Carl Eberle v. People of the State of Michigan

• Court: U.S. Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Lamar
• Citation: Carl Eberle v. People of the State of Michigan, 232 U.S. 700, 34 S.Ct. 464, 58 L.Ed. 803 (1914)
• Decision Date: 23 March 1914
• Docket Number: No. 164,164
• Parties: CARL EBERLE and Stephen H. Carroll, Plffs. in Err., v. PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN

232 U.S. 700

34 S.Ct. 464

58 L.Ed. 803

CARL EBERLE and Stephen H. Carroll, Plffs. in Err.,

v PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN.

No. 164.

Argued January 16 and 19, 1914.

Decided March 23, 1914.

Mr. Richard Price for plaintiffs in error.

[Argument of Counsel from page 701 intentionally omitted] Mr. Grant Fellows, Attorney General of Michigan, for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice Lamar delivered the opinion of the court:

The Michigan local option law of 1889 makes it unlawful to manufacture or sell malt, vinous, spirituous, or intoxicating liquors in any county where a majority of the electors vote in favor of prohibition.

The provisions of the law, however, do not (§ 1) apply to druggists selling such liquors in compliance with the restrictions imposed upon them by the general laws of this state. It was also provided (§ 15) that 'nothing in this act shall be so construed as to prohibit the sale of wine for sacramental purposes, nor shall anything herein con- tained prohibit druggists from selling pure alcohol for medicinal, art, scientific, and mechanical purposes.' Pub. Acts (Mich.) 1889, pp. 287, 293.

By amendments passed in 1899 and 1903 (Acts of 1899, p. 280; Acts of 1903, p. 229), it was further provided that the act should not be construed to 'prohibit the sale of wine or cider made from home-grown fruit in quantities of not less than 5 gallons, nor . . . to prohibit the manufacture of wine or cider, nor . . . to prohibit the sale at wholesale of wine or cider manufactured in said [dry] county to parties who reside outside of said county.'

As a result of an election held April 13, 1909, the law became operative in Jackson county on May 1st, 1909. The defendants, who were officers of a brewing company, were charged with having thereafter manufactured beer in that county, in violation of the statute. They moved to quash the information, upon the ground that the act was void because it interfered with interstate commerce, took property without due process of law, and so discriminated against them and other manufacturers residing in dry counties as to deny them the equal protection of the law. These defenses were overruled. On the trial they offered evidence tending to show that the beer which they had manufactured had not been made for sale, but to be used in causing re-fermentation of 1,600 barrels of beer, worth $5 a barrel, which was on hand at the date of the election, with a view of making it salable, and thereby save themselves against loss. Under the charge of the court, the jury returned a verdict of guilty. The case was then taken to the supreme court of Michigan, which held (167 Mich. 477, 133 N. W. 519) that the amendments of 1899 and 1903 (permitting the manufacture and sale of wine and cider in dry counties) were void as an unlawful discrimination against the products and citizens of other states, and a violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. The court, however, sustained the conviction and sentence of defendants upon the ground that the original local option act was constitutional and had not been rendered invalid by the void amendments of 1899 and 1903. The case was then brought here, where, in addition to the errors previously assigned, the plaintiffs in error—defendants in the trial court—insisted that the court erred in holding that the act could be valid if the amendments relative to wine and cider were stricken—said provisions 'being a part of the act at the time the local option law was adopted in Jackson county, where defendants reside, and operating, together with the other provisions of the act, to bring about such adoption.'

1. The argument here was principally directed to a discussion of this assignment of error,—the defendants contending that the discriminatory wine-and-cider amendments formed an integral part of the law (Endlich, Statutes, §§ 94, 294) which had been submitted to the voters, and which, when adopted, it was claimed, was adopted as a whole. It was insisted that the provisions permitting the manufacture and sale of wine and cider induced many to vote for the law as amended, and it was, in effect, argued that these amendments could not be treated as a part of the statute for the purpose of carrying the election, and then be held void in order to save the law from being set aside as discriminatory. In support of this contention, defendants relied on State ex rel. Huston v. Perry County, 5 Ohio St. 497, where the court was considering a local option statute, one section of which provided for an election to determine whether a county seat should be removed, and another (§ 5) contained unconstitutional provisions which were such 'as would naturally influence the vote upon the adoption or rejection of the main section.' It was held that 'the provisions of both sections are made equally to depend upon the result of the election. They were submitted by the legislature collectively to the voters, and could only be passed upon as a whole, and . . . must therefore stand or fall together.' But in that case the valid and invalid provisions formed an inseparable part of a...