Carlson v. Miller

Decision Date01 May 1934
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesCARLSON v. MILLER et al.

Appeal from Superior Court, Hartford County; Newell Jennings, Judge.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Arvid Carlson opposed by Charles G. Miller and others. From a finding and award of the Compensation Commissioner in favor of plaintiff defendant appealed to the superior court. From a judgment sustaining the appeal and setting aside the award, plaintiff appeals.

Error and cause remanded with directions.

Donald Gaffney, of New Britain, for appellant.

Delancey S. Pelgrift, of Hartford, for appellees.

Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HAINES, HINMAN, BANKS, and AVERY, JJ.

HAINES, Judge.

The defendant was in the business of selling meats, vegetables and fruits, and engaged the plaintiff as an employee and not as independent contractor, to erect a stand upon which to display his goods. The plaintiff was using the employer's saw in cutting lumber for this stand when he was injured by the saw. The commissioner held that the plaintiff was a casual employee, but that the work he was doing was " for the purposes of the employer's trade or business" and within the meaning and intent of General Statutes, § 5223, and awarded him compensation; but upon defendant's appeal the superior court ruled that the work was not of that character sustained the appeal, and set aside the award, and the plaintiff then appealed to this court. The correctness of the latter ruling is the only question presented by this appeal.

The relevant portion of section 5223 reads: " ‘ Employee’ shall mean any person who has entered into or works under any contract of service or apprenticeship with an employer: *** but said term shall not be construed to include (a) an outworker or (b) one whose employment is of a casual nature, and who is employed otherwise than for the purposes of the employer's trade or business ."

Throughout the record and in argument, frequent reference is made to another statute; section 5230, which is entitled and rends as follows: " Principal employer, contractor and subcontractor . When any principal employer shall procure any work to be done wholly or in part for him by a contractor, or through him by a subcontractor, and the work so procured to be done shall be a part or process in the trade or business of such principal employer, and shall be performed in, on or about premises under his control, then such principal employer shall be liable to pay all compensation under this chapter to the same extent as if the work were done without the intervention of such contractor or subcontractor." Compensation acts in many other jurisdictions contain language of more or less similar import to that we have italicized in quoting our own statutes, and we are referred to many decisions in such jurisdictions, which, however, are not greatly helpful because of variations in statutory phraseology and context and in the factual set-up of the questions involved.

There have been three decisions of this court dealing more or less directly with the interpretation of these terms. In Pallanck v. Donovan, 105 Conn. 591, 136 A. 471, 472, the plaintiff was injured while employed at housework in the home of the employer whose business was conducting a meat market. It was there held that the work being done by the plaintiff was not " for the purpose of that business."

In Fox v. Fafnir Bearing Co., 107 Conn. 189, 139 A 778, 58 A.L.R. 861, the plaintiff's injury occurred while cleaning the windows of the defendant's factory building. The defendant had contracted with M to do this work at a certain price per window and the plaintiff was engaged in this work as an employee of M. The defendant's business was the manufacture and sale of ball bearings. This work was being done under a contractor, and the case involved the meaning of the provision of section 5345 of the Revision of 1918, now section 5230. The respondent contended that the plaintiff had failed to establish his right under that statute in one particular, viz.: That it was not shown that the work he was doing was " a part or process in the trade or business" of the company. See Crane v. Peach Brothers, 106 Conn. 110, 113, 137 A. 15. We cited many decisions under the British and other Compensation Acts to illustrate the inharmony of view in various courts as to the scope and meaning of similar provisions, and to enforce the conclusion that no general rule of interpretation applicable in all cases was deducible from the authorities. We pointed out that, for the most part, this diversity of view arose in cases where the work being done was by way of repairing or improving the premises used in the business-work essential to the purposes of the business though not strictly a part of the business itself. The defendant's business required it to maintain and operate its factory with necessary instrumentalities for the production and marketing of ball bearings, and while the cleaning of the windows of the factory was not a " process" in the making of ball bearings, yet it and other work " which was an essential part of the maintenance and operation of its factory was a part of its ‘ trade or business." In decreeing compensation to the plaintiff in that case, we looked upon the cleaning of the windows as a work of maintenance and, fairly considered, as an essential, such as the cleaning of the floors and ordinary janitor work, customarily done in the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
8 cases
  • Garrison v. Gortler, 46417.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Iowa
    • March 7, 1944
    ...Industrial Comm., 173 Cal. 642, 161 P. 2, and LaGrande Laundry Co. v. Pillsbury et al, 173 Cal. 777, 161 P. 988.” In Carlson v. Miller, 118 Conn. 367, 172 A. 872, 873, 874, the court in speaking of the exception in the Connecticut act and distinguishing it from the exception in the Pennsylv......
  • Garrison v. Gortler
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Iowa
    • March 7, 1944
    ......v. Industrial Comm., 173 Cal. 642, 161 P. 2, and LaGrande. Laundry Co. v. Pillsbury et al, 173 Cal. 777, 161 P. 988." In Carlson v. Miller, 118 Conn. 367, 172 A. 872,. 873, 874, the court in speaking of the exception in the. Connecticut act and distinguishing it from the ......
  • Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Pixler
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Florida
    • November 14, 1939
    ...... case of Caca v. Woodruff, 70 Ind.App. 93, 123 N.E. 120, wherein the claimant was working as a carpenter by the. hour, and paid weekly by miller to make additions and repairs. at the mill under the miller's supervision, that court. held that the repair and construction work was in the usual. ... fruit, held engaged in work for the purpose of employer's. trade or business and compensation was allowed. Carlson. v. Miller, 118 Conn. 367, 172 A. 872. . . Removal. of lumber accumulated in rear of store was part of process of. trade or business ......
  • Levecque v. Dupuis
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Connecticut
    • November 20, 1934
    ...market. It was there held that the work being done by the plaintiff was not "for the purpose of that business." In Carlson v. Miller, 118 Conn. 367, 371, 172 A. 872, the defendant was in the business of selling meats and vegetables and engaged the plaintiff to erect a stand upon which to di......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT