Carlton v. Estelle

• Decision Date: 28 June 1973
• Docket Number: No. 72-3544.,72-3544.
• Citation: 480 F.2d 759
• Parties: Darrell Eugene CARLTON, #166802, Petitioner-Appellant, v. W. J. ESTELLE, Director, Texas Department of Corrections, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

480 F.2d 759 (1973)

Darrell Eugene CARLTON, #166802, Petitioner-Appellant, v. W. J. ESTELLE, Director, Texas Department of Corrections, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 72-3544.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

June 28, 1973.

Bertrand C. Moser (Court-appointed), Houston, Tex., for petitioner-appellant.

John L. Hill, Atty. Gen., Howard M. Fender, Guy C. Fisher, Lonny F. Zwiener, Asst. Attys. Gen., Austin, Tex., for respondent-appellee.

Before BELL, GOLDBERG and SIMPSON, Circuit Judges.

BELL, Circuit Judge:

At appellant's state trial for rape the prosecution introduced evidence which derived from a warrantless search of his automobile. There was no direct appeal from his conviction, but appellant pursued collateral state remedies and ultimately petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas corpus. He alleged that the warrantless search of his automobile had been unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied relief. We affirm.

The facts are not in dispute. Ruth Dean Bailey was raped on September 24, 1961, between 9:30 p.m. and 11:30 p.m. She went to a hospital. She was interviewed at the hospital by officers of the Harris County Sheriff's Department. She told the officers that a man had taken her at gunpoint, forced her into a blue and white car, driven the car into a field, and raped her there, in or near the car. She gave the officers a physical description of the man.

Her boyfriend, Mr. Schiefelle, was present at the interview. He told the officers that he knew of a person meeting the description of the rapist and that he knew the name of this person's employer, a Mr. Harris. After a short conference, the officers, joined by Mr. Schiefelle and other members of the Sheriff's Department, went to the home of Mr. Harris. Mr. Harris told them that he did have an employee who fit the description of the rapist. This employee drove a 1955 blue and white Pontiac. His name was Darrell Eugene Carlton. Mr. Harris gave the officers the address of Carlton's parents.

The officers then went to the home of Carlton's parents. Carlton's mother met them and told them that her son lived on West 22nd Street. Mr. Schiefelle said that he knew the exact address. The officers went to that address.

When they arrived at Carlton's home it was early in the morning, just after daybreak, several hours after the rape had occurred. Upon their arrival, they observed a blue and white Pontiac parked on the street in front of the house. They surrounded the house. Two officers went to the door. Carlton's wife met them and admitted them. They asked to see Mr. Carlton. She said that he was asleep. They said that they must talk to him. Carlton either awoke on his own or was awakened by the officers. Dressed only in shorts, which were spotted with blood, he went into the living room. The victim had been treated for head lacerations. Carlton was immediately placed under arrest.

Shortly, Carlton and the two arresting officers emerged from the house. The record discloses that on his way from the house to an awaiting police car, Carlton observed an officer of the Sheriff's Department bent over in his (Carlton's) car. The record discloses that the officer who conducted this search found a bloody shirt on the floorboard of the car, a button, and blood stains on the front seat.

During the period of the arrest and search, Carlton's wife was in the house. She was never placed under arrest; she was not asked to come with Carlton to the station house; her freedom was not restricted in any way.

After the search, the blue and white Pontiac was seized and taken to the Sheriff's Department. It was parked in the basement. Around 8:00 a.m. it was searched again, without a warrant. The second search revealed a fingerprint of the victim of the rape.

The evidence produced by these searches was introduced, over objection, at Carlton's trial. Carlton was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. As stated, he did not take a direct appeal.

After an evidentiary hearing on his federal habeas petition, the district court concluded that Carlton had not deliberately bypassed state procedures by failing to take an appeal and had otherwise exhausted all state remedies presently available to him. On the merits, the district court considered the propriety of the contested warrantless search, the sole issue presented on the merits, in light of the opinion of the Supreme Court in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 1971, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed.2d 564. The court upheld the search on the ground that (1) the investigating officers had lawfully and inadvertently obtained a "plain view" of the automobile in their pursuit of Carlton and (2) because they had probable cause to believe that the automobile contained, and was itself, evidence of crime, they were entitled to seize it and search it without a warrant, under the "plain view" exception to the warrant requirement.

We uphold the search as well, but on somewhat different grounds.

It is the general rule that a search conducted without the prior approval of a magistrate is unreasonable, and therefore violative of the Fourth Amendment, even though a subsequent assessment of the circumstances of the search may reveal that the investigating authorities had probable cause. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, 403 U.S. at 455, 91 S.Ct. 2022; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576. But cases do arise in which a search based on probable cause is reasonable, and constitutional, even though a warrant is not obtained beforehand. These cases represent exceptions to the warrant requirement.

The courts and the commentators have pigeonholed and labeled many of the "exceptional" cases. Thus some of the cases are said to represent the "automobile" exception, see, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 1925, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543; others are said to represent the "plain view" exception, see, e.g., Ker v. California, 1963, 374 U. S. 23, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726; others, the "search incident to a lawful arrest" exception, see, e.g., Chimel v. California, 1969, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685; others, the "stop and frisk" exception, see, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 1968, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889; others, the "abandonment" exception, see, e.g., United States v. Colbert, 5 Cir., 1973, 474 F.2d 174 (en banc); still others, the "hot pursuit" exception, see, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 1967, 387 U.S. 294, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L. Ed.2d 782, and so on. These labels are useful; they are not substitutes for thought. We use them, but we use them with care. Some cases fall between the categories. The labels do not always fit. Many decisions turn, not upon the labels, but upon a close analysis of the facts.

In the case before us, the investigating officials came upon Carlton's car in the early hours of morning, after a night of intensive investigation. They had obtained a physical description of the assailant and a description of his car, and they quickly pursued one lead after another until they came to the Carlton residence. They approached the house, knocked on the door, discovered Carlton inside, placed him under arrest, and conducted a simultaneous warrantless search of the car. The question is whether this course of action was constitutionally unreasonable.

Under the circumstances presented here, one important consideration in determining reasonableness vel non is the potential constitutional significance of courses of action other than the one pursued by the officers — courses which were open to them at the time of their arrival at the Carlton residence. Basically, there were three of these. First, the officers could have proceeded exactly as they did, except that instead of conducting a warrantless search of the car, they could have seized the car without a warrant, secured it against movement, and sought a warrant before conducting a search. Second, upon their arrival at the house they could have stopped in their tracks, sought a warrant for the arrest of Carlton and the search of the car, and then proceeded to the house to make the arrest only after the warrants had been obtained. Third, they could have proceeded to the house without warrants and arrested Carlton, as they did, except that instead of conducting a warrantless search afterwards or making a warrantless seizure, they could have sought a warrant and delayed any search or seizure in the hope that the car would not be driven away before a warrant could be obtained.

With regard to the first alternative, we observe that under the Fourth Amendment there is "no difference between on the one hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying out an immediate search without a warrant". Chambers v. Maroney, 1970, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419. If a warrantless seizure of a car is constitutionally permissible, an immediate warrantless search of the car is permissible as well. 399 U.S. at 52, 90 S.Ct. 1975. The question, of course, is whether a warrantless procedure is permissible in either case.

In the present context the Chambers rule means that the warrantless seizure alternative was not a constitutionally significant one. This leaves the second and third alternatives and the questions they present: On the one hand, upon their arrival at the house, should the officers have stayed their pursuit of Carlton until arrest and search warrants were obtained? On the other hand, should the officers have proceeded to the house, arrested Carlton, and afterwards, without making a warrantless seizure, sought a warrant before searching the car?

As to the first of these questions, we think the officers were not obliged to obtain arrest and search warrants before proceeding to the point of arrest. They were not certain of the whereabouts of Carlton; they did not know the location of the car until they arrived at...