Cargill, Inc. v. WDS, Inc.
| Decision Date | 28 March 2018 |
| Docket Number | DOCKET NO. 3:16-cv-00848-FDW-DSC |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina |
| Parties | CARGILL, INC., and CARGILL MEAT SOLUTIONS, CORP., Plaintiffs, v. WDS, INC., JENNIFER MAIER, and BRIAN EWERT, Defendants. |
THIS MATTER is before the Court upon the filing of several post-trial motions by Plaintiffs and Defendants and one pending pre-trial motion filed by Plaintiffs. Before trial, Plaintiffs sought default judgment against all Defendants as sanction for abusive litigation practices. (Doc. No. 187). After trial, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Award of Prejudgment Interest (Doc. No. 320), a Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs (Doc. No. 325), and a Memorandum of Law on the Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practice Act (Doc. No. 329).1 Defendants WDS, Inc. ("WDS") and Brian Ewert ("Ewert") move under Rule 50(b) and Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for judgment as a matter of law in its favor or in the alternative a new trial. (Doc. No. 322). Defendant Jennifer Maier ("Maier") also filed a motion seeking judgment as a matter of law in her favor under Rule 50(b) or in the alternative, a new trialor amendment to the judgment under Rule 59. (Doc. No. 323). All motions and matters are now ripe for resolution. The Court addresses each motion but not necessarily in the order filed.
In the interests of judicial economy, the Court provides a general overview of the case here but summarizes the specific background relevant to the issues raised by the parties' motions in the analysis. Plaintiff Cargill, Inc. ("Cargill") and its wholly owned subsidiary, Cargill Meat Solutions, Corp. ("CMS"), had contractual relations with Defendant WDS. Under these contractual arrangements, Cargill, CMS, and other entities controlled by Cargill ("Cargill Affiliates") purchased products and related services from WDS, as a supplier that provides warehousing and distribution services. WDS was founded and managed by Defendant Maier, as majority owner (51%) and President, and Defendant Ewert, minority owner (49%) and at times, Vice President of Sales. As alleged, this litigation stems from WDS charging prices in the purchase orders generated throughout the course of the parties' relationship that exceeded the margins provided for in the Select Supplier Agreements ("SSAs") executed by Cargill and WDS in 2009, 2012, and 2015 and the actions taken by WDS, Ewert, and Maier to misrepresent and conceal the margins. After a seven day trial, the jury found all Defendants liable for conversion, fraud, and conspiracy to defraud Plaintiffs or engage in commercial bribery that damaged Plaintiffs. The jury found Defendant Ewert liable under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") § 1962(a) and (c) and both Defendants Ewert and Maier liable under RICO § 1962(d). The jury found Defendant WDS liable for breach of contract. The jury also found all Defendants misrepresented to Plaintiffs the margins charged on the products WDS supplied to Plaintiffs; falsified business records, including invoices and alleged agreements, in order to further theirmisrepresentation to Plaintiffs; and engaged in commercial bribery. Defendant Ewert also was found by the jury to have engaged in other misrepresentations causing Plaintiffs to continue the business relationship with WDS. The jury concluded the conduct it found was in or affecting commerce and the proximate cause of Plaintiffs' injury as required by the Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act. On each of the aforementioned claims, the jury concluded Plaintiffs were entitled to recover $35,177,269.
Defendants WDS and Ewert renew their motion under Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and move for judgment as a matter of law on several claims and in the alternative move for a new trial under Rule 59(a). Defendant Maier also moves under Rule 50 for judgment as a matter of law and alternatively moves for a new trial under Rule 59. Accordingly, the Court considers each of these matters under Rule 50(b) and Rule 59(a), where applicable.
A motion under Rule 50(b) "assesses whether the claim should succeed or fail because the evidence developed at trial was insufficient as a matter of law to sustain the claim." Belk, Inc. v. Meyer Corp., 679 F.3d 146, 155 (4th Cir. 2012). The moving party must have moved under Rule 50(a) for relief on similar grounds to move after trial under Rule 50(b). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50; Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 485 n.5 (2008). Failure to move under Rule 50(a) and appraise the court of the alleged insufficiency of the suit results in waiver of that unraised insufficiency. See Varghese v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 424 F.3d 411, 423 (4th Cir. 2005); Price v.City of Charlotte, N.C., 93 F.3d 1241, 1248-49 (4th Cir. 1996); Bridgetree, Inc. v. Red F. Marketing LLC, No. 3:10-cv-00228-FDW-DSC, 2013 WL 443698, at *17 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 5, 2013).
When considering a Rule 50 motion, the court cannot reweigh the evidence or consider the credibility of the witness and must view "all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and draw all reasonable inferences in [the prevailing party's] favor." Konkel v. Bob Evans Farms, Inc., 165 F.3d 275, 279 (4th Cir. 1999). A jury's verdict will withstand a motion under Rule 50 unless the court "determines that the only conclusion a reasonable trier of fact could draw from the evidence is in favor of the moving party." Tools USA and Equip. Co. v. Champ Frame Straightening Equip., Inc., 87 F.3d 654, 656-57 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting Winant v. Bostic, 5 F.3d 767, 774 (4th Cir. 1993)); see also Konkel, 165 F.3d at 279. When ruling on a motion under Rule 50(b), the court may allow judgment on the verdict, order a new trial, or direct entry of judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b).
"The grant or denial of a motion for new trial is entrusted to the sound discretion of the district court and will be reversed on appeal only upon a showing of abuse of discretion." Cline v. Wal-Mart Stores, 144 F.3d 294, 305 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 435 (1996)). A court may grant a new trial on some or all of the issues "for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A). Acceptable reasons include: "(1) the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence, or (2) is based upon evidence which is false, or (3) will result in a miscarriage of justice, even though there may be substantial evidence which would prevent the direction of averdict." Cline, 144 F.3d at 301 (quoting Atlas Food Sys. & Servs., Inc. v. Crain Nat'l Vendors, Inc., 99 F.3d 587, 594 (4th Cir. 1996)). When making this determination, the court may weigh the evidence and consider the credibility of witnesses. Wilhelm v. Blue Bell, Inc., 773 F.2d 1429, 1433 (4th Cir. 1985) (citing Wyatt v. Interstate & Ocean Transport Co., 623 F.2d 888, 891-92 (4th Cir. 1980)).
Defendants WDS and Ewert maintain that the SSAs are not enforceable contracts. (Doc. No. 322-1 at 8). They contend the SSAs are contracts for the sale of goods between merchants, and the SSAs do not contain a quantity term as required under the Uniform Commercial Code. (Doc. No. 322-1 at 8). Although the Uniform Commercial Code section 2-201(1), as adopted by New York, provides that a writing for "a contract for the sale of goods for the price of $500 or more is not enforceable by way of action or defense" unless a quantity term is included, N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (McKinney), the SSAs are not contracts for the sale of goods. Goods are "all things . . . which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale . . ." N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (McKinney). Meanwhile, "[a] 'sale' consists in the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price[.]" N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-106(1) (McKinney). In the SSAs, Cargill designates WDS as a "Select Supplier" and Cargill and WDS make mutual promises and covenants to govern their relationship. The SSAs contemplate a relationship between Cargill, Cargill Affiliates, and WDS involving the sale of goods to be facilitated by the issuance of purchase orders, but the SSAs contain no promise to pass title for anything. Accordingly, the Uniform Commercial Code doesnot govern the enforceability of the contract, and the lack of a quantity term does not render the SSAs unenforceable.
Citing the Alabama Supreme Court decision in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Schlumberger, 598 So. 2d. 1341 (Ala. 1992), Defendants WDS and Ewert also argue that the SSAs standing alone are not enforceable. (Doc. No. 322-1 at 8). However, Mobil2 does not hold that master agreements are never enforceable contracts. The Supreme Court of Alabama in Mobile stated:
A master service agreement is not binding alone. A master service agreement provides the framework for subsequent contracts that result from oral or written work orders. . . . "Such a contract 'merely sets out the rules of the game in the event the parties decide to play ball.'"
Id. at 1345 (internal citations omitted). Thus, the Court in Mobil considers master agreements unenforceable until subsequent contracts are made. Although breaching a master agreement only providing the framework for subsequent contracts and the rules for those subsequent contracts may not be possible until a subsequent contract is entered, the Court need not consider that here, because it is undisputed that subsequent contracts were entered. See generally Crown Battery Mfg. Co. v. Club Car, Inc., No. 3:12CV2158, 2014 WL 587142, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 14, 2014) (...
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