Carmack v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Authority

Decision Date10 October 2006
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 05-11430-PBS.
Citation465 F.Supp.2d 18
PartiesJoseph T. CARMACK, Plaintiff, v. MASSACHUSETTS BAY TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY and Massachusetts Bay Commuter Railroad Company, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

Joseph T. Carmack, Boston, MA, pro se.

Todd M. Valicenti, MBTA, Robert K. Blaisdell, Donoghue, Barrett & Singal, PC, Boston, MA, for Defendants.

ORDER

SARIS, District Judge.

Action on motion: allowed in part and denied in part. "After review of Plaintiffs objections, the Court adopts the report and recommendation."

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANT MBCR'S MOTION TO DISMISS

DEIN, United States Magistrate Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

The plaintiff Joseph T. Carmack ("Mr.Carmack") has brought two actions, pro se, challenging his termination from employment as a locomotive engineer for the National Railroad Passenger Corporation ("Amtrak") and his subsequent treatment during his efforts to be reinstated. The first action, Civil Action No. 03-12488-PBS, was brought against Amtrak only. Discovery has been ongoing in that matter (the "Amtrak case") and Amtrak has filed a motion for summary judgment, which is presently pending before the court.

In the instant case, filed in 1995, Mr. Carmack has sued the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority ("MBTA") and the Massachusetts Bay Commuter Railroad Company ("MBCR"). Each of these defendants has filed a motion to dismiss the complaint against it pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The instant Report and Recommendation relates to MBCR's motion (Docket No. 15), by which MBCR is seeking dismissal of all fifteen counts of the plaintiffs First Amended Complaint.1

For the reasons detailed below, this court recommends to the District Judge to whom this case is assigned that MBCR's motion to dismiss (Docket No. 15) be ALLOWED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Specifically, this court recommends that the Railway Labor Act claim asserted against MBCR in Count I, and the claims set forth against MBCR in Counts II-IX and XI-XV be dismissed, but that MBCR's motion to dismiss otherwise be denied. Thus, the only remaining claims against MBCR would be Mr. Carmack's claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, § 11, which are asserted in Count I, and Mr. Carmack's claims for discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12112, and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701, which are asserted in Count X.

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts, and give the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences. See Cooperman v. Individual, Inc., 171 F.3d 43, 46 (1st Cir.1999). "Ordinarily, of course, any consideration of documents not attached to the complaint, or not expressly incorporated therein, is forbidden, unless the proceeding is properly converted into one for summary judgment under Rule 56." Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1993).2 Applying this standard to the instant case, the relevant facts are as follows.

The Parties

Mr. Carmack was employed by Amtrak as a Locomotive Engineer on Massachusetts commuter rail trains from December 1996 until his termination by Amtrak on May 13, 2002. (Am.Compl.¶¶ 13, 121). Mr. Carmack has been a member of the union, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers ("BLE"), since 1998. (Id. ¶ 14). Defendant MBTA is a state agency that was established pursuant to Massachusetts statutory law. (Id. ¶3). It is responsible for the administration of transportation services throughout the Commonwealth. (Id.). During the time Mr. Carmack was employed as a Locomotive Engineer, Amtrak operated commuter rail services pursuant to a contract with MBTA. (Id. ¶ 10). In the Fall of 2002, defendant MBCR replaced Amtrak, and entered into a contract with MBTA whereby MBCR agreed to take over the operation of commuter rail services within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts beginning on July 1, 2003. (Id. ¶ 9). MBCR is a for profit corporation, which is organized under the laws of Massachusetts. (Id, ¶ 4). Both MBCR and Amtrak maintain collective bargaining agreements with the BLE. (Id. ¶ 12).

In Counts I and X of his First Amended Complaint, Mr. Carmack is seeking to hold MBCR liable for the conduct of its own personnel. In Counts II-IX and XI-XV, Mr. Carmack is seeking to hold MBCR liable, apparently based on a theory of successor liability, for actions taken solely by Amtrak employees during the time when Mr. Carmack worked for Amtrak. (See id. § IV at p. 5 (alleging "successor and joint liability claims" against the defendants for Amtrak's actions)). However, Mr. Carmack has not alleged any facts showing that MBCR had any contractual relationship with Amtrak or was otherwise affiliated with Amtrak.

Circumstances Leading to Plaintiffs Discharge from Employment

According to Mr. Carmack, the events leading up to his allegedly wrongful termination from Amtrak began in the Spring of 2001. Specifically, on or about April 4, 2001, Mr. Carmack wrote a letter to the BLE's Local Chairman and other union members in which he "expressed belief in spiritual forces exerting positive and negative moral, spiritual and ethical influence of human beings." (Id, ¶ 161). Shortly thereafter, Gerrard L. DeModena, one of the plaintiffs supervisors at Amtrak, began an oral and written "campaign portraying Plaintiff as a violent, dangerous and mentally unstable person who has threatened Mr. DeModena." (Id. ¶ 29). Mr. DeModena allegedly conspired with other named Amtrak employees to falsely and maliciously portray Mr. Carmack. (Id, ¶ 32). In addition, Mr. DeModena and other named Amtrak employees allegedly distributed written materials wrongfully characterizing the religious beliefs expressed in Mr. Carmack's April 4, 2001 letter as indicative of a mental impairment and falsely describing the plaintiffs mental condition and ability to perform his job. (Id. ¶¶ 34-41, 163-65). Mr. DeModena was an Amtrak employee at the time when these events occurred; however, Mr. Carmack asserts that Mr. DeModena "became subsumed into the operations of MBCR on or about July 1, 2003." (Id, ¶ 28). Mr. Carmack also asserts, throughout the Amended Complaint, that these and other allegedly wrongful actions were taken by agents, servants and employees of the "Defendants." (See e.g., id. ¶¶ 32, 39, 164).

In April 2001, members of the Amtrak Threat Assessment Response Team ("TART") responded to Mr. DeModena's complaint that Mr. Carmack had threatened him, and evaluated materials that reportedly had been written by Mr. Carmark. (Id. ¶¶ 51-52). Although the TART team was unable to assess a threat or any cause for Mr. Carmack to be disciplined, it determined, based upon Mr. DeModena's representations, that the plaintiff should undergo a psychological examination. (Id. ¶¶ 53-54). Thereafter, on about May 3, 2001, Amtrak's Medical Director, Dr. Tim Pinsky, allegedly prepared and disseminated medical reports that falsely and maliciously characterized Mr. Carmack's mental condition. (Id. ¶ 62). Dr. Pinsky also allegedly directed Amtrak's Manager of Health Services to inform Mr. DeModena and other Amtrak employees that Dr. Pinsky "deemed Plaintiff medically disqualified pending a psychiatric evaluation and psychological testing." (Id. ¶ 63). As a result, Mr. Carmack was medically disqualified from service as a Locomotive Engineer for the commuter rail on May 4, 2001. (Id. ¶ 66).

Following the plaintiffs disqualification, Amtrak ordered Mr. Carmack to undergo psychiatric evaluations and extensive psychological testing by Dr. Russell Vasile, a psychiatrist. (Id. ¶¶ 76-77). However, the plaintiff believed, based upon the advice of his own physician, that such testing would prove medically harmful, and he notified his superiors at Amtrak, as well as Drs. Vasile and Pinsky, of his concerns. (Id. ¶¶ 78, 87, 101-106). Mr. Carmack also sought reasonable accommodations that would limit the extent of the testing and any disclosures resulting therefrom, but Amtrak rejected his requests and suggestions for such accommodations. (Id. ¶¶ 89-94; 101-116). Instead, according to Mr. Carmack, Amtrak wrongfully charged him with insubordination for failing to submit to the testing. (Id. ¶¶ 116-17). On May 13, 2002, following a hearing by a "Hearing Officer in service to Amtrak," Amtrak fired Mr. Carmack for insubordination. (Id. ¶¶ 115-122).

MBCR's Refusal to Hire the Plaintiff

On May 6, 2003, nearly one year after Mr. Carmack's termination from Amtrak, MBCR's General Manager offered Mr. Carmack a job as a locomotive engineer. (Id. ¶ 15). According to Mr. Carmack, the offer was in accordance with his seniority and with MBCR's agreement with the BLE. (Id.). Mr. Carmack "accepted employment with MBCR and submitted appropriate application materials to MBCR." (Id. ¶ 16). However, when MBCR awarded the locomotive engineer positions on June 24, 2003, it omitted Mr. Carmack from the award list. (Id. ¶ 17). Mr. Carmack alleges that MBCR wrongfully failed to hire him based on information from employees who were former agents of Amtrak that the plaintiff was violent and dangerous as a result of mental illness. (Id. ¶ 128).

Plaintiff's Eviction from North Station

On July 1, 2003, Mr. Carmack went to North Station in Boston in order "to contact other union members to solicit assistance and support to enforce plaintiffs seniority rights in accordance with [the] MBCR/BLE agreement, the Railway Labor Act and the Constitution of [the BLE]" and to hand out written informational materials to other union members. (Id. ¶¶ 20-21). North Station is one of two hub stations in Boston from which MBCR operates commuter trains. (Id. ¶ 11). According to Mr. Carmack, he remained in the public access areas of the station. (Id. ¶¶ 20, 22).

Allegedly, after Mr. Carmack had arrived at North Station and...

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