Carlson v. Kozlowski

• Decision Date: 18 January 1977
• Citation: Carlson v. Kozlowski, 172 Conn. 263, 374 A.2d 207 (Conn. 1977)
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Alan J. CARLSON v. Edward J. KOZLOWSKI, Commissioner of Motor Vehicles.

Page 207

374 A.2d 207

172 Conn. 263

Alan J. CARLSON v.Edward J. KOZLOWSKI, Commissioner of Motor Vehicles.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Nov. 3, 1976.

Decided Jan. 18, 1977.

John F. Gill, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, was Carl R. Ajello, Atty. Gen., for appellant(defendant).

Robert M. Zeisler, Bridgeport, for appellee(plaintiff).

Before HOUSE, C. J., and LOISELLE, BOGDANSKI, LONGO and BARBER, JJ.

LOISELLE, Associate Justice.

The plaintiff's operator's license was suspended for a period of at least one year by the defendant commissioner of motor vehicles pursuant to General Statutes § 14-111(c).¹The plaintiff appealed to the Court of Common Pleas and his appeal was sustained.The commissioner of motor vehicles has appealed from that judgment.

According to its memorandum of decision, the Court of Common Pleas sustained the appeal on the ground that the adjudicator abused his discretion in relying solely on hearsay statements which the court held were not competent evidence.We find that the appeal was properly sustained for another reason."A judgment responsive to the issues and supported by the facts should stand, even if the court's method of reaching its decision might be questionable."Malone v. Steinberg, 138 Conn. 718, 723, 89 A.2d 213;see alsoWalsh v. Turlick, 164 Conn. 75, 84, 316 A.2d 759.

The adjudicator of the motor vehicle department found that on October 14, 1973, at approximately 1 a.m., the plaintiff's vehicle, travelling south at approximately fifty to fifty-five miles per hour, appeared to jump the red light facing it and crashed broadside into another vehicle.The other vehicle had been heading north and was continuing through the intersection in an attempt to make a left turn and head west, although the traffic light facing it had turned red.A passenger in the other vehicle was killed.The adjudicator concluded that the plaintiff caused or contributed to the death of the passenger.The plaintiff's operator's license was suspended.The only witness who testified at the hearing was a police officer who had arrived at the accident scene within five to ten minutes after the collision.The other evidence, and the only evidence pointing to the plaintiff's culpability, was contained in affidavits of four witnesses to the accident who were not present at the hearing.These affidavits were admitted over the plaintiff's objection.

The hearing, being contested, was subject to the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act, General Statutes§§ 4-166 4-189, § 4-178 of which reads in part as follows: "Any oral or documentary evidence may be received, but the agency shall, as a matter of policy, provide for the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence.Agencies shall give effect to the rules of privilege recognized by law.Subject to these requirements, when a hearing will be expedited and the interests of the parties will not be prejudiced substantially, any part of the evidence may be received in written form."

At the outset, it is noted that evidence in written form is not, as a matter of law, inadmissible in an administrative hearing conducted under General Statutes § 4-178 unless it substantially prejudices a party.The words "substantially prejudice" as they appear in the statute are to be construed according to commonly approved usage of the language;General Statutes § 1-1;Balch Pontiac-Buick, Inc. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles,165 Conn. 559, 565, 345 A.2d 520;"(o)r, stated another way, statutory language is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning."Klapproth v. Turner,156 Conn. 276, 280, 240 A.2d 886, 888.

Both parties cite Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842, in support of their respective positions.There the United States Supreme Court ruled that medical reports, although hearsay, were sufficiently trustworthy to constitute substantial evidence to support the denial of a disability claim.Federal law requires a reviewing court to set aside an agency finding if the finding is not supported by "substantial evidence."5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E).Our statute differs in that it provides that a court may reverse or modify an agency decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings are clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record.General Statutes § 4-183(g)(5).

This case, however, turns on the authority of a court to reverse an agency decision under § 4-183(g)(1), where the administrative decision is in "violation of . . . statutory provisions," such as § 4-178 of the General Statutes.On this issue the standard set forth in Richardson is not irrelevant.If hearsay evidence is insufficiently trustworthy to be considered "substantial evidence" and it is the only evidence probative of the...