Caristo v. Blairsville-Saltsburg Sch. Dist.
Decision Date | 28 February 2019 |
Docket Number | 2:18-cv-00976 |
Parties | Tammy CARISTO, Plaintiff, v. BLAIRSVILLE-SALTSBURG SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
Avrum Levicoff, David A. Jones, Jr., The Levicoff Law Firm, P.C., Pittsburgh, PA, for Plaintiff.
Joseph L. Luvara, Linda V. Hernandez, Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, Pittsburgh, PA, for Defendants Blairsville-Saltsburg School District, Beverly Caranese, Holly Hall, Marlene Joyce, Michael Bartolini, Linda Brown.
P. Brennan Hart, Peter W. Nigra, Pietragallo Gordon Alfano Bosick & Raspanti, LLP, Pittsburgh, PA, for Defendant John Cambest, Esq.
Pending before the Court are two Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint. (Mots., ECF Nos. 19, 21; Compl., ECF No. 1.) Defendants Michael Bartolini, Blairsville-Saltsburg School District (the "School District"), Linda Brown, Beverly Caranese, Holly Hall, and Marlene Joyce filed their collective Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 19 ), and Defendant John Cambest filed his own Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 21. For the reasons that follow, both Motions are granted.
This defamation case arises out of a public statement made by Plaintiff Tammy Caristo ("Plaintiff")1 impugning the ethics and conduct of the Defendants and a press statement issued by the School District responding to Plaintiff, all of which related to Plaintiff's tenure as Superintendent of the School District.
Plaintiff was hired by the School District as Superintendent in 2010. (Compl. ¶ 7.) On December 7, 2016, the School District suspended Plaintiff without pay. (Id. ¶ 8.) Defendants Michael Bartolini, Linda Brown, Beverly Caranese, Holly Hall, and Marlene Joyce (collectively, "School Board Member Defendants") were five members of the School District's nine-member Board and had all voted in favor of the suspension.2 (Id. )
Following that suspension, Plaintiff commenced a civil action (also in this Court) against the School District and the School Board Member Defendants alleging that she was retaliated against in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, state whistleblower laws, and state contract law when she engaged in legally protected public speech concerning financial waste by the School District. (Id. ¶ 9.) That civil action settled via a written Settlement Agreement and Release, executed on November 22, 2017 ("Settlement Agreement"). (Id. ¶ 10.) Pursuant to the terms of the Settlement Agreement, Plaintiff received a monetary payment, she released School Board Member Defendants and the School District for liability for prior acts, and she resigned from her employment as Superintendent of the School District. (Id. )
Plaintiff gave a statement about the Settlement Agreement that made its way into newspaper articles published by TribLive and the Indiana Gazette. (Id. ¶¶ 41–42.) According to the Complaint, "Plaintiff's statement concerned false allegations, wrongdoing, misconduct, and financial waste by the [School] District and the School Board [Member] Defendants." (Id. )3
The School District then released a written "Press Statement" via its public website, and Defendant John Cambest, Solicitor for the School District, read the Press Statement aloud at a school board meeting on December 6, 2017.4 (Id. ¶¶ 4, 11.) The Press Statement states that its purpose is to "clear up the misstatements and fake news given to" the newspapers, presumably by Plaintiff. (Press Statement, ECF No. 1-2.) The Press Statement included the following statements, which Plaintiff alleges are "false and defamatory":
(Id. ¶ 13.) The Press Statement also lists allegations that were lodged against Plaintiff pending a Section 1080 Hearing5 following her December 2016 suspension. (Press Statement, at 1.) In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the allegations enumerated below are also "false and misleading" statements: (Compl. ¶ 13.)
(Id. )
Plaintiff alleges that all Defendants knew that these statements were false or made with reckless disregard for their falsity, and these statements were made "knowingly, willfully, and maliciously for the purpose of causing Plaintiff to suffer harm to her reputation, to hold her up for public ridicule, blacken her character, discredit her, and subject her to further harm and injury." (Id. ¶¶ 14–15.) The Press Release was later republished in print and online by various news outlets. (Id. ¶ 16.)
Plaintiff brings this lawsuit alleging that the publication of the "false and defamatory statements" via the Press Statement caused Plaintiff to suffer injury to her reputation and standing in the community, humiliation, public embarrassment and stigma, severe anxiety, distress, emotional pain and suffering, lost earnings and lost earning ability. (Id. ¶ 17.)
Count I of the Complaint asserts a claim for defamation (libel/slander), presumably under Pennsylvania common law, against the School Board Member Defendants and Mr. Cambest. (Id. ¶¶ 18–23.) Count II asserts a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment against the School Board Member Defendants and Mr. Cambest. (Id. ¶¶ 24–30.) Count III asserts claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment against the School District. (Id. ¶¶ 31–38.) Count IV asserts a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 First Amendment retaliation against the School District. (Id. ¶¶ 39–46.) The filed Motions to Dismiss attack the validity of each claim asserted.
A motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court is not opining upon whether the plaintiff will be likely to prevail on the merits; rather, when considering a motion to dismiss, the court accepts as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint and views them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002). While a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must provide more than labels and conclusions. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level" and "sufficient to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face." Id. "A claim has facial plausibility when ...
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