Carmichael ex rel. Stars in the Sky Tr. v. Cnty. of San Diego

Decision Date10 December 2019
Docket NumberCase No.: 19-cv-01750-GPC-AGS
PartiesKIRK MATTHEW CARMICHAEL, ROBERT E. BASKIN on behalf of STARS IN THE SKY TRUST, Plaintiffs, v. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, PETER ESTES, SUMMER STEPHAN, MICHAEL HOLMES, JOHN STALEY, AUTONATION DBA BMW OF ENCINITAS, TOYOTA OF ESCONDIDO, AND DOES 1-10 inclusive, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of California
ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

ECF Nos. 4, 6, 10.

Plaintiffs Kirk Matthew Carmichael ("Plaintiff") and Robert E. Baskin ("Trustee") (collectively, "Plaintiffs"), on behalf of the Stars in the Sky Trust ("Trust"), have filed a complaint alleging a wide variety of constitutional and statutory violations against the Defendants County of San Diego, Peters Esters, Summer Stephan, Michael Holmes, John Staley, AutoNation DBA BMW of Encinitas, Toyota of Escondido, and multiple Doe individuals. ECF No. 1. Three of these Defendants - John Staley, Michael Holmes, and the County of San Diego ("County") - have filed motions to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a claim. ECF No. 4, 6, 10. Plaintiffs filed responses to each motion, ECF Nos. 12, 13, 14, and Defendants filed their replies. ECF Nos. 16, 17, 18. Both the County, ECF No. 10-2, and Plaintiffs, ECF No. 15, filed requests for judicial notice.1

The Court now faces two questions. First, because Plaintiffs' claim arises out of an ongoing prosecution in California state court, the Court must determine whether the Younger doctrine precludes review of Plaintiffs' claims. Second, the Court must decide whether Plaintiffs' scattershot complaint - which incorporates over two dozen statutes and constitutional provisions as well as 756 pages of attachments - comports with the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 8 and with the pleading standards established by Twombly and Iqball. The Court finds for Defendants as to both questions and dismisses the complaint.

I. Background
a. Factual Background

On October 12, 2018, Plaintiff arrived at BMW of Encinitas to purchase a car at about 7 p.m. (ECF No. 1 at 3.) Plaintiff's application triggered a "fraud alert." (Id.; ECF No. 1 at 21-25, Carmichael Affidavit ("CA") at ¶ 5-8.) A police officer arrived and spoke to Plaintiff "in an hour long questioning." (ECF No. 1 at 3.) The officer then arrested Plaintiff, first placing him in the back of a police car and then reading Plaintiff his Miranda rights.2 (Id.; CA at ¶ 2.) The officer next searched Plaintiff, and then tookhim to Vista County jail. (ECF No. 1 at 3.) Plaintiff was released at 9 a.m. the next morning after he posted a $50,000 bond. (Id.; CA at ¶ 12.) Plaintiff obtained the funds to post bond after contacting Mr. Robert E. Baskin, co-trustee of the Living Water Trust, who authorized him to "use trust assets from a Checkbook to post a Bond of $50,000." (Id. at ¶ 4-6.)

On February 5, 2019, Plaintiff presented himself for arraignment on the charges resulting from his October 12, 2018 arrest. (ECF No. 1 at 3.) At the hearing, Plaintiff was arrested on other charges and remanded to the state's custody pursuant to California Penal Code ("CPC") § 1275.1. (Id. 3-4; ECF No. 1-3, Ex. 8 at 11.) Plaintiff was not permitted to review the bail order. (ECF No. 1 at 4.) Plaintiff was searched without being Mirandized and then taken to a holding cell. (Id.)

A public defender assigned by the Court next waived the reading of the complaint and entered a plea of not guilty in both cases. (Id.; ECF No. 1-3, Ex. 8 at 7-8; CA at ¶¶ 16, 22, 38.) Plaintiff objected to entering a plea. (ECF No. 1 at 4.; CA at ¶¶ 17-21.) Plaintiff was held in County jail for about 21 days until February 25, 2019 when the state court held a hearing on the CPC § 1275.1 hold. (ECF No. 1 at 4; CA at ¶ 39.)

During this period of incarceration, on February 17, 2019, Plaintiff hired Mr. John Staley to represent him on the bond for $2,500. (ECF No. 1 at 6; CA at ¶ 40.) Two days later, on February 19, 2019, Mr. Staley informed Plaintiff that he could not represent him because the public defender's office was already his attorney of record. (ECF No. 1 at 9; CA at ¶ 41.). Then, on February 23, 2019, Plaintiff hired Mr. Michael Holmes, a second private attorney, "to coordinate the release from incarceration at the February 25, 2019 hearing" for $25,000. (ECF No. 1 at 6; CA at ¶ 46.) Mr. Holmes was later relived as counsel on August 12, 2019 due to a conflict of interest. (ECF No. 1-4, Ex. 10 at 1-2; CA at ¶¶ 48-49.)

b. The Complaint's Allegations

Plaintiff's complaint contains a multitude of allegations that are difficult to parsefor lack of specificity and direction. First, based on these facts, Plaintiff makes the broad claim that the "municipality" is engaged in a "cottage operation in the obstruction of justice" which consists of "abuse of legal process, abuse of discretion, Malconduct by attorney of record, Malice in law, Malice in fact, and disruption of public safety and peace in which such acts does not comport with constitutional Due Process of law." (ECF No. 1 at 4.)

Next, Plaintiff alleges that all Defendants are guilty of violating various constitutional provisions, including the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments. (Id. at 7-8.) Plaintiff also contends that Defendants' conduct likewise violates three federal statutes: the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VI § 601 (i.e. 40 U.S. Code § 14702), the Highway Safety Act of 1966, and the National Drivers Act of 1982. (Id. at 6-7.)

Then, Plaintiff's complaint adds four "Counts" directed at the Honorable James E. Simmons, Jr. of the Superior Court of San Diego County (the "Judge"), the judge who presides over Plaintiff's criminal case. Under Count 1, Plaintiff alleges that the Judge is guilty of perjury. (Id. at 8-9 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1621.)) Under Counts 2 and 3, Plaintiff alleges that the Judge is liable for several criminal offenses, including treason and seditious conspiracy. (Id. at 9-10 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384); id. at 11-12 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242.)) Lastly, under Count 4, Plaintiff alleges that the Judge "willfully and knowingly violate[d]" Plaintiff's constitutional rights and "created a public debt from said" unlawful conduct. (Id. at 12-18 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3729; 18 U.S.C. §§ 1834, 1957; 42 U.S.C. 2000d-7.))

II. Legal Standard

A complaint must provide a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that [the Plaintiff] is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). That statement must "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,47 (1957)). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted tests the legal sufficiency of the claims in the complaint. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court does not look at whether the plaintiff will "ultimately prevail but whether the [plaintiff] is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), reversed on other grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 188 (1984). The court must assume the truth of the facts presented and construe all inferences from them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Buckey v. County of Los Angeles, 968 F.2d 791, 794 (9th Cir. 1992). Nonetheless, the court is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

With respect to an inmate who proceeds pro se, his factual allegations, "however inartfully pleaded," must be held "to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); see also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (reaffirming that this standard applies to pro se pleadings post-Twombly). Thus, where a plaintiff appears pro se in a civil rights case, the Court must construe the pleadings liberally and afford plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. Hebbev. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). Courts, however, should not "supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled." Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

"[B]efore dismissing a pro se civil rights complaint for failure to state a claim, the plaintiff should be given a statement of the complaint's deficiencies and an opportunity to cure." Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 624-25 (9th Cir. 1988). Only if the deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment should the complaint be dismissed without leave to amend. Id.; see also James v. Giles, 221 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 2000).

III. Analysis
a. Trust and Trustee Lack Standing and Trustee Requires Counsel.

As threshold matters, the Court addresses the issues of standing and counsel for Trust and Trustee. Plaintiffs must demonstrate that they have standing to sue. Friends of Santa Clara River v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 887 F.3d 906, 917-18 (9th Cir. 2018). Standing exists where the plaintiff has "(1) suffered an...

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