Carlton v. State

• Decision Date: 08 June 1982
• Docket Number: 6 Div. 646
• Citation: 415 So.2d 1241
• Parties: John Edward CARLTON v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 1241

415 So.2d 1241

John Edward CARLTON v. STATE.

6 Div. 646.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

June 8, 1982.

Elizabeth Debardeleben, Birmingham, for appellant.

Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and Martha Gail Ingram, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

BOWEN, Judge.

The defendant was indicted and convicted of assault in the first degree. Alabama Code 1975, Section 13A-6-20. Sentence was eighteen years' imprisonment.

I

The defendant claims that since one of the prospective jurors worked part-time at Rich's Department Store where the security guard was assaulted the court erred when it overruled defendant's motion to strike the juror for cause.

In qualifying the jury venire, the following occurred:

"MR. GOMANY (Assistant District Attorney): Does anyone know Mr. Clemons? Let me identify him further. At the time of the incident he was employed as security officer for Rich's Department Store out at Century Plaza.

"PJ PUCHTA: (Raised hand.)

"MR. GOMANY: Now, Ms. Puchta--

"PJ PUCHTA: I was employed at Rich's part-time.

"MR. GOMANY: Were you there when this incident occurred? Do you recall it?

"PJ PUCHTA: I was not working at the time.

"MR. GOMANY: Okay. This happened back on September 22nd, 1980.

"PJ PUCHTA: Well, I was working at the store, but not that particular day it happened.

"MR. GOMANY: Okay. Do you recall any of the events about it?

"PJ PUCHTA: Very few. I wasn't involved at all.

"MR. CONWAY (Defense Counsel): Judge, we challenge for cause.

"MR. GOMANY: We except to that.

"THE COURT: Ms. Puchta, I have to ask you what I asked this other gentlemen. As you heard me say, your verdict--if you're on the jury your verdict has to be based solely on the evidence you hear in this case and then on the law which I will give you at the end of the case. It should not be based on anything outside the case. Now, whatever you heard, is this just from hearing someone that was around there?

"PJ PUCHTA: Yes, sir.

"THE COURT: Now, can you base--I don't know what you heard or whether you heard much of anything, but can you base your verdict solely on what you--on the evidence that you hear only in this courtroom and the law and not on anything that you have heard about this matter outside the courtroom?

"PJ PUCHTA: Yes, sir, I can.

"THE COURT: All right. I overrule the motion.

"MR. CONWAY: We reserve an exception."

The facts that the victim and a prospective juror are personally acquainted and work for the same company do not automatically disqualify a juror for cause. Grandquest v. Williams, 273 Ala. 140, 146, 135 So.2d 391 (1961). Employment of the juror by the same company that employed the victim is not a prima facie indication of interest or bias on the part of the juror. Glenn v. State, 395 So.2d 102, 107 (Ala.Cr.App.1980), cert. denied, 395 So.2d 110 (Ala.1981).

While bias or "probable prejudice" will disqualify a prospective juror, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in denying the challenge for cause. If the defendant felt there was some relationship between the witness and the prospective juror which would prevent the juror from forming a fair and impartial opinion he should have propounded further questions to determine the specific nature of the relationship. Grandquest, 273 Ala. at 146, 135 So.2d 391.

The defendant also argues that the prospective juror had independent knowledge of the facts of the incident. "As the Supreme Court and lower courts have continually reiterated, the constitutional standard of fairness requires only that the accused have 'a panel of impartial " 'indifferent' " jurors' who base their decision solely on the evidence produced in court; it does not require jurors to be wholly ignorant of the case." Mayola v. State of Alabama, 623 F.2d 992 (5th Cir. 1980), quoting from Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 at 799-800, 95 S.Ct. 2031 at 2035-2036, 44 L.Ed.2d 589 (1975).

The record reveals that the prospective juror knew few events about the case and was not involved in any way. She affirmed that she could base her verdict solely on the evidence presented in court. It was not error for the trial judge to deny defendant's challenge for cause. Jarrell v. State, 355 So.2d 747 (Ala.Cr.App.1978).

II

The defendant argues that the trial judge erred when he allowed the State to introduce evidence of another crime to show the defendant's intent because such evidence was more prejudicial than probative.

Rich's store detective, Billy Ray Clemons, attempted to arrest the defendant and his brother for shoplifting on September 23, 1980. Without warning, the defendant slashed Clemons across the face with a knife and escaped.

The next day the defendant was arrested after stealing some jewelry at a different Rich's department store. The defendant argues that the testimony of this second shoplifting incident requires a reversal of his conviction. We disagree.

Identification was not an issue in this case. The defendant admitted cutting the security guard but claimed that he struck only after he had first been attacked and then only in self-defense. The comments of the trial judge make it clear that the jury was informed of these contentions in the opening argument of defense counsel.

Under exceptions to the general rule excluding evidence which tends to show the commission of a crime other than that for which the defendant is on trial, evidence may be admitted to show motive, intent or scienter. C. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence, Section 69.01 et seq. (3rd ed. 1977). Under this exception, evidence of other offenses is admissible to show whether the defendant's intent was unlawful or whether it was good and lawful, Burt v. United States, 139 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1944); whether the accused acted intentionally or accidentally, Lucy v. State, 340 So.2d 840 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, Ex parte Lucy, 340 So.2d 847 (Ala.1976); or to show the purpose with which the act was committed, O'Neal v. State, 50 Ala.App. 31, 276 So.2d 616, cert. denied, 290 Ala. 370, 276 So.2d 621 (1973). For a comprehensive statement of the principles involved see Allen v. State, 380 So.2d 313 (Ala.Cr.App.1979), cert. denied, 380 So.2d 341 (Ala.1980).

Under the particular facts of this case, the major issue the jury had to determine was whether the defendant cut the security guard in an attempt to escape after committing a crime or whether the assault was committed in self-defense. Thus the issue of whether the defendant was actually shoplifting was fundamentally related to the issue of the intent of the assault.

The limited purpose of the evidence of the subsequent...