Jury confer upon him immunity from prosecution for sales tax evasion and filing false sales tax returns as charged in the instant indictment?
In 1980 the District Attorney of Suffolk County convened a Grand Jury to investigate allegations concerning the Vantage Oil parkway gas stations. In connection with that investigation, the Suffolk County District Attorney issued a subpoena duces tecum directing petitioner, Martin Carey, to produce before the Grand Jury numerous books and records of petitioner's company, Petroleum Combustion International Inc. (hereinafter PCI), which operated gas stations on Long Island.
In addition to this subpoena duces tecum, the Grand Jury issued a subpoena ad testificandum directing petitioner to appear and give testimony. Petitioner appeared and testified to PCI's sales volume, his knowledge of that volume, his involvement in PCI's operation and his knowledge of PCI's financial situation. Specifically, the Grand Jury proceeding included the following questions and answers:
Thereafter, the Attorney-General of the State of New York secured an indictment against petitioner charging him with one count of grand larceny in the second degree (sales tax evasion) and sixteen counts of offering a false instrument for filing in the first degree (false sales tax returns). The following language was used in the indictment (the second count is representative of the other 15 false instrument counts):
of ONE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED ($1,500.00) DOLLARS.
Petitioner moved, inter alia, to dismiss the indictment on the ground that his testimony before the Grand Jury in April, 1980 had conferred upon him immunity from prosecution on the transactions charged in the indictment.
In opposition to the motion, the Attorney-General argued, inter alia, that (1) neither petitioner nor his corporation was a target of the investigation conducted by the Suffolk County District Attorney in 1980; (2) he did not learn of petitioner's April, 1980 Grand Jury testimony until June, 1982 and (3) his investigation, which resulted in Indictment Number 3131/81, did not arise out of, or flow from, the prior investigation by the Suffolk County District Attorney.
With regard to the substance of petitioner's Grand Jury testimony, the Attorney-General argued that his answers before the Grand Jury were introductory and general in nature and of no evidentiary value.
Special Term rejected outright all of the Attorney-General's arguments except for one, viz., that petitioner's testimony before the Grand Jury in April, 1980 was not sufficiently related to the transactions which were the subject of the instant indictment. Special Term characterized the latter issue as "close and difficult" and invited oral argument on the question as to "whether the testimony would 'tend' to a conviction within the meaning of Matter of Doyle, [257 N.Y. 244, 177 N.E. 489] and how the quantum of testimony needed to confer immunity may relate to the nature of the crimes charged which are of the 'white collar' variety."
On January 12, 1983, after both sides had been heard, Special Term denied petitioner's motion, inter alia, to dismiss the indictment.
In so holding, Special Term concluded as follows:
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