Carlson v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc.

• Decision Date: 28 May 2015
• Docket Number: No. 13–14979.,13–14979.
• Citation: 787 F.3d 1313
• Parties: Donald E. CARLSON, Sheree Harting, Charles House, Stephen Renberg, Troy Upman, each individually and on behalf of all similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs–Appellants, Cross–Appellees, v. FEDEX GROUND PACKAGE SYSTEMS, INC., Defendant–Appellee Cross–Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

787 F.3d 1313

Donald E. CARLSON, Sheree Harting, Charles House, Stephen Renberg, Troy Upman, each individually and on behalf of all similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs–Appellants, Cross–Appellees

v.FEDEX GROUND PACKAGE SYSTEMS, INC., Defendant–Appellee Cross–Appellant.

No. 13–14979.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

May 28, 2015.

Robert I. Harwood, Matthew M. Houston, Peter W. Overs, Harwood Feffer, LLP, New York, N.Y., Anthony L. Marchetti, Jr., Marchetti Law, PC, Cherry Hill, NJ, Kristine M. Reighard, James A. Staack, Staack & Simms, PA, Clearwater, FL, for Plaintiff–Appellant Cross–Appellee.

Barry Richard, Mary Hope Keating Greenberg Traurig, LLP, Tallahassee, FL, K. Lee Blalack, II, O'Melveny & Myers, LLP, Washington, DC, Jennifer Evans, Daniel J. Franklin, O'Melveny & Myers, LLP, New York, N.Y., Kimberly J. Geary, Fedex Ground Package System, Inc., Coraopolis, PA, Benjamin H. Hill, III, David L. Luikart, III, Brett J. Preston, Hill Ward Henderson, PA, Tampa, FL, for Defendant–Appellee Cross–Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, JORDAN and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.

Opinion

JORDAN, Circuit Judge:

For customers who are regularly visited by the ubiquitous white trucks of FedEx Ground, with their familiar purple and green logos, the usual concern is whether packages are picked up on schedule and delivered on time. If asked, a good number of those customers would probably say that they believe (or reasonably assume) that the drivers of those white trucks are employed by FedEx. The law, however, sometimes has a funny way of making hard what would otherwise seem intuitively simple, and that is the case with the legal status of FedEx's drivers. The drivers who work for FedEx in Florida say they are employees, while FedEx maintains that they are independent contractors, and the resolution of that dispute is critical to a class action lawsuit filed by those Florida drivers against FedEx. Applying Florida law, we conclude that, on this record, the issue is one for a jury to resolve.

I

Drivers who worked for FedEx in Florida filed suit in June of 2005, asserting a number of statutory and common-law claims against the company (statutory claims under Florida's Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, see Fla. Stat. § 501.201 et seq., and common-law claims for false information negligently supplied, breach of contract, and fraud). Between 2003 and 2009, drivers in approximately 40 other states filed similar actions against FedEx. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated these actions and transferred them to the Northern District of Indiana, which we will refer to as the MDL court. In these consolidated actions, the drivers alleged that, under their respective state laws, they were employees of FedEx and sought, among other things, reimbursement of business expenses and back pay for overtime. See In re FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., Emp't Practices Litig., 758 F.Supp.2d 638, 654 (N.D.Ind.2010) (In re FedEx II ).

The Florida drivers sought class certification in the MDL court, arguing that their status as employees would be demonstrated by the standard contract they executed with FedEx—the “Operating Agreement”—and internal policies, practices, and procedures distributed by FedEx to its officers and employees. The MDL court agreed with the drivers and certified a Florida class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), finding that the common question regarding FedEx's right to control the work of its drivers predominated over other questions affecting members of the class. It determined that the extent of FedEx's control would depend on an analysis of the terms of the standard Operating Agreement, as well as standard practices and procedures of FedEx that were systematically applicable to all of the Florida drivers.

Following discovery, the Florida drivers filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that they were FedEx's employees under Florida law. FedEx filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing that the drivers were independent contractors. The MDL court, specifying that it was only considering “evidence common to the drivers' relationships with FedEx on a nationwide basis” (i.e., the standard Operating Agreement and FedEx's standard practices and procedures), granted FedEx's motion for summary judgment and denied the drivers' motion. Id. at 655.

In granting FedEx's motion, the MDL court ruled that the drivers were independent contractors under Florida law because, under the Operating Agreement and FedEx's standard practices and procedures, FedEx did not have the right to control the manner, method, and means by which the drivers did their jobs. See In re FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., Emp't Practices Litig., 734 F.Supp.2d 557, 560–75 (N.D.Ind.2010) (In re FedEx I ) (setting out the provisions of the standard Operating Agreement and FedEx's standard practices and procedures in the course of analyzing similar claims by Kansas drivers); In re FedEx II, 758 F.Supp.2d at 676–78 (applying Florida law to those provisions, practices, and procedures). Incorporating its earlier decision in In re FedEx I concerning Kansas drivers, the MDL court concluded that “ ‘the only reasonable inference that can be drawn [from the Operating Agreement and FedEx's standard practices and procedures] is that FedEx hasn't retained the right to control the details of the [Florida drivers'] work methods on a class-wide basis.’ Whether the court looks only to the right to control, or to all the Restatement factors or some number of factors in-between, the result is the same.” In re FedEx II, 758 F.Supp.2d at 678 (quoting In re FedEx I, 734 F.Supp.2d at 589 ).

The MDL court then remanded the case to the Middle District of Florida for resolution of individual common-law claims (false information negligently provided and breach of contract) asserted by plaintiffs Sheree Harting, Troy Upman, and David Mosher. FedEx prevailed on these individual claims in the Middle District, and ultimately obtained a final judgment in its favor. The Florida drivers now appeal.

II

We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the record and drawing all factual inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving parties. See Mazzeo v. Color Resolutions Int'l, LLC, 746 F.3d 1264, 1266 (11th Cir.2014). Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact” and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “[W]hether a genuine issue concerning a material fact exists is itself a question of law that must be decided by the court.” 10A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2720 (3d ed.1998).

“If reasonable minds could differ on the inferences arising from undisputed facts, then a court should deny summary judgment.” Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir.1997) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This is because “the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, as we explain, the underlying facts are largely undisputed, but the inferences that can be drawn from those facts are not.

III

Everyone in this diversity case agrees that Florida substantive law governs. See generally Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). In interpreting Florida law, we look first to precedent from the Florida Supreme Court. If there is no such precedent, we adhere to decisions of Florida's intermediate appellate courts absent some persuasive indication that the Florida Supreme Court “would decide the issue otherwise.” Winn–Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Dolgencorp, LLC, 746 F.3d 1008, 1021 (11th Cir.2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). See Huron Holding Corp. v. Lincoln Mine Operating Co., 312 U.S. 183, 189 n. 7, 61 S.Ct. 513, 85 L.Ed. 725 (1941).

A

The claims of the Florida drivers stand or fall on the common question of whether FedEx properly classified them as independent contractors. In Florida, “[i]t is well-established that the question of an employer/employee relationship is generally a question of fact, and therefore a question for the trier of fact.” Pate v. Gilmore, 647 So.2d 235, 236 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). Accord Villazon v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 843 So.2d 842, 853 (Fla.2003) (“The existence of an agency relationship is normally one for the trier of fact to decide.”). Nevertheless, this general default rule does not always apply, and Florida courts have not hesitated to grant summary judgment on the employee/independent contractor question when the circumstances warrant. See, e.g., Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Kendall, 88 So.2d 276, 279 (Fla.1956).

In determining whether an employment relationship exists, the Florida Supreme Court has long used the standard set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Agency. See Keith v. News & Sun Sentinel Co., 667 So.2d 167, 172–73 (Fla.1995) ; Cantor v. Cochran, 184 So.2d 173, 174–75 (Fla.1966) ; Kendall, 88 So.2d at 278–79 ; Magarian v. S. Fruit Distribs., 146 Fla. 773, 1 So.2d 858, 860–61 (1941). Generally speaking, the Restatement provides that an employee is “a person employed to perform services in the affairs of another and who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the services is subject to the other's control or right to control.” Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220(1) (1958).

The Restatement provides a list of 10 non-exclusive “matters of fact” that courts should consider in determining whether someone is an employee. These factors, used by the Florida Supreme Court in Cantor, 184 So.2d at 174–75, are as follows: (a) the extent of control which, by the parties' agreement,...