Cargill v. Barr
| Decision Date | 23 November 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:19-CV-349-DAE,1:19-CV-349-DAE |
| Citation | 502 F.Supp.3d 1163 |
| Parties | Michael CARGILL, Plaintiff, v. William P. BARR, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the United States, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas |
Caleb Kruckenberg, Pro Hac Vice, Mark Chenoweth, Pro Hac Vice, New Civil Liberties Alliance, Washington, DC, Jonathan F. Mitchell, Firm Name: Mitchell Law PLLC, Austin, TX, for Plaintiff.
Eric J. Soskin, Matthew James Glover, Christopher Alan Bates, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division, Washington, DC, for Defendants.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Plaintiff Michael Cargill ("Plaintiff") seeks injunctive relief to enjoin Defendants Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives ("ATF"), William Barr, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the United States ("AG Barr"), the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ"), Regina Lombardo,1 in her official capacity as Acting Director of ATF ("Lombardo") (collectively "Defendants") from enforcing their Final Rule, Bump-Stock-Type Devices , 83 Fed. Reg. 66514 (Dec. 26, 2018) ("the Final Rule"). A bench trial was held in this case on September 9, 2020. Having considered the pleadings, evidence, and written and oral arguments of counsel, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law, denying Plaintiff's requested relief on all counts.
Plaintiff filed this action on March 25, 2019.2 In support of his petition for injunctive relief, Plaintiff argues that: (1) the Final Rule is a legislative rule that ATF lacks the authority to promulgate (Counts IV, VII, VIII); (2) Defendants violated principles of non-delegation and/or separation of powers principles by issuing the Final Rule (Counts I, II, III, VIII); (3) the Final Rule's interpretations of terms within the statutory definition of "machinegun," which includes bump stocks and bump stock-type devices, are unreasonable and conflict with the statute (Counts I, V, VIII); and (4) Defendants violated the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA") in promulgating the Final Rule (Counts V, VI, VII, VIII).
After a status conference on February 13, 2020 (Dkt. # 31), the parties submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law on April 3, 2020 (Dkts. ## 33, 34) in advance of the bench trial in this case, and Plaintiff revised his proposal on June 22, 2020. (Dkt. # 39.) The parties submitted their trial briefs on August 28, 2020. (Dkts. ## 45, 46.)
On September 9, 2020, the Court held a bench trial in this case. Caleb Kruckenberg, Esq., and Mark Chenoweth, Esq., appeared at the trial on behalf of Plaintiff. Eric Soskin, Esq., Matthew Glover, Esq., and Christopher Bates, Esq., appeared at the trial on behalf of Defendants. At trial, Plaintiff did not call any witnesses but introduced eleven (11) exhibits. (Dkt. # 54 (and attachments).) Defendants called one in-person witness, David A. Smith, Firearms Enforcement Officer for the Firearms & Ammunition Technology Division ("FATD") of ATF, and introduced forty-five (45) exhibits, with Government Exhibit Two ("Exh. G-2") admitted for demonstrative purposes only. ( Id. ) After trial, the parties submitted written post-trial briefs in lieu of closing oral arguments. (Dkts. ## 70, 71.)
The Court has considered the record evidence submitted, made determinations as to relevance and materiality, assessed the credibility of the witness and evidence, and ascertained the probative significance of the evidence presented. Upon consideration of the above, the Court finds the following facts by a preponderance of the evidence, and, in applying the applicable law to such factual findings, makes the following conclusions of law. To the extent any findings of fact as stated may also be deemed to be conclusions of law, they shall also be considered conclusions of law; similarly, to the extent any conclusions of law as stated may be deemed findings of fact, they shall also be considered findings of fact. See Compaq Computer Corp. & Subsidiaries v. C.I.R., 277 F.3d 778, 781 (5th Cir. 2001).
1. Plaintiff Michael Cargill is a natural person and resident of the State of Texas.
(Dkt. # 54-2, Exh. P-1 ("Stipulated Facts"), ¶ 1.)
2. Plaintiff is a law-abiding person and has no disqualification that would prevent him from lawfully owning or operating a firearm and related accessories. (Id. ¶ 2.)
3. Defendant William Barr ("AG Barr"), Attorney General of the United States, is the head of the United States Department of Justice. (Dkt. # 1 ¶ 3; Dkt. # 11 ¶ 3.)
4. AG Barr is sued in his official capacity. (Dkt. # 1 ¶ 4; Dkt. #11 ¶ 4.)
5. Defendant United States Department of Justice ("DOJ") is an executive agency of the United States, which is partially responsible for administering and enforcing the National Firearms Act ("the NFA") and Gun Control Act ("the GCA"). (Dkt. # 1 ¶ 5; Dkt. # 11 ¶ 5.)
6. AG Barr and DOJ are responsible for overseeing the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives ("ATF"). See 28 C.F.R. § 0.130(a)(1).
7. Defendant Regina Lombardo is the Acting Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Firearms, Tobacco, and Explosives. (Dkt. # 1 ¶ 6; Dkt. # 11 ¶ 6.)3
8. Lombardo is sued in her official capacity. (Dkt. # 1 ¶ 7; Dkt. # 11 ¶ 7.)
9. Defendant ATF is an agency of the United States partially responsible for administering and enforcing the NFA and the GCA. (Dkt. # 1 ¶ 8; Dkt. # 11 ¶ 8.)
10. The Court has federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 702 and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
11. Venue for this action is proper in the Western District of Texas pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 703 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b)(2), (e)(1)(C) because Plaintiff resides in this judicial district, a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred in this judicial district, and because the property at issue in this action is situated in this judicial district. (Dkt. # 1 ¶ 11; Dkt. # 11 ¶ 11.)
12. In 1934, Congress passed the National Firearms Act ("the NFA"), Pub. L. No. 73-474, 48 Stat. 1236 (June 26, 1934), originally codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 2720–2733 (1939), now codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801 – 5872.
13. The NFA criminalized possession or transfer of an unregistered firearm, while also prohibiting the registration of firearms otherwise banned by law. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 5812(a).
14. The NFA defined "machinegun" as a specific type of "firearm." National Firearms Act § 1(b).
15. The original proposed definition of "machinegun" included "any weapon designed to shoot automatically, or semi-automatically, 12 or more shots without reloading." Hearing on H.R. 9066, House Ways and Means Comm., 73rd Cong., 6 (1934) ().
16. In hearings prior to adoption of the NFA, the House of Representatives received testimony that a gun "which is capable of firing more than one shot by a single pull of the trigger, a single function of the trigger, is properly regarded, in my opinion, as a machinegun," whereas "[o]ther guns [that] require a separate pull of the trigger for every shot fired ... are not properly designated as machineguns." Hearing on H.R. 9066, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., at 40 (1934) ().
17. In a report on the legislation that became the NFA, the House Committee on Ways and Means stated that the bill "contains the usual definition of machinegun as a weapon designed to shoot more than one shot without reloading and by a single pull of the trigger." H.R. Rep. No. 73-1780, at 2 (1934).
18. When enacted in 1934, the final statutory definition of "machinegun" under the NFA excluded the 12-shot threshold originally proposed, but still included a prohibition on weapons "designed to shoot ... semiautomatically." National Firearms Act § 1(b).
19. In 1968, Congress passed the Gun Control Act ("the GCA"). Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1214 (Oct. 22, 1968); see 18 U.S.C. § 921 et seq.
20. The GCA was enacted less than four months after the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (June 19, 1968), in which Congress made findings that "the high incidence of crime in the United States threatens the peace, security, and general welfare of the Nation and its citizens," and that gun control laws and other measures were warranted "[t]o prevent crime and to insure the greater safety of the people" through "law enforcement efforts [that] must be better coordinated, intensified, and made more effective at all levels of government." Id.
21. A Senate report on the legislation that became the GCA indicates that the law was passed to "regulate more effectively interstate commerce in firearms" to reduce crime and misuse, to "assist the States and their political subdivisions to enforce their firearms control laws," and to "help combat ... the incidence of serious crime." S. Rep. No. 89-1866, at 1 (1966).
22. The GCA deleted the phrase "or semiautomatically" from the statutory definition of "machinegun," but otherwise expanded the definition to include "parts designed and intended for use in converting a weapon into a machinegun." Gun Control Act, tit. II, § 201 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b) ).
23. In 1986, Congress amended the GCA by enacting the Firearm Owners Protection Act ("the FOPA"). Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449 (May 19, 1986).
24. The FOPA added 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) to the GCA, which reads:
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