Cargill v. Garland

• Decision Date: 06 January 2023
• Docket Number: 20-51016
• Parties: Michael CARGILL, Plaintiff—Appellant, v. Merrick GARLAND, in his official capacity as U.S. Attorney General; United States Department of Justice; Steven Dettelbach, in his official capacity as Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, Defendants—Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

57 F.4th 447

Michael CARGILL, Plaintiff—Appellant,

v.Merrick GARLAND, in his official capacity as U.S. Attorney General; United States Department of Justice; Steven Dettelbach, in his official capacity as Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, Defendants—Appellees.

No. 20-51016

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

FILED January 6, 2023

Richard Abbott Samp, Chief Counsel, New Civil Liberties Alliance, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff—Appellant.

Bradley Hinshelwood, Trial Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Mark Bernard Stern, Esq., U.S. Department of Justice Civil Division, Appellate Section, Washington, DC, Abby Christine Wright, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division, Washington, DC, for Defendants—Appellees.

Trevor Caldwell Burrus, Cato Institute, Washington, DC, for Amicus Curiae Cato Institute.

Michael Jean, National Rifle Association of America, Fairfax, VA, for Amicus Curiae National Rifle Association of America.

Stephen Obermeier, Wiley Rein, L.L.P., Washington, DC, for Amici Curiae Firearms Regulatory Accountability Coalition, Incorporated, and NST Global, L.L.C., B&T USA, L.L.C.

Robert Michael Miller, Fairfax, VA, Pro Se.

John D. Cline, Law Office of John D. Cline, Seattle, WA, for Amicus Curiae Due Process Institute.

William Jeffrey Olson, Esq., Vienna, VA, for Amici Curiae Gun Owners of America, Incorporated, Gun Owners Foundation, Gun Owners of California, America's Future, Tennessee Firearms Association, Virginia Citizens Defense League, Arizona Citizens Defense League, Grass Roots North Carolina, Rights Watch International, Conservative Legal Defense and Education Fund, and Heller Foundation.

Glenn Evans Roper, Pacific Legal Foundation, Highlands Ranch, CO, Daniel Ortner, Counsel, Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression, Philadelphia, PA, for Amicus Curiae Pacific Legal Foundation.

Joseph Greenlee, Firearms Policy Coalition, Sacramento, CA, Joshua James Prince, Schaerr Jaffe, L.L.P., Washington, DC, for Amici Curiae Firearms Policy Coalition, and Center to Keep and Bear Arms.

Jeffrey Jennings, Liberty Justice Center, Chicago, IL, for Amicus Curiae Liberty Justice Center

Ian Simmons, O'Melveny & Myers, L.L.P., Washington, DC, for Amicus Curiae Giffords Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence.

Joshua James Prince, Schaerr Jaffe, L.L.P., Washington, DC, for Amicus Curiae FPC Action Foundation.

John Cutonilli, Garrett Park, MD, Pro Se.

Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Jones, Smith, Stewart, Dennis, Elrod, Southwick, Haynes, Graves, Higginson, Willett, Ho, Duncan, Engelhardt, Oldham, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.

Jennifer Walker Elrod, Circuit Judge, joined by Richman, Chief Judge, and Jones, Smith, Stewart, Southwick, Haynes, Willett, Ho, Duncan, Engelhardt, Oldham, and Wilson, Circuit Judges:^*

Since the National Firearms Act of 1934, federal law has heavily regulated machineguns. Indeed, as proposed, that law was known to many as "the Anti-Machine Gun Bill." The possession or transfer of a machinegun was eventually banned through the Gun Control Act of 1968 and the Firearms Owners' Protection Act of 1986. Today, possession of a machinegun is a federal crime, carrying a penalty of up to ten years' incarceration.

This appeal concerns a regulation promulgated by the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, purporting to interpret the federal prohibition on machineguns as extending to bump stocks. A bump stock is a firearm attachment that allows a shooter to harness the natural recoil of a semi-automatic weapon to quickly re-engage the trigger after firing, enabling him to shoot at an increased rate of speed. When ATF first considered the type of bump stocks at issue here, it understood that they were not machineguns. ATF maintained this position for over a decade, issuing many interpretation letters to that effect to members of the public.

But ATF reversed its longstanding position in 2018, subjecting anyone who possessed a bump stock to criminal liability. ATF reversed its position to a great extent in response to the tragic events that occurred in Las Vegas on October 1, 2017. On that day, a deranged gunman murdered dozens of innocent men and women, and injured hundreds more. To carry out this appalling crime, the gunman used many weapons and utilized many accessories—including bump stocks.

Public pressure to ban bump stocks was tremendous. Multiple bills to that effect were introduced in both houses of Congress. But before they could be considered in earnest, ATF published the regulation at issue here, short-circuiting the legislative process. Appellant Michael Cargill surrendered several bump stocks to the Government following publication of the regulation at issue. He now challenges the legality of that regulation, arguing that a bump stock does not fall within the definition of "machinegun" as set forth in federal law, and thus that ATF lacked the authority to issue a regulation purporting to define the term as such.

Cargill is correct. A plain reading of the statutory language, paired with close consideration of the mechanics of a semi-automatic firearm, reveals that a bump stock is excluded from the technical definition of "machinegun" set forth in the Gun Control Act and National Firearms Act.

But even if that conclusion were incorrect, the rule of lenity wouJohn Cutonilli, Garrett Parkld still require us to interpret the statute against imposing criminal liability. A rich legal tradition supports the "well known rule" that "penal laws are to be construed strictly." United States v. Wiltberger , 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 94–95, 5 L.Ed. 37 (1820). As Chief Justice Marshall explained long ago, the rule "is founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals; and on the plain principle that the power of punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial department. It is the legislature, not the Court, which is to define a crime, and ordain its punishment." Id. at 95.

The Government's regulation violates these principles. As an initial matter, it purports to allow ATF—rather than Congress—to set forth the scope of criminal prohibitions. Indeed, the Government would outlaw bump stocks by administrative fiat even though the very same agency routinely interpreted the ban on machineguns as not applying to the type of bump stocks at issue here. Nor can we say that the statutory definition unambiguously supports the Government's interpretation. As noted above, we conclude that it unambiguously does not. But even if we are wrong, the statute is at least ambiguous in this regard. And if the statute is ambiguous, Congress must cure that ambiguity, not the federal courts.

The definition of "machinegun" as set forth in the National Firearms Act and Gun Control Act does not apply to bump stocks. And if there were any doubt as to this conclusion, we conclude that the statutory definition is ambiguous, at the very least. The rule of lenity therefore compels us to construe the statute in Cargill's favor. Either way, we must REVERSE.

I

A

The Gun Control Act of 1968 provides that "it shall be unlawful for any person to transfer or possess a machinegun." 18 U.S.C. § 922(o)(1). The Act defines machinegun as follows:

The term "machinegun" means any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger. The term shall also include the frame or receiver of any such weapon, any part designed and intended solely and exclusively, or combination of parts designed and intended, for use in converting a weapon into a machinegun, and any combination of parts from which a machinegun can be assembled if such parts are in the possession or under the control of a person.

26 U.S.C. § 5845(b) ; see 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(24) (incorporating the definition in the National Firearms Act).

The traditional example of a machinegun¹ is a rifle capable of automatic fire, like the M-16. Semi-automatic rifles like the AR-15 are not machineguns. See Hollis v. Lynch , 827 F.3d 436, 440 n.2 (5th Cir. 2016) (The M-16 "is capable of automatic fire, that is to say, firing more than one round per trigger-action.... The AR-15 is essentially a semi-automatic version of the M-16, that is to say, it fires only one round per trigger-action.").

B

To understand what a machinegun is, it is helpful to understand what a machinegun is not. To that end, the firing mechanism of a semi-automatic weapon is especially important. The relevant parts are as follows:

The trigger is the interface between the gun's internal mechanism and the human finger. The sear is the trigger's top-forward geometric plane, which locks snugly into a groove near the spring of the hammer. The hammer is the spring-loaded element that strikes the firing pin, causing ignition of the charge and propulsion of the bullet. The disconnector is a part that sits on top of the trigger and serves to reset the hammer after a round is fired; this resetting is what makes a semi-automatic weapon semi-automatic.

The mechanics of the firing process are as follows. First, the user pulls the trigger. Doing so disengages the hammer from the sear, allowing the spring to swing the hammer to strike the firing pin, which causes the charge to combust and propel the bullet. The firing of the bullet thrusts the bolt backward, which kicks the hammer into the disconnector on top of the still-depressed trigger. When the trigger is reset, the hammer is pulled back into the cocked position and secured by the trigger's sear as it slips off the disconnector. The user may then fire again by pulling the trigger, without having to manually re-cock the hammer. The mechanics are viewed below:²

The end result is that the user of a semi-automatic firearm can fire rapidly by means of repeated use of the trigger. Critically, use of the trigger necessarily corresponds one-to-one with...