Carmichael v. Morrison Mgmt. Specialists
| Decision Date | 26 March 2014 |
| Docket Number | 13-CV-00692-A |
| Parties | DARRYL L. CARMICHAEL Plaintiff, v. MORRISON MANAGEMENT SPECIALISTS and ERIE COUNTY MEDICAL CENTER Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of New York |
This disability-discrimination case is brought by the plaintiff, Darryl L. Carmichael, against the defendants, Morrison Management Specialists ("Morrison"), and Erie County Medical Center ("ECMC"), under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112-12117 ("ADA") and New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 290-297 ("NYSHRL"). Plaintiff Carmichael alleges he was asked impermissible medical questions, and that he was discharged from employment based upon a disability.
Defendants Morrison and ECMC filed motions pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss plaintiff Carmichael's ADA claims on statute of limitations grounds. The Court entered an Order pursuant to Rules 12(d) and 56(f)(3), Dkt. No. 16, converting the motions to dismiss to motions for summary judgment. The action is now before the Court to determine whether material issues of fact preclude entry of judgment in favor of defendants on theirstatute of limitations defenses to plaintiff's ADA claims. For the reasons that follow, the Court enters summary judgment against plaintiff on his ADA claims, and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his NYSHRL claim.
In April of 2010, plaintiff Carmichael filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") claiming defendants Morrison and ECMC violated the ADA and NYSHRL. He alleged defendants subjected him to impermissible medical questions (the "First Charge"), and discharged him because of a disability after six hours of employment (the "Second Charge"). Dkt. No. 1.
On May 11, 2011, the EEOC mailed plaintiff Carmichael a letter captioned as a Final Determination (the "EEOC Letter") dismissing the Second Charge that alleged his wrongful discharge, and informing plaintiff of a 90-day deadline to bring suit. Dkt. No. 1, pp. 8-10. The EEOC referred the First Charge to the Department of Justice ("DOJ"). Dkt. No. 1, p. 17.
On April 30, 2011, DOJ mailed plaintiff a letter with the heading "NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUE WITHIN 90 DAYS," declining to pursue the First Charge alleging impermissible questions (the "DOJ Letter"), and informing plaintiff of a 90-day window to bring suit. Dkt. No. 1, p. 17. However, the DOJ Letter was returned unopened by plaintiff, and "unclaimed." Dkt. No. 1, p. 26.
On February 5, 2013, plaintiff Carmichael obtained copies of documentation relating to both the EEOC Letter and the DOJ Letter from his former employer and delivered copies of that documentation to his attorney. Dkt. No. 1, p. 14; Dkt. No. 18, ¶ 3. That documentation included detailed and accurate references to the DOJ Letter. Dkt. No. 1, p. 14; Dkt. No. 18, ¶ 3; Dkt. No. 18-1, p. 1. Plaintiff's attorney wrote plaintiff a letter dated the same date, and described to plaintiff the substance of the EEOC Letter and the DOJ Letter (the "Attorney Letter"). Dkt. No. 1, p. 14. The Attorney Letter advised plaintiff that his 90-day deadline to file suit would have expired, if plaintiff received the DOJ Letter when it was mailed to his residence.
Plaintiff Carmichael filed the Complaint in this action pro se, on July 1, 2013, 145 days after the date of the Attorney Letter. See Dkt. No. 1. When defendants Morrison and ECMC responded to the Complaint by filing motions to dismiss plaintiff's ADA claims, Dkt. Nos. 12, 13, plaintiff's attorney appeared on plaintiff's behalf to respond. Dkt. No. 18-1.
The Summary Judgment Standard. Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). While the right to trial by jury is a cherished right, summary judgment:
. . . is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather . . . must be construed with due regard not only for the rights of persons asserting claims and defenses that are adequately based in fact to have those claims and defenses tried to a jury, but also for the rights of persons opposing such claims and defenses to demonstrate . . . , prior to trial, that the claims and defenses have no factual basis.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986). A dispute regarding a material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Once the moving party has met its burden of "demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must come forward with enough evidence to support a jury verdict in its favor, and the motion will not be defeated merely upon a metaphysical doubt concerning the facts, or on the basis of conjecture or surmise." Bryant v. Maffuci, 923 F.2d 979, 982 (2d Cir. 1991) (quotations and internal citations omitted).
The ADA Claims Process. A disability-discrimination claimant must exhaust administrative remedies with the EEOC before filing ADA claims in district court. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e),(f); DLima v. Cuba Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 383, 388 (W.D.N.Y. 2011). The administrative process begins when the claimant files a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(b). The EEOC investigates the charges. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). If the charges do not have merit, the EEOC may dismiss them and give the claimant notice of a 90-day deadline to sue in district court. See id. § 2000e-5(f). If the charges have merit, the EEOC will attempt to reach a conciliation agreement with the respondent. Id. If conciliation fails, the EEOC may sue on the claimant's behalf, or decline to do so and issue the notice of right to sue. Id.; 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(b)(1).
The EEOC must refer all claims that have not been dismissed to the Attorney General if the respondent is a "government, government agency, or political subdivision." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(d). The Attorney General will consider whether to sue on the claimant's behalf. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). If the Attorney General decides not to sue, it is the Attorney General's responsibility to notify the claimant of the 90-day deadline to sue in district court. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(d).
The notice of the right to sue, whether issued by the EEOC or the DOJ (on behalf of the Attorney General), almost invariably takes the form of a right to sue letter. See, e.g., Tiberio v. Allergy Asthma Immunology of Rochester, 664 F.3d 35, 36 (2d Cir. 2011); Coffey v. Donahoe, No.12-CV-138-A, 2013 WL 3244788, *1 (W.D.N.Y. June 26, 2013). The notice must include: (1) authorization to the claimant "to bring a civil action under title VII, the ADA, or GINA"; (2) advice to the claimant on instituting the civil action, where appropriate; (3) "[a] copy of thecharge"; and (4) "[t]he Commision's decision, determination, or dismissal, as appropriate." 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(e).
The 90-Day Statute of Limitations. A claimant must file an ADA lawsuit within 90 days of his or his attorney's receipt of the right to sue letter. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)(1), 12117(a) (2012); Tiberio, 664 F.3d at 38 (2d Cir. 2011). "The 90-day period is strictly enforced and cannot be extended by even one day." Hughes v. Elmira Coll., 584 F. Supp. 2d 588, 589 (W.D.N.Y. 2008) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Equitable tolling of the 90-day statute of limitations is only available in "rare and exceptional circumstances". See Coffey, 2013 WL 3244788, at *5.
If a claimant does not receive a right to sue letter, the 90-day period begins when the claimant receives actual notice that the administrative complaint was dismissed. See Loftin v. New York State Dep't of Mental Health, 80 F. App'x 717, 718 (2d Cir. 2003); Hilton v. Bedford Paving, LLC, No. 08-CV-6552 CJS, 2011 WL 3957269, at *9 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2011). Actual notice may be verbal or written. See Williams v. Chertoff, No. 06-CV-3847 (NGG)(LB), 2008 WL 2001897, at *5 (verbal notice); Beggan v. New York Times, No. 91 Civ. 8343 (LJF), 1992 WL 111090, at *1 (verbal notice); see also Loftin, 80 F. App'x at 718 (written notice).
The EEOC Letter and the DOJ Letter. Plaintiff's original charges with the EEOC stated: Dkt. No. 1, at p. 7. Apparently, the EEOC construed this as alleging two charges, the First Charge relating to impermissible medical questions, and the Second Charge relating to the employment discharge. Dkt. No. 1, p. 7, pp. 8-26. However, the EEOC only assigned one "charge number" to the allegations. Dkt. No. 1, p. 7 (charge number of 525-2010-00460).
On May 11, 2012, the EEOC sent plaintiff a letter — the EEOC Letter-appearing to dismiss the Second Charge and notifying plaintiff of a 90-day time limit to bring suit. Dkt. No. 1 at p. 9. However, the EEOC Letter also stated that there was merit to the First Charge, and "invit[ed] Respondents to join with it in an effort toward a just resolution of this matter." Dkt. No. 1, at p. 9. It may have been confusing whether the EEOC dismissed one, both, or none of the plaintiff's claims.
Defendant Morrison Management Specialists asserts that the EEOC Letter was a right to sue notice. See Dkt. No. 21, at p. 4. However, plaintiff's counsel was confused as to whether the EEOC Letter was actually a notice of the right to sue. See Dkt. No. 1, at 20 (...
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