Carling Brewing Co. v. Belzner

• Decision Date: 01 June 1972
• Docket Number: No. 497,497
• Citation: 291 A.2d 175,15 Md.App. 406
• Parties: CARLING BREWING COMPANY et al. v. Henry BELZNER.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 406

15 Md.App. 406

291 A.2d 175

CARLING BREWING COMPANY et al. v. Henry BELZNER.

No. 497.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

June 1, 1972.

K. Donald Proctor, Baltimore, with whom was John S. Hebb, III, Baltimore, on the brief for appellants.

R. Roland Brockmeyer, Baltimore, for appellee.

Argued before MURPHY, C. J., and MOYLAN and CARTER, JJ.

CARTER, Judge.

Judge Robert B. Watts of the Superior Court of Baltimore City affirmed an order of the Workmen's Compensation Commission (hereafter referred to as the Commission) which found that Henry Belzner (appellee) sustained an accidental personal injury arising out of and in the course of his employment with the Carling Brewing Co., Inc. The employer and its insurer, Royal Indemnity Company, (appellants) have appealed from this determination, contending that the injury was not compensable because it resulted from an emotional outburst precipitated by appellee's anger over a matter in no way related to his employment.

The case was tried below on the transcript of the proceedings before the Commission. The record shows that the injury occurred during a regular thirty-minute luncheon break on August 13, 1970, in a lunchroom provided by the appellant (employer) on the work premises. The lunchroom contained luncheon facilities and a pay telephone for the use and convenience of the employees. The employer compensated the appellee (claimant) during his luncheon break to the same extent as though he were working. During the luncheon period, the appellee used the pay telephone to make a personal call to the police to inquire if a warrant he had sworn out against a man had been served. After being advised that it had not been served, appellee hung up the phone, turned around and took about two steps toward Mr. Hussey, a coemployee who was then standing in the open doorway of the lunchroom. Hussey greeted the appellee by calling his name and the appellee then threw his hands up and out and said to Mr. Hussey, 'God damn, lousy people!' As the appellee made this statement and gesture, his right hand and arm crashed through the glass window of the open door to the lunchroom thereby causing the injury complained of. The door, which was to appellee's right as he approached Hussey, was approximately three feet from the telephone. Hussey testified that after appellee hung up the phone, he was 'choked up * * * very loud and shouting,' and was so positioned that 'when he throwed his hands he had to hit the glass.' He further stated that the appellee was usually loud and boisterous and on several prior occasions he had seen the appellee make similar gestures while speaking. Hussey did not think that appellee intentionally struck the door. Appellee testified that he was 'just expressing myself after the telephone conversation, and I put my hand out and it was no intention of anything whatsoever.' He said, 'I use my hands quite a bit when I talk, and everything, and at that time it was unfortunate that I used my hands and I didn't see the door was there, and I threw my hand out and that was it.' He admitted that he was upset at the time over his telephone conversation with the police, but not to the extent that he did not know what he was doing.

The Commission found from this evidence that appellee's injury was not self-inflicted, that it was accidental, and arose out of and in the course of appellee's employment. In affirming the Commission's order, Judge Watts, sitting without a jury, reviewed the evidence and concluded therefrom, among other things, that he was 'not convinced that the throwing out of Belzner's arms was an emotional reaction.' The court stated:

'* * * There is testimony from Hussey that Belzner was normally boisterous and regularly used hand and arm gestures when speaking. Appellant provides no evidence to contradict this portion of Hussey's testimony, and it appears that the Commission based much of its finding of fact on this point. It is inconceivable to this Court that Belzner's arm movements at the time of the accident were solely emotional. To be so would mean that the gesture Belzner used was one lacking in habit and prior use. But, there is testimony that Belzner normally communicated with his hands and that he was speaking with Hussey as his hands moved outward. The exact nature of the movement of Belzner's arms and hands remains shrouded, and neither litigant has produced evidence sufficient to remove this cloak.

'Because of the continuing conflict in the evidence which has not been settled conclusively to this Court's satisfaction, the mind of the Court is in equal balance as to the character of Belzner's up thrown arms. The appellant has not met the burden of proof so as to satisfy the Court that the Commission's finding of fact was incorrect, and the decision and order of the Workmen's Compensation Commission must be affirmed. * * *'

Appellants contend on appeal, as they did below, that the evidence before the Commission was legally insufficient to permit a finding that appellee's injury did not result from an emotional outburst stemming from a cause wholly unrelated to his work. Appellants contend that as a matter of law only one conclusion could be properly reached in view of the evidence, namely, that appellee's injury was not compensable, primarily because it did not arise out of his employment. Appellants rely particularly upon Rice v. Revere Copper & Brass, Inc., 186 Md. 561, 48 A.2d 166. Appellee claims on the other hand that the evidence was legally sufficient to show that he accidentally came into contact with the glass in the door under circumstances not emanating from an emotional outburst. He contends that while there was evidence showing that he was upset by his phone call to the police, and that he so indicated to his fellow employee, he did not see the...