Caritativo v. People of the State of California Rupp v. Dickson

Citation357 U.S. 549,2 L.Ed.2d 1531,78 S.Ct. 1263
Decision Date30 June 1958
Docket Number562,Nos. 561,s. 561
PartiesBart Luis CARITATIVO, Petitioner, v. The PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA and Fred R. Dickson, Acting Warden. William Francis RUPP, Petitioner, v. Fred R. DICKSON, Acting Warden
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

See 79 S.Ct. 13.

Mr. George T. Davis, San Francisco, Cal., for petitioner caritativo.

Mr. A. J. Zirpoli, San Francisco, Cal., for petitioner Ruff.

Mr. Clarence A. Linn, San Francisco, Cal., for respondents.

Mr. Arlo E. Smith, San Francisco, Cal., for respondent Dickson.

Mr. Justice HARLAN, concurring.

Being uncertain as to the full implications of Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 70 S.Ct. 457, 94 L.Ed. 604, I prefer not to rely on that decision in disposing of these cases.

I proceed on the premise that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a State from executing a prisoner who has become insane after his conviction. Even so, I do not believe that the procedure established by California to deal with such cases, in evident recognition of the grave interest at stake, can upon the records before us be said to offend due process.

The California statute in substance imposes on the warden a mandatory duty to make a continuing check on the mental condition of condemned prisoners and to notify the district attorney whenever he finds grounds for belief that a prisoner has become insane. Upon being so advised, it is the unqualified duty of the district attorney to submit the issue of the prisoner's sanity to a jury in judicial proceedings in which the prisoner is entitled to be heard. The prisoner is given no right to commence such proceedings himself, or to be heard in connection with the warden's initiating determination. Affidavits submitted by the warden disclose that his statutory duty is carried out under a regular procedure pursuant to which the prison psychiatric staff submits reports to the warden as to all condemned prisoners soon after their arrival at the prison, and also submits a special psychiatric report within 20 days of a scheduled execution.

This procedure, in my opinion, satisfies the test of fundamental fairness which underlies due process. At the post-conviction stage of a capital case, it seems to me entirely proper for the State to condition a prisoner's right to a sanity trial upon a preliminary determination by a responsible official that 'good reason' exists for the belief that the prisoner has become insane. Surely it is not inappropriate for California to lodge this grave responsibility in the hands of the warden, the official who beyond all others has had the most intimate relations with, and best opportunity to observe, the prisoner. And having regard to the natural and impelling impulse of lawyers representing condemned men to stave off their execution as long as possible, I also think it constitutionally permissible for the State to conclude that such a preliminary determination should be made ex parte. It is a legitimate consideration for California to take into account that an adversary proceeding on the issue of probable cause might open the door to interminable delaying maneuvers in capital cases, contrary to the sound administration of justice. For example, unless this Court were prepared to accept as conclusive the warden's representation that he had reckoned with the condemned prisoner's submissions, whenever such a representation is challenged, it would inevitably invite judicial proceedings to determine whether the warden had in fact acted properly on every occasion that a condemned man claimed that he had become insane.

Granting that under the Fourteenth Amendment the warden may not refrain from making a responsible and good-faith determination, no considerations of this kind are suggested by either of the records before us. The warden's affidavits show that the usual procedures were followed here; that the prison psychiatrists unanimously concluded that each of the petitioners was sane; that the warden personally observed their conduct; and that 'neither from the psychiatric reports, his own observation, nor the reports of his custodial staff has he any reason to believe (petitioners) presently insane.' In addition, the warden affirms his intention to institute the required proceedings to determine petitioners' sanity if and when he has 'good reason' to believe either of them insane. Petitioners do not controvert the substance of these affirmations, but simply claim that they were denied due process because the warden acted without according them an opportunity to be heard or to submit further data.

In the absence of any challenge to the warden's affirmations that he followed the customary California procedure, that is, that he determined petitioners' sanity on the basis of responsible medical advice and on his own personal observations, and in the absence of any allegation that he acted in bad faith, I cannot say that the petitioners were denied due process solely because the warden declined, in the exercise of his discretion, to consider also the professions sought to be made on their behalf.

For these reasons I concur in the Court's affirmance of the two judgments.

Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER, whom Mr. Justice DOUGLAS and Mr. Justice BRENNAN join, dissenting.

By its summary disposition of these cases, the Court extends the disturbing decision in Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 70 S.Ct. 457, 94 L.Ed. 604, where it was found that a State did not offend due process by leaving to the private judgment of its governor, in which the victim had no part, the determination of the sanity of a man condemned to death. Now it appears that this determination, upon which depends the fearful question of life or death, may also be made on the mere say-so of the warden of a state prison, according to such procedure as he chooses to pursue, and more particularly without any right on the part of a man awaiting death who claims that insanity has supervened to have his case put to the warden. There can hardly be a comparable situation under our constitutional scheme of things in which an interest so great, that an insane man not be executed, is given such flimsy procedural protection, and where one asserting a claim is denied the rudimentary right of having his side submitted to the one who sits in judgment.

Petitioners in both these cases have been convicted of murder in the first degree and sentenced to death. Their convictions were affirmed by the Supreme Court of California. People v. Caritativo, 46 Cal.2d 68, 292 P.2d 513; People v. Rupp, 41 Cal.2d 371, 260 P.2d 1. Subsequently, each petitioned that court for habeas corpus to review the determination of the warden of San Quentin, where they are confined awaiting execution, that there is no reason to believe petitioners insane and his refusal to institute proceedings under California law to determine their present sanity. To review the denial of these petitions, Caritativo v. Teets, 48 A.C. (Minutes, May 8, 1957); Rupp v. Teets, 49 A.C. (Minutes, Aug. 27, 1957), we granted certiorari. 355 U.S. 853, 78 S.Ct. 89, 2 L.Ed.2d 62; Rupp v. Teets, 355 U.S. 854, 78 S.Ct. 91, 2 L.Ed.2d 62.

Sections 3700 and 3701 of the California Penal Code set forth the procedure to be followed in determining the sanity of a person condemned to death. Section 3700 provides that, 'No judge, court, or officer, other than the Governor, can suspend the execution of a judgment of death, except the warden of the State prison to whom he is delivered for execution, as provided in the six succeeding sections, unless an appeal is taken.' Section 3701 provides that, 'If, after his delivery to the warden for execution, there is good reason to believe that a defendant, under judgment of death, has become insane, the warden must call such fact to the attention of the district attorney of the county in which the prison is situated, whose duty it is to immediately file in the superior court of such county a petition, stating the conviction and judgment, and the fact that the defendant is believed to be insane, and asking that the question of his sanity be inquired into. Thereupon the court must at once cause to be summoned and impaneled, from the regular jury list of the county, a jury of 12 persons to hear such inquiry.'

The warden in the present cases did not institute proceedings pursuant to these sections leading to a judicial determination of petitioners' sanity. According to the petitions for habeas corpus filed in the California Supreme Court, he did not do so in spite of the fact that 'there is good reason to believe' that petitioners are insane. Affidavits of the warden, appended to briefs filed in this Court, state that he has observed the petitioners and examined reports submitted to him by prison psychiatrists, and that he has no reason to...

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    • U.S. Supreme Court
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