Carman v. Wieland

Citation406 S.W.3d 70
Decision Date16 July 2013
Docket NumberNo. ED 98872.,ED 98872.
PartiesJan CARMAN, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Pat WIELAND, Defendant/Respondent.
CourtCourt of Appeal of Missouri (US)

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Kenneth J. Vuylsteke, Webster Groves, MO, for appellant.

Peter J. Dunne, Robyn Greifzu Fox, Robert T. Plunkert, St. Louis, MO, for respondent.

LAWRENCE E. MOONEY, Presiding Judge.

The plaintiff, Jan Carman, appeals the grant of summary judgment entered by the Circuit Court of St. Louis County in favor of the defendant, Pat Wieland. The defendant moved for summary judgment on two different bases. The trial court granted summary judgment on one basis, but denied it on the other. Generally two wrongs don't make a right. Today is an exception. For today we affirm the grant of summary judgment because the trial court reached the right result, even though we conclude that both its grant of summary judgment and denial of summary judgment were erroneous.

First, we conclude that the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment on the basis of the statute of limitations; we find the defendant does not qualify as an “officer” under the special statute of limitations asserted. However, we also hold that the trial court erred when it denied summary judgment on the basis of the nature of the defendant's duty to the plaintiff; we find the plaintiff did not allege that the defendant committed an independent negligent act. We conclude that the defendant owed the plaintiff no independent duty to exercise ordinary care and safety requiring the defendant to refrain from operating a motor vehicle in a negligent manner when driving in the course of the defendant's work. That duty is subsumed within the employer's common-law non-delegable duty to ensure a safe workplace. Because the plaintiff failed to allege any duty of the defendant, other than the employer's non-delegable duty to provide a safe workplace, we affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the defendant.

Factual and Procedural Background

The City of Richmond Heights employed both the plaintiff and the defendant as firefighters. Neither party held a supervisory position. On January 15, 2006, the defendant drove a fire truck in which the plaintiff was a passenger. When they arrived at the fire station, the plaintiff exited the truck, and the defendant attempted to back the truck into the station. While doing so, the defendant backed the truck over the plaintiff, causing her serious injury. The plaintiff received workers' compensation benefits for medical, temporary total disability, and permanent partial disability.

The plaintiff filed suit against the defendant, the City of Richmond Heights, and the City of Richmond Heights Fire Department.1 The plaintiff's petition alleged that the defendant negligently caused the plaintiff's injuries and sought monetary damages. The defendant moved for summary judgment on two bases. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant based on the statute of limitations asserted in the motion. But the trial court denied summary judgment on the other basis asserted in the motion, reasoning that the plaintiff's claims against the defendant did not involve a breach of a non-delegable duty owed by the employer to provide a safe workplace but rather alleged an independent negligent act committed by the defendant. The plaintiff appeals.

Standard of Review

Summary judgment allows a trial court to enter judgment for the moving party where the party demonstrates a right to judgment as a matter of law based on facts about which there is no genuine dispute. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid–Am. Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc 1993). Our review is essentially de novo. Id. We will affirm the judgment where the trial court reached the correct result, even if for the wrong reason. Goforth v. Mo. Dept. Corr., 62 S.W.3d 566, 568 (Mo.App. W.D.2001). When considering an appeal from summary judgment, we review the record in the light most favorable to the party against whom the court entered judgment. ITT, 854 S.W.2d at 376.

Discussion

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the basis that the three-year statute of limitations applicable to claims against a sheriff, coroner, or other officer under section 516.130(1) RSMo. (2000 & Supp.2012) barred the plaintiff's claims.2 However, the trial court denied summary judgment on the other basis asserted in the motion, reasoning that the plaintiff's claims against the defendant did not involve a breach of a non-delegable duty owed by the employer to provide a safe workplace but rather alleged an independent negligent act committed by the defendant. The trial court determined that:

[C]o-employees such as [the defendant] are not entitled to immunity from lawsuits under the workers' compensation statute. Also, it appears that [the plaintiff's] claims against [the defendant] do not involve a breach of a non-delegable duty owed by [the] employer to provide a safe workplace. Rather, it appears that [the plaintiff] alleges that she was injured by the independent negligent act of [the defendant] by the way he handled an otherwise safe piece of equipment, i.e. the backing of a fire truck.

(Citations omitted). We shall consider each basis for summary judgment.

Grant of Summary Judgment Based on the Statute of Limitations

The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant on the second basis asserted in the defendant's motion, ruling that the three-year statute of limitations applicable to claims against “a sheriff, coroner, or other officer” under section 516.130(1) barred the plaintiff's claims. The plaintiff contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because the defendant does not qualify as an “officer” under section 516.130(1). She maintains that the five-year statute of limitations contained in section 516.120(4) RSMo. (2000) applies. We agree that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on this basis because as a matter of law the defendant does not qualify as an “officer” under section 516.130(1).

Section 516.130(1) provides that the following actions must be filed within three years:

An action against a sheriff, coroner or other officer, upon a liability incurred by the doing of an act in his official capacity and in virtue of his office, or by the omission of an official duty, including the nonpayment of money collected upon an execution or otherwise[.]

When faced with the issue of what constituted an “officer” within the meaning of the three-year statute of limitations, our Supreme Court wrote:

A public office is defined to be “the right, authority and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public.” The individual who is invested with the authority and is required to perform the duties is a public officer.

State ex rel. School Dist. of Sedalia v. Harter, 188 Mo. 516, 87 S.W. 941, 943 (1905) (citations omitted).

In plainer language, Black's Law Dictionary defines an “officer” in relevant part as:

A person who holds an office of trust, authority, or command. In public affairs, the term refers esp[ecially] to a person holding public office under a national, state, or local government, and authorized by that government to exercise some specific function.

1113 (7th ed.1999). “Public office” means [a] position whose occupant has legal authority to exercise a government's sovereign powers for a fixed period.” Id. at 1245. A “public official” is [a] person elected or appointed to carry out some portion of a government's sovereign powers.” Id. “The power to make and enforce laws” constitutes the sovereign power. Id. at 1401.

Thus, Missouri courts have found section 516.130(1) applies to a county recorder of deeds, Investors Title Co., Inc. v. Hammonds, 217 S.W.3d 288 (Mo. banc 2007); the Missouri director of revenue, City of Ellisville v. Lohman, 972 S.W.2d 527 (Mo.App. E.D.1998); a circuit clerk, State ex rel. Buchanan County v. Roach, 548 S.W.2d 206 (Mo.App. K.C.D.1977); a county collector of revenue, State ex rel. School Dist. of St. Joseph v. Wells, 270 S.W.2d 857 (Mo.1954); the treasurer of a state hospital, State ex rel. Bell v. Yates, 231 Mo. 276, 132 S.W. 672 (1910); and a school-district treasurer, Harter, 87 S.W. at 945. The parties cite no case applying section 516.130(1) to an ordinary firefighter as an “officer” for purposes of that section, and our own research has revealed no such case. To the contrary, each of the above-cited cases found that an officeholder was an “officer.”

In granting summary judgment for the defendant, however, the trial court stated “it appears that firefighters fall within the meaning of ‘other officer’ in the above statute of limitations.” The trial court cited Chambers v. Nelson, stating that the Chambers Court noted that section 516.130(1) applied to police officers acting in their official capacities. However, the Chambers Court cautioned:

Chambers does not ask this court to determine whether the trial court erred in relying on Section 516.130(1) rather than applying Section 516.120. The sole argument on appeal is whether Section 516.170 tolled the application of Section 516.130(1). Plaintiffs position on appeal assumes, and we do not consider [whether], the trial court correctly relied on Section 516.130(1). This issue was not presented to the trial court and thus is not properly preserved for appellate review. On the limited claim of error, we hold that Section 516.170 did not toll the statute of limitations under the facts of this case.

737 S.W.2d 225, 226 (Mo.App. E.D.1987)(emphasis added) (citations omitted). Chambers then cited two cases brought against Missouri police departments in which the federal courts held, without substantial discussion, that ...

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