Carlyle v. Am. Health Partners

Decision Date08 March 2023
Docket Number4:21-cv-00920-RK
PartiesLYNDA G. CARLYLE, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN HEALTH PARTNERS, INC., TRUADVANTAGE, INC., TRUHEALTH, LLC, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri
ORDER

ROSEANN A. KETCHMARK, JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT.

This is an employment-discrimination/retaliation and wrongful discharge action brought under the Missouri Human Rights Act (“MHRA”) and Missouri's Whistleblower's Protection Act (“WPA”). Before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 42.) The motion is fully briefed. (Docs. 43, 46, 49.) After careful consideration and for the reasons explained below, the motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, as follows:

(1) Summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part as to Plaintiff's MHRA discrimination claims in Count I Summary judgment is granted in favor of Defendants as to Plaintiffs' MHRA age-discrimination claim and disability-discrimination claim based on pretermination personnel actions, and is denied as to Plaintiff's disability-discrimination claim based on her termination;
(2) Summary judgment is granted in favor of Defendants as to Plaintiff's MHRA retaliation claim in Count II; and
(3) Summary judgment is denied as to Plaintiff's WPA claim in Count III.
I. Background[1]

Defendant TruHealth, LLC d/b/a TruAdvantage, Inc., is a wholly owned subsidiary of Defendant American Health Partners, Inc. (collectively, Defendants). TruHealth contracts with long-term care facilities in Missouri to provide nurse practitioner (“NP”) and other medical care services to residents or patients of these facilities who have signed up for one of Defendants' health plans. Plaintiff Lynda Carlyle was hired by TruHealth as an NP on December 2, 2019. Plaintiff's immediate supervisor while employed as an NP with TruHealth was Clinical Program Manager Dawn Ketchum. Ms. Ketchum's supervisor was Director Kami Carlson.

One of the facilities at which Plaintiff was assigned to provide NP services for TruHealth was Highland Rehabilitation. (Doc. 46-2 at 11.) Plaintiff was working at Highland Rehabilitation, on July 13, 2020, when during a morning meeting the director of nursing for the facility said a CNA or charge nurse at the facility had recently reportedly walked in on a male resident and female resident in a sexually compromised position. Both residents involved were TruHealth patients. It was agreed at the morning meeting that the situation would be discussed further at a STRIDES meeting to occur the following day (a weekly mental health meeting involving Highland Rehabilitation's medical primary care providers, among others); the discussion would also include whether the male resident involved should continue to reside at Highland Rehabilitation.

The next day, July 14, 2020, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services (“DHSS”) reporting the alleged abuse by the male resident against the female resident. At the STRIDES meeting that same day, the decision was made to discharge the male resident from the facility.

The following day, July 15, 2020, Plaintiff called Ms. Ketchum and Chris Burkhart, the regional director of operations for the owner of Highland Rehabilitation, to discuss the situation. Plaintiff told Ms. Ketchum that she believed the male resident “should be reported to the State and that the facility wasn't doing anything about it.” Plaintiff did not inform Ms. Ketchum that she had already reported the alleged abuse to DHSS. Ms. Ketchum told Plaintiff that she would call Ms. Carlson and Kelly Helms, Vice President of the company that owned Highland Rehabilitation, to determine whether the incident should be reported to DHSS. Ms. Ketchum and Ms. Carlson agreed that Plaintiff did not need to report the incident “since [Plaintiff] didn't see anything,” “the female patient denied anything happening,” and “the facility had done their investigation.” (Doc. 46-1 at 29.) Ms. Ketchum then called Plaintiff and told her that she (Ms. Ketchum) and Ms. Carlson agreed there was nothing for Plaintiff to report; Plaintiff informed Ms. Ketchum that she had already made a report to DHSS the day before.

Three weeks later, on August 4, 2020, Plaintiff was issued a Personnel Action Form (“PAF”) for insubordination regarding her July 14 DHSS report, in addition to a PAF regarding her professionalism after referring to two members of a facility's management team as “butt buddies” in meetings. The next day, Plaintiff was issued a Performance Improvement Plan (“PIP”) outlining three areas of performance concerns, including: timely completing charting duties; insubordination (specifically referring to the PAF “from 8/4/20202”), and “professionalism while on calls/meetings.”[2]Plaintiff was also issued a PAF for providing medical treatment or services to a Highland Rehabilitation resident who was not a TruHealth member.

On August 9, 2020, Plaintiff submitted a grievance to Peter Boguski, a TruHealth Employee Relations Specialist, regarding personnel actions that had been taken against her the week before. Plaintiff asserted that the documents were inaccurate, false, or “backwards” facts.[3]The next day, Mr. Boguski asked Plaintiff to forward her grievance to Ms. Carlson, which she did. Plaintiff sent another complaint to Mr. Boguski on August 13, 2020, and Ms. Carlson on August 14, 2020, taking issue with various personnel actions. Ms. Carlson ultimately determined that Plaintiff was not insubordinate for making the DHSS report.

On August 18, 2020, while at Highland Rehabilitation, Ms. Ketchum went into an office shared by Plaintiff and the Case Manager, Heather Crouch. Plaintiff testified that in addition to herself and Ms. Crouch, the maintenance supervisor also had access to the office space, which was secured by a number keypad lock. When she went into the office, Ms. Ketchum found in plain view on Plaintiff's desk a pill bottle of hydrocodone that had been prescribed to Plaintiff. The following day, Plaintiff was terminated.

In the initial termination phone call, Ms. Carlson explained to Plaintiff:

It was discovered yesterday that there were controlled substances prescribed to you left in your place of work inside the nursing home. This causes suspicion for you having been on duty while under the influence of opioids and calls into question your judgment as these opioids were negligently left in plain sight on a desk in a shared office where the physical access could not be controlled by you. These new findings qualify as gross misconduct and based on the understanding of the performance improvement plan as it was written and delivered to you on August 4th, we are choosing to terminate your employment with TruHealth effective immediately.

The subsequent PAF notifying Plaintiff of her termination stated that Ms. Ketchum observed

a bottle of Hydrocodone on one of the desk[s] with the name Lynda Carlyle on it. This was sitting in plain site [sic]. There is cause for suspicion of working under the influence of Opiods. [sic] Also negligence in securing a controlled substance properly, which is concerning. The Admin, DON, and maintenance have access to this room. It would also be a concern that patients could break into the room and take this medication or distribute to other patients and cause injury or harm. There has been a history of rooms in the facility being broken into. This would be considered Gross Misconduct.

Further facts are set forth as necessary.

II. Legal Standard

“Summary judgment is required if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. Ins. Co. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 893 F.3d 1098, 1102 (8th Cir. 2018) (citations and quotation marks omitted). “In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court does not weigh the evidence, make credibility determinations, or attempt to discern the truth of any factual issue.” Morris v. City of Chillicothe, 512 F.3d 1013, 1018 (8th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Instead, the Court views the evidence “in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and giv[es] the nonmoving party the benefit of all reasonable inferences.” Fed. Ins. Co., 893 F.3d at 1102 (citation and quotation marks omitted).

A party may be entitled to summary judgment if the opposing party ‘fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case.' Hodge ex rel. Farrow v. Walgreen Co., 37 F.4th 461, 464 (8th Cir. 2022) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citation and quotation marks omitted). In other words, while the summary judgment movant has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of fact, . . . the plaintiff is not thereby relieved of his own burden of producing in turn evidence that would support a jury verdict.” Hodge, 37 F.4th at 464 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Once a summary judgment movant has satisfied his or her burden, the non-movant must point to some “affirmative evidence, specific facts, showing that there is a genuine dispute” as to a material fact. Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).

III. Discussion

Plaintiff seeks relief under three counts: Count I - MHRA claims for age and disability discrimination; Count II - MHRA claim for retaliation; and Count III - unlawful discharge in violation of the WPA. Defendants seek summary judgment as to each of these claims.

A. Waiver

In her response, Plaintiff did not address Defendants'...

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