Carlson v. Clark

• Decision Date: 13 February 2009
• Docket Number: No. 07-313.,07-313.
• Citation: 970 A.2d 1269,2009 VT 17
• Parties: David W. CARLSON and Linda Carlson, et al. v. Lockwood L. CLARK and Claire B. Clark.
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

970 A.2d 1269

2009 VT 17

David W. CARLSON and Linda Carlson, et al. v. Lockwood L. CLARK and Claire B. Clark.

No. 07-313.

Supreme Court of Vermont.

February 13, 2009.

John C. Gravel and Thomas C. Nuovo of Bauer, Gravel, Farnham, Nuovo, Parker & Lang, Burlington, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

John C. Collins and Michael J. Harris of Collins, McMahon & Harris, PLLC, Burlington, for Defendants-Appellees.

Present: REIBER, C.J., DOOLEY, JOHNSON, SKOGLUND and BURGESS, JJ.

¶ 1. JOHNSON, J.

Plaintiffs challenge the trial court's denial of their request to unilaterally relocate a shoreline right-of-way held by defendants Lockwood and Claire Clark. According to plaintiffs, the Clarks hold an easement by necessity, rather than a prescriptive easement, and plaintiffs are entitled to move the Clarks' easement to a location plaintiffs deem more convenient. The Clarks respond that their right to use the shoreline road was conclusively determined in prior litigation with plaintiffs' predecessor-in-interest, and that plaintiffs are barred by the doctrine of res judicata from raising this issue for a second time. We agree with the Clarks, and affirm.

¶ 2. Plaintiffs own real property on a peninsula called Windmill Point in Alburg, Vermont, derived from a common grantor, the Aqua Terra Corporation. The Clarks own adjacent property as well as an historic lighthouse on the tip of the peninsula. The Clarks have a right-of-way to their property that runs along the shoreline of Lake Champlain, behind plaintiffs' homes. Plaintiffs purchased their lots with clear notice of the existing right-of-way. They nonetheless claimed that increased traffic on the road was presenting a safety hazard and interfering with their ability to enjoy their backyards. Plaintiffs asked the Clarks to move their right-of-way to a new access road running along the center of the peninsula. The Clarks declined to do so.

¶ 3. In March 2004, plaintiffs sued the Clarks, alleging that the Clarks held an easement by necessity, and that the necessity no longer existed because plaintiffs had created a new access road. Plaintiffs asked the court to "extinguish" the existing right-of-way, and order the Clarks to use the private roadway they had constructed. Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment and the court denied their motion. The court found that both the servient and dominant estates must agree to the relocation of an existing easement. The court also noted that material facts remained in dispute regarding the level of traffic on the shoreline road.

¶ 4. In March 2006, the Clarks moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that their vested prescriptive easement rights defeated plaintiffs' attempt to unilaterally move the right-of-way. The trial court agreed, finding that the earlier summary judgment ruling had resolved the issue of whether the right-of-way could be unilaterally relocated. The court declared the Clarks' easement to be prescriptive, and reiterated that it could not be relocated without the Clarks' consent.

¶ 5. Before the issue of the traffic level on the road could be tried, the parties reached an agreement on the road's use. They stipulated that use of the shoreline road would be limited to the Clarks and their family members, and that other visitors would use the center road. As part of their stipulation, the parties also reserved the right to challenge the trial court's underlying orders. In July 2007, the trial court issued a final order, recognizing the Clarks' right to use their existing right-of-way. Plaintiffs appealed.

¶ 6. On appeal, plaintiffs assert that, notwithstanding this Court's ruling in prior litigation between the Clarks and plaintiffs' predecessor-in-interest, the Clarks hold an easement by necessity. They suggest that any prior statement that the Clarks held a prescriptive easement was "unnecessary and served only to confuse the true nature of the easement." Plaintiffs argue that because the Clarks' easement is one of necessity, they have the right to relocate it unilaterally.¹

¶ 7. As plaintiffs conceded below, the nature of the Clarks' right to use this road has already been litigated and determined to be a prescriptive easement.² See Clark v. Aqua Terra Corp., 133 Vt. 54, 329 A.2d 666 (1974). In Aqua Terra, we recounted the following history of the shoreline road. In 1857, one Mott, who owned the entire Windmill Point peninsula, conveyed the lighthouse property to the United States. The deed did not include an express right of access, but following the conveyance, the lighthouse keepers and family members used the shoreline road to access the property. In 1946, the United States conveyed the lighthouse property to a private owner, again with no mention of access to the property. Evidence showed, however, that from 1949 forward, there was continuous use of the shoreline road by the owners of the lighthouse property, including by the Clarks, who acquired the property in 1963.

¶ 8. Mott eventually transferred his property to Aqua Terra Corporation, and in 1972, Aqua Terra physically blocked the shoreline right-of-way. The Clarks filed a complaint for injunctive relief, seeking the removal of the physical barrier and an order permanently enjoining Aqua Terra from interfering with their use of the right-of-way. The Clarks asserted that the right-of-way had been used to access their property for over sixty years. Aqua Terra responded that any prior use of this road was permissive. Following a trial, the court issued a written order finding that there had been open, notorious, continuous, and adverse use of the shoreline road since 1949. The court concluded that the Clarks had obtained a right-of-way by prescription, "defined as that parcel of land on the westerly side of Windmill Point ... from the terminus of the town road at the old ferry landing directly to the northerly gate of [the Clarks]." The court permanently enjoined Aqua Terra from interfering with the described right-of-way.

¶ 9. While neither party appears to have directly raised the issue of an easement by necessity, the Clarks did allege in their complaint that no public road served their property, although they noted that the property was accessible by water. In a related vein, Aqua Terra asked the court to find, following trial, that Lake Champlain was a navigable waterway, and that at the time of the initial conveyance to the United States, the property was accessible by a water route over Lake Champlain. Aqua Terra also maintained that there had been no evidence presented at trial as to whether any public roads served the lighthouse property at the time of the initial conveyance. As reflected above, the trial court found the easement to have been acquired by prescription, not implied by necessity. It noted in its findings, however, that access to the lighthouse could be had by water, as it had been in the past, although such access would be limited during much of the year due to weather conditions.

¶ 10. Aqua Terra appealed from the trial court's decision, arguing that the prior use of the right-of-way had been permissive, not adverse, and thus, the Clarks could not have obtained a prescriptive right of way. We rejected this argument and affirmed the trial court's order. In reciting the facts, we noted, sua sponte, that Mott's conveyance to the United States in 1857 "would generate in the United States a right-of-way by necessity," which would attach to the land and pass to succeeding owners. Aqua Terra, 133 Vt. at 56, 329 A.2d at 667. No further specific mention was made of a right-of-way by necessity, however. Instead, the Court discussed the trial court's finding that the Clarks' right was acquired by prescription and that it had not been abandoned. We concluded, in response to the arguments raised by Aqua Terra, that it was for the trial court to weigh the evidence. Id. at 57, 329 A.2d at 668.

¶ 11. Although the case was disposed of by deferring to the trial court's finding of fact that the use was adverse, we gave a further response to Aqua Terra's position that the use was permissive. "But assuming the facts to be as [Aqua Terra] urges them," we reasoned, the result would be the same. Id. Once the right attached, we explained, whether it arose at the time of the initial conveyance or through prescription, it could not be divested by future permissive use of the road. Id. at 57-58, 329 A.2d at 668. Although this discussion ensued in the context of the Clarks' prescriptive claim, the opinion does not further characterize the right.

¶ 12. It is fair to say, however, that the majority of our discussion in the case involved the issues that were actually litigated between the parties in the superior court, which were adverse use, abandonment, and permission. Moreover, we affirmed the trial court's judgment on appeal, and we did not note that we were affirming on an alternate legal theory, as we are entitled to do on appeal. We read Aqua Terra to affirm the trial court's decision that the Clarks hold a right-of-way by prescription, and we construe the Court's reference to a possible easement by necessity as dicta.³

¶ 13. Because the issue of the Clarks' easement right has been litigated, plaintiffs are now barred from trying to recharacterize the nature of that right. As we have often repeated, "[u]nder the doctrine of claim preclusion, a final judgment in previous litigation bars subsequent litigation if the parties, subject matter, and cause(s) of action in both matters are the same or substantially identical." Faulkner v. Caledonia County Fair Ass'n, 2004 VT 123, ¶ 8, 178 Vt. 51, 869 A.2d 103. The doctrine "bars parties from relitigating, not only those claims and issues that were previously litigated, but also those that could have been litigated in a prior action." Merrilees v. Treasurer, 159 Vt. 623, 624, 618 A.2d 1314, 1316 (1992) (mem.)⁴; see also Moitie, 452 U.S. at 398, 101 S.Ct. 2424 ("A final judgment on the merits of an action...