Carland v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 88-1713-K.

• Citation: 727 F. Supp. 592
• Decision Date: 27 December 1989
• Docket Number: No. 88-1713-K.,88-1713-K.
• Parties: Beatrice Hinds CARLAND, Plaintiff, v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant.
• Court: United States District Courts. 10th Circuit. United States District Courts. 10th Circuit. District of Kansas

727 F. Supp. 592

Beatrice Hinds CARLAND, Plaintiff, v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant.

No. 88-1713-K.

United States District Court, D. Kansas.

December 27, 1989.

Andrew L. Oswald, Martindell, Swearer, Cabbage, Ricksecker & Hertach, Hutchinson, Kan., for plaintiff.

William A. Wells, Gott, Young & Bogle, Wichita, Kan., for appellant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

PATRICK F. KELLY, District Judge.

This matter is before the court on motion by the defendant, Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. (Metropolitan), to dismiss or for summary judgment. In addition, plaintiff Beatrice Hinds Carland, in her response, seeks summary judgment.

The plaintiff originally filed this action in Reno County District Court, seeking to recover proceeds from a life insurance policy on her former husband, Ralph Carland. In the state court petition, the plaintiff alleged that a divorce decree between her and her former husband required that she was to be the sole beneficiary of the policy in question. Metropolitan then sought removal of the case to this court under 26 U.S.C. § 1441(a) & (b) (diversity and federal question jurisdiction). Metropolitan then filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, alleging that it has already properly paid out the full proceeds of the policy according to the terms of the divorce decree and to a change of beneficiary form executed by the decedent husband. In response, the plaintiff asserts she does state a claim under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., and that she is entitled to summary judgment thereunder.

The court finds herein that the plaintiff does state a cause of action under ERISA. In addition, since none of the facts alleged by the plaintiff in her summary judgment motion are controverted by the defendant, they are deemed admitted under D.Kan. Rule 206(c). As a result, the court finds herein that the plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Findings of Facts

The following are the facts set forth in the parties' summary judgment motions and they are not controverted by the party in opposition thereto.

Ralph C. Carland, as an eligible employee of Metropolitan, was covered for group life insurance under Metropolitan Group Policy No. 50 G.L., Certificate No. 134181 (group policy). The group policy is part of an employee welfare benefit plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq.

Mr. Carland and plaintiff, Beatrice Carland, were divorced on September 4, 1964. The journal entry of the divorce decree reads in pertinent part as follows:

The court further finds that the parties hereto have entered into an agreement which contains the mutual covenants of the parties hereto with regard to that for which they would jointly ask the court to decree regarding child custody and visitation, child support, alimony, property division and expenses. An executed copy of said agreement is attached hereto and made a part hereof.

....

In accordance with said agreement Defendant is ordered to pay the premiums on, and to make irrevocable designation of Plaintiff as the sole primary beneficiary under and of, the policies of insurance on the life of defendant listed in Schedule "A" appended to the Settlement Agreement to which reference has been made herein.

(Emphasis added).

SCHEDULE "A"

Policies of Insurance on life of Ralph C. Carland

                   Policy No.             Company                Face Amount
                   17 083 285A    Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.     $ 5,000.00
                   22 127 306A    Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.      10,000.00
                   21 300 423     New York Life Ins. Co.           5,000.00
                   21 372 985     New York Life Ins. Co.           5,000.00
                   Ctf. 134181    Metropolitan Group Ins.        Current value
                                                              less 1000.00
                

(Journal Entry, Case No. 13926, D.Ct. Reno Co., Kan., Sept. 4, 1964). At the time the property settlement was negotiated, Beatrice Carland was a homemaker and Ralph Carland was an employee of defendant Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., holding the position of District Manager, Hutchinson District Office.

On September 4, 1964, the value of Mr. Carland's life insurance under Policy Ctf. 134181 (group policy) was $14,000.00. At the time of Mr. Carland's death on April 9, 1987, some 23 years after the divorce decree, the value of Mr. Carland's life insurance under the group policy was $51,480.00.

In a letter to the defendant dated February 15, 1974, Mr. Carland said the following:

Please note that the attached schedule is from my divorce decree of September 4, 1964, Case 13926. The decree provides that my Group life Insurance is designated to go to my divorced wife — Beatrice Hinds Carland — in the amount of the current value, less $1,000.00 as of the date of the decree.

Therefore, I direct the Company to make the following Beneficiary designations:

Primary beneficiaries:

BEATRICE HINDS CARLAND — divorced wife, $13,000.00 (Current value, less $1,000.00 as of date of divorce, September 4, 1964)

OLIVE KOHLMEYER CARLAND — present wife, Group Insurance over and above $13,000.00 Secondary Beneficiaries:

RALPH C. CARLAND, JR. and CHRISTOPHER BRIEN CARLAND (Share and share alike of all to survivor)

I further request that the beneficiary designation be effective as of the date of this memo of record.

On or about March 1, 1974, Mr. Carland attempted to change the beneficiary of the group policy from solely Beatrice Carland to Beatrice Carland as beneficiary for $13,000.00, and Olive Carland, his second wife, as beneficiary for any amount in excess of $13,000.00. On the same day, Mr. Carland designated Olive Carland as beneficiary for all of the group life insurance. It is unclear which designation was completed first.

Ralph Carland died on April 9, 1987. On April 10, 1987, Beatrice Carland gave written notice to Metropolitan of her claim to the entire proceeds of the insurance policy under the aforementioned divorce decree and enclosed a copy of the relevant divorce decree provisions. The Tulsa Metropolitan office received the letter on April 12, 1987. On April 14, 1987, defendant's Tulsa office sent plaintiff claim application forms which required a death certificate. On May 4, 1987, while waiting for receipt of the death certificate requested from the New York City Bureau of Vital Records, plaintiff spoke with defendant's Wichita district office. She was assured by that office that she was the beneficiary of the policy, but that the company needed a death certificated in order for it to formally process her claim. On May 6, 1987, plaintiff again spoke with the Wichita office, requesting information as to the policy's value. On May 8, 1987, plaintiff was informed by Wilma Sandoval of defendant's Wichita office, that a call to defendant's New York office had revealed that the company intended to pay another beneficiary. At this time Wilma Sandoval informed the New York office that the Wichita office was in possession of the divorce decree which designates plaintiff as the sole and irrevocable beneficiary of the proceeds of the policy. On May 11, 1987, the plaintiff sent a letter to one of Metropolitan's offices and enclosed a certified copy of the divorce decree. On May 13, 1987, plaintiff sought the intervention of the Kansas Insurance Commissioner's Office.

On or about May 22, 1987, Metropolitan paid Olive Carland all of the insurance proceeds plus interest. Subsequently, Metropolitan contacted Olive Carland and sent her a copy of the divorce decree. Olive Carland agreed that plaintiff Beatrice Carland was entitled to $13,000.00 under the divorce decree and reimbursed $13,000.00 to Metropolitan. Metropolitan paid plaintiff $13,623.99, claiming such represented her share under the 1964 divorce decree plus interest.

Thereafter, plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Metropolitan contending that she should have received all of the insurance proceeds, $51,480.00, from the group life policy rather than just $13,000.00 plus interest.

Standard of Review

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In considering a motion for summary judgment, this court must examine all evidence in a light most favorable to the opposing party. McKenzie v. Mercy Hospital, 854 F.2d 365, 367 (10th Cir.1988). Further, the party moving for summary judgment must demonstrate its entitlement beyond a reasonable doubt. Ellis v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 754 F.2d 884, 885 (10th Cir.1985). The moving party need not disprove plaintiff's claim, but rather, must only establish that the factual allegations have no legal significance. Dayton Hudson Corp. v. Macerich Real Estate Co., 812 F.2d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir.1987).

In resisting a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party may not rely upon mere allegations, or denials, contained in its pleadings or briefs. Rather, the party must come forward with specific facts showing the presence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial and significant probative evidence supporting the allegations. Burnette v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 849 F.2d 1277, 1284 (10th Cir.1988). One of the principal purposes of summary judgment is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses, and the rule should be interpreted in a way that allows it to accomplish this purpose. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

Furthermore, it must be noted that cross-motions for summary judgment do not automatically empower the court to dispense with the determination of whether questions of material fact exist. Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Voigt, 700 F.2d 341, 349 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 805, 104 S.Ct. 53, 78 L.Ed.2d...