Carmichael v. Adams
| Decision Date | 26 November 1883 |
| Docket Number | 10,476 |
| Citation | 91 Ind. 526 |
| Parties | Carmichael v. Adams et al |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
From the Monroe Circuit Court.
Judgment affirmed.
J. R East and W. H. East, for appellant.
J. H Louden and R. W. Miers, for appellees.
The provision of the Constitution which declares that "the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate" does not enlarge the right, but simply ordains that it shall remain as it was when the Constitution was adopted. It preserves a right, but does not extend it. At the time the Constitution was adopted, suits in equity were always, as of right, heard and determined by the chancellor. As the right to a trial by jury did not exist in chancery proceedings at the time the Constitution was adopted, the provision respecting trial by jury does not prohibit the Legislature from declaring that suits in equity may be tried by the court. A suit to foreclose a mortgage was of purely chancery jurisdiction when our Constitution was adopted, and was a suit in which there was no right to a trial by jury.
The provisions of the code of 1881, concerning the trial of equity causes, are constitutional, and do govern suits to foreclose mortgages.
"Where a court of equity has obtained jurisdiction over some portion or feature of a controversy, it may, and will in general, proceed to decide the whole issues, and to award complete relief, although the rights of the parties are strictly legal, and the final remedy granted is of the kind which might be conferred by a court of law." 1 Pom. Eq., section 231. Wherever equity jurisdiction is developed, it continues throughout the entire controversy, and ends only with a complete adjustment of the rights of the parties and the award of full relief. Phelan v. Boylan, 25 Wis. 679; Henderson v. Dickey, 50 Mo. 161; McGowin v. Remington, 12 Pa. 56; Souder's Appeal, 57 Pa. 498; Oelrichs v. Spain, 15 Wal. 211; Hepburn v. Dunlop, 1 Wheat. 179. In Armstrong v. Gilchrist, 2 Johns. Cas. 424, will be found an able review of the earlier cases by Chancellor Kent, and a clear statement of this great principle of equity.
The court, having acquired jurisdiction of the present case as a suit in equity to foreclose a mortgage, was not bound to dissect the suit into separate members, and try each separately, one member as a matter of law, and the other as a matter of equity, but had a right to treat the case as a unity, and as one of exclusive equitable jurisdiction.
There could, in such a case as this--a suit upon a note and mortgage--be no decree without an ascertainment of the amount due on the note, and, therefore, the whole...
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...under these statutes, Downing v. Le Du, 1890, 82 Cal. 471, 23 P. 202; Lindsey v. Porter, 1913, 140 Ga. 249, 78 S.E. 848; Carmichael v. Adams, 1883, 91 Ind. 526. See Note, 65 Harv.L.Rev. 453, 463 (1952). Contra, Clemenson v. Chandler, 1868, 4 Kan. 558; Ladd v. James, 1859, 10 Ohio St. 437, 4......
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...of the alleged debt or obligation until the right to a judgment in law is made to appear from the complaint.” In the case of Carmichael v. Adams, 91 Ind. 526, the question was on the right to a jury trial in a suit on a note and to foreclose a mortgage. The Supreme Court of Indiana said: “T......
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...then no right to a jury trial exists. Under Indiana law, a mortgage foreclosure proceeding is equitable in nature. Carmichael v. Adams, 91 Ind. 526 (1883); Berkemeier v. Rushville National Bank, 459 N.E.2d 1194, 1197 (Ind.App. 1984); Farmers Bank and Trust Co. v. Ross, 401 N.E.2d 74 (Ind.Ap......
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...with additional relief seeking to recover a personal judgment on a promissory note deemed an exclusively equitable action); Carmichael v. Adams, (1883) 91 Ind. 526 (action to recover on a note and to foreclose a mortgage securing the note deemed an exclusively equitable cause of action); Fi......