Carmax Auto Superstores, Inc. v. Sibley

• Decision Date: 13 July 2016
• Docket Number: Case No. RWT 16-cv-1459
• Citation: 194 F.Supp.3d 392
• Parties: CARMAX AUTO SUPERSTORES, INC., Plaintiff, v. Montgomery Blair SIBLEY, Defendant, v. Littler Mendelson, P.C., et al., Third-Party Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

194 F.Supp.3d 392

CARMAX AUTO SUPERSTORES, INC., Plaintiff,

v.Montgomery Blair SIBLEY, Defendant,

v.Littler Mendelson, P.C., et al., Third-Party Defendants.

Case No. RWT 16-cv-1459

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

Signed July 13, 2016

Joshua B. Waxman, Richard William Black, Littler Mendelson, P.C., Adam Joel Singer, Pamela Anne Bresnahan, Vorys, Sater, Seymour and Pease LLP, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Montgomery B. Sibley, Rockville, MD, pro se.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ROGER W. TITUS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Montgomery Blair Sibley ("Sibley") is trained and was previously licensed as an attorney. He was suspended from the practice of law for three years in Florida (2008), three years in the District of Columbia (2010) and indefinitely in New York (2009).¹ The suspensions were based on Sibley's pursuit of meritless and vexatious litigation. He has not been reinstated by these jurisdictions.

In January 2011, Sibley obtained employment as a sales consultant for CarMax. The relationship did not end well. CarMax terminated Sibley's employment on May 6, 2016 after Sibley had formally requested arbitration in April 2016 for a number of grievances. Although Sibley initiated the arbitration proceeding, he unequivocally and in writing communicated his intent to pursue his claims instead in litigation. After Sibley did so, CarMax filed a petition on May 16, 2016, asking this Court to compel arbitration regarding all of Sibley's claims against it. ECF No. 1. On May 25, 2016, Sibley filed an Answer, Counterclaim, and Third-Party Complaint against CarMax and additional Third-Party Defendants, the attorneys and law firm representing CarMax: Joshua B. Waxman, Richard W. Black and the law firm of Little, Mendelson, P.C. ECF No. 8. Since that time, Sibley has flooded the Court with nine additional motions and two amended or supplemental Answers and Counterclaims. ECF Nos. 6, 10, 12, 13, 14, 27, 28, 32, 33, and 35. CarMax has filed one Motion to Dismiss Counts Three through Eight of Sibley's First Amended Counterclaim. ECF No. 29. The Court will now address all of the pending Motions in this Memorandum Opinion.

I. Factual Background

When Sibley applied for employment with CarMax, he executed a Dispute Resolution Agreement ("DRA"). In the DRA, Sibley agreed to arbitrate any and all claims arising out of his employment at CarMax. He also received a copy of the CarMax Dispute Resolution Rules and Procedures ("DRRP"). ECF No. 29-1 at 2. Sibley began to work as a Sales Consultant at CarMax store 7206 in Montgomery County, Maryland, on or about January 24, 2011.² ECF No. 12 at 1. As an employee, Sibley was assigned a company e-mail address, monty_b_sibley @carmx.com. Id. at 1–2.

Sibley formally requested arbitration on April 12, 2016, pursuant to the terms of the DRA and DRRP. He alleged that "CarMax failed to provide fair and equal access to sales leads to Sibley and other commissioned employees." Id. at 2. "[T]he Arbitration Claim alleged: (i) Breach of Promise of Fair Sales Lead Access, (ii) Breach of Maryland Public Policy of Fair Sales Lead Access and (iii) Breach of Maryland Implied Covenant of Good Faith in Employment." Id. at 2. On May 1, 2016, Sibley sent an e-mail through the CarMax corporate e-mail system to every CarMax Sales Associate. The e-mail addressed wages and working conditions. Id. Sibley asserted that he was anticipating bringing these issues up at the annual CarMax Shareholder's meeting in Richmond, Virginia scheduled for June 28, 2016. ECF No. 12 at 3.

On May 6, 2016 CarMax terminated Sibley's employment. ECF No. 29-1, at 2. Four days later, Sibley sent a letter to CarMax stating that he would be challenging the "substance of CarMax's answer to his arbitration claim, as well as certain provisions of the DRA and DRRP, in state court." Id. He restated this intention on May 13, 2016 when he asked CarMax's attorneys in a letter if they would accept service on behalf of CarMax. Id. Three days later, CarMax brought its petition to compel arbitration. The day after this matter was initiated, May 17, 2016, Sibley signed and dated a charge against CarMax and submitted it to the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB"). Sibley asserts that this charge has been docketed with the NLRB as CarMax Auto Super Stores, Inc., Case No. 05–CA–176501.³ ECF No. 12, at 3.

II. Analysis

A. Motion for Protective Order and Sanctions [ECF Nos. 6 and 17]

In Sibley's first Motion for Protective Order and Sanctions, he requested the Court to seal Exhibit 2 to the Complaint and enter sanctions against CarMax and its attorneys. ECF No. 6, at 3. As of May 25, 2016 at 11:55 a.m., Exhibit 2 was sealed. ECF No. 11, at 1. Accordingly, there is no need for a protective order, and the Court will direct that Exhibit 2 remain under seal.

The Court may impose sanctions upon an attorney who presents to the Court a pleading, motion or paper which was presented for an improper purpose. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (b), (c). A cursory review of Exhibit 2 clearly shows that the disclosure of Sibley's social security number was inadvertent. The social security number was properly redacted in two other places where it seems to have been typed in the document, but the disclosure in question was handwritten under Sibley's signature on the bottom half of page 6. ECF No. 1-2, at 2. It is thus obvious that the handwritten number was overlooked by the individual (or technology) redacting the documents. Id. Additionally, Littler Mendelson has offered to pay for a two-year membership in a credit monitoring service and has assured the Court that those responsible were counseled on the importance of redaction. ECF No. 9, at 2. While the Court does not condone such an oversight, there is absolutely no basis—aside from Sibley's bald assertions—upon which this Court could conclude that the number was disclosed maliciously, with intent to harass, or for any other improper purpose. Accordingly, the motion for a protective order and sanctions will be denied. See ECF Nos. 6 and 17.

B. Second Motion for Protective Order [ECF No. 10]

Sibley also moved for a protective order "striking and/or sealing Exhibit ‘1,’ " which he alleges was part of settlement negotiations. ECF No. 10, at 4. He argues that the release of the document violated the confidentiality agreement of the DRRP and Federal Rule of Evidence 408. Sibley has since asked to withdraw the related Count VIII of his Counterclaim, in which he alleged that the release of the document was a breach of the DRRP. See ECF No. 14, at 17; ECF No. 34, at 2. Indeed, in Count II of his Counterclaim, he asks this Court to declare that the confidentiality provision is void, ECF No. 14, at 9, a position that is at odds with his motion. The Court finds that the Exhibit was properly attached to the petition for purposes of establishing the amount in controversy as required for jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. This is a proper purpose under the DRRP, which permits disclosure "as may be appropriate in any subsequent proceeding between the Parties." ECF No. 29-2, at 7. Moreover, the purpose of the disclosure was not "to prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim or to impeach by a prior inconsistent statement or a contradiction," and thus Rule 408 does not prohibit its use. See Fed. R. Evid. 408 (b) (allowing evidence of settlement negotiations or compromise to be admitted for other purposes). For these reasons, the motion shall be denied and Count VIII of the Counterclaim shall be dismissed.

C. Motion for Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction [ECF No. 12]

Even though he was terminated from his position, Sibley also moved for a temporary restraining order or alternatively a preliminary injunction to restore his access to the CarMax e-mail system. ECF No. 12 at 1. He later withdrew Count III of his Counterclaim, which asks for similar, if not identical relief, to that sought in this motion. ECF No. 34, at 2. As such, the motion is moot and shall be denied. However, the Court shall briefly address the merits for the sake of thoroughness. Put simply, the Court does not have jurisdiction to hear this claim and, even if jurisdiction were not wanting, Sibley's arguments in favor of the motion fail on the merits.

Section Seven of the National Labor Relations Act grants employees the right to "self-organization, to form, join or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." 29 U.S.C. § 157. Section Eight enforces these rights by making it an unfair labor practice for employers to interfere with their employees' exercise of their Section Seven rights. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a). Any unfair labor practice claims are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon , 359 U.S. 236, 245, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959). "[W]hen an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the [National Labor Relations] Act, the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Relations Labor Board." Lontz v. Tharp , 413 F.3d 435, 442 (4th Cir. 2005).

The only exceptions relevant to this case are when the conduct "is only a peripheral concern of the NLRA" or "touches on interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, it could not be inferred that Congress intended to deprive the State of the power to act." Richardson v. Kruchko & Fries, 966 F.2d 153, 156 at n. * (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting Local 926, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, AFL–CIO v. Jones, 460 U.S. 669, 676, 103 S.Ct. 1453, 75 L.Ed.2d 368 (1983) (quotation marks omitted)). The claims Sibley asserts meet neither exception; he has not argued to the contrary. Sibley claims that by terminating his employment and removing his access to its...