Carmichael v. Snyder
Decision Date | 06 December 1968 |
Citation | 209 Va. 451,164 S.E.2d 703 |
Parties | John H. CARMICHAEL et al. v. Joseph C. SNYDER. |
Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
John M. Court, Phelps & Atkinson, Newport News, on brief, for plaintiffs in error.
Sidney Sacks, Lewis, Sacks & DeLaura, Norfolk, on brief, for defendant in error.
Before EGGLESTON, C.J., and BUCHANAN, SNEAD, I'ANSON, CARRICO, GORDON and HARRISON, JJ.
The primary question involved here is the jurisdiction of the court below over the defendant under the provisions of the state's 'Long-Arm Statute', having particular reference to subsections (1) and (6) of § 8--81.2(a) of the Code of Virginia 1968 Cum.Supp.
On March 9, 1967, John H. and Gordon E. Carmichael, plaintiffs, filed in the court below a motion for judgment against defendant, Joseph C. Snyder, a resident of New London, Connecticut, for damages allegedly sustained by plaintiffs as a direct result of the refusal of defendant to perform a contract for the purchase of real estate.
The motion alleges that on May 6, 1966, defendant contracted in writing, in Norfolk, Virginia, to purchase from plaintiffs for $26,500 property located in that city, identified as 4201 Gosnold Avenue, and to make settlement by July 1, 1966; that defendant refused to perform his agreement, and soon after July 1, 1966 moved from Virginia to Connecticut; and that plaintiffs, after mitigating their damages by a sale of the property to another person, incurred the loss which they seek to recover in this action.
Process against Snyder was served on the Secretary of the Commonwealth of Virginia. Defendant filed a motion to quash the service, wherein he denied and put in issue the jurisdiction and venue of the lower court and the right of the court to enter a personal judgment against him, a non-resident of the state. Plaintiffs responded with a motion to strike defendant's motion to quash. The trial court sustained defendant's motion, and the validity of that ruling is before us on this writ of error.
We have no difficulty in finding that, if the trial court had the right to exercise personal jurisdiction over defendant under the 'Long-Arm Statute', service of process on the Secretary of the Commonwealth, as his statutory agent, was authorized by Code § 8--81.3; and that the action was properly brought in the City of Norfolk where the plaintiffs reside and the cause of action arose. Code § 8--81.4.
Chapter 4.1, Title 8 of the Code of Virginia treats of personal jurisdiction in certain actions. It defines persons as including '* * * an individual * * * whether or not a citizen or domiciliary of this state * * *' (Code § 8--81.1), and provides when personal jurisdiction over a person may be exercised. Plaintiffs claim jurisdiction over defendant here by virtue of two subsections of Code § 8--81.2 as follows:
'(a) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from the person's
'(1) Transacting any business in this state;
'(6) Having an interest in, using, or possessing real property in this State; * * *.'
Since Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 24 L.Ed. 565 (1877), the Supreme Court of the United States has held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment places some limit on the power of state courts to enter binding judgments against persons not served with process within their boundaries. The line of limitation has been the subject of great controversy and the doctrine there enunciated has undergone a continued process of evolution.
For a review of the numerous opinions reflecting the trend toward expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations and other nonresidents, see State ex rel. Coral Pools v. Knapp, 147 W.Va. 704, 131 S.E.2d 81 (1963); Grobark v. Addo Machine Company, 16 Ill.2d 426, 158 N.E.2d 73 (1959); Beaty v. M. S. Steel Co., 276 F.Supp. 259 (D.Md.1967); Etzler v. Dille and McGuire Manufacturing Company, 249 F.Supp. 1 (W.D.Va.1965); Walke v. Dallas, 209 Va. 32, 161 S.E.2d 722 (1968).
In International Shoe Company v. State of Washington, etc., 326 U.S. 310, 316, 319, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 160, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945), the court made these pertinent observations:
(Citing cases.)
In McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222, 223, 78 S.Ct. 199, 201, 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957), the court said:
That case involved an action on an insurance contract issued by a foreign corporation to a resident of California and the court said that it was . 355 U.S. 220, 223, 78 S.Ct. 199, 201.
The statute involved in the instant case is clear and specific. It gives the court the right to exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who acts directly as to a cause of action arising from that person having an interest in, using, or possessing real property in Virginia. Significantly, the statute refers to a Cause of action which Arises from a person Having an interest in real estate.
Defendant and plaintiffs executed a detailed written contract whereby defendant agreed to purchase from plaintiffs real property for a definite sum of money and to make settlement on or before a fixed date. A portion of the purchase price for the property was paid in cash and provision was made as to the manner and time in which the balance was to be paid.
Upon the execution of this contract, defendant thereby became vested of an interest in real estate in Norfolk, Virginia. In Sale v. Swann, 138 Va. 198, 208, 120 S.E. 870, 873 (1924), we held:
See also 55 Am.Jur., Vendor and Purchaser, § 356, p. 782; 19 Mich.Jur., Vendor and Purchaser, § 224, p. 328; 91 C.J.S. Vendor & Purchaser § 106, p. 1009.
The contract clothed Snyder with an equitable estate or interest in the land he agreed to purchase from plaintiffs, thereby entitling him to the protection of the laws of this state and the machinery which is provided incident to real estate transactions. These laws include the recording statutes; procedures to remove clouds on titles, quiet title to land, establish boundary lines; the zoning statutes and numerous others. Had plaintiffs refused to convey the property in accordance with their contract, defendant could have enforced specific performance. Had defendant decided to cancel, reform or rescind his contract, a forum would have been provided for him to seek such relief.
In the cases discussing 'Long-Arm Statutes', great stress has been given to the enjoyment that a nonresident has of the benefits and protections of a state in which he does business, and to the fact that the exercise of such privilege may give rise to obligations. Protection of life and property within its boundaries is a primary concern of state government, and each state has a vital interest in providing a forum for actions that arise both from torts committed, and out of contracts entered into, within its borders. The interest of the state has necessarily expanded as its citizens have...
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...against his heirs at law after death. In fact, all the incidents of a real ownership belong to it.' Accord, Carmichael v. Snyder, 209 Va. 451, 455, 164 S.E.2d 703, 706 (1968). "We therefore hold that Covenant 17 of the deed of trust was breached by the execution of the Land Contract by Borr......
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