Carmona Rios v. Aramark Corp.

• Decision Date: 27 March 2001
• Docket Number: No. 99-1985(DRD).,99-1985(DRD).
• Citation: 139 F.Supp.2d 210
• Parties: Rosario CARMONA RIOS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ARAMARK CORPORATION, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

139 F.Supp.2d 210

Rosario CARMONA RIOS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ARAMARK CORPORATION, et al., Defendants.

No. 99-1985(DRD).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

March 27, 2001.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Jose Durand-Carrasquillo, San Juan, PR, for plaintiffs.

Beatriz M. Rodriguez-Burgos, Fiddler, Gonzalez & Rodriguez, San Juan, PR, for defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

DOMINGUEZ, District Judge.

Pending before the Court is defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and plaintiff's opposition thereto. (Docket Nos. 20 & 29). Plaintiffs filed this action pursuant to the Age Employment Discrimination Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., Puerto Rico's Law 100 of May 30, 1959 ("Law 100"), 29 P.R. LAWS ANN. § 146, et seq., and Puerto Rico's Law 80 of May 30, 1976 ("Law 80"), 29 P.R. LAWS ANN. § 185a, et seq. Further, co-plaintiff Hernandez seeks damages under Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, 31 P.R. LAWS ANN. § 5141. On August 25, 2000, defendant filed a Motion to Strike alleging that plaintiffs' Statement of Material Facts in Controversy fails to comply with Fed. R.Civ.P. 56 and Local Rule 311.12. (Docket No. 33).¹ For the following reasons, defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part and defendant's Motion to Strike is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Rosario Carmona Rios ("Carmona") commenced working for Aramark Services of Puerto Rico, Inc. ("Aramark"), on April 1, 1981, when she was forty-one (41) years of age. Aramark is a business entity that provides food services to different types of enterprises throughout the island. Carmona was employed by Aramark as a Food Service Director ("FSD"). Some of Carmona's duties as an FSD consisted in managing a particular cafeteria unit where she developed financial and operational objectives, unit budgets, monitored the performance of employees in the unit, supervised the quality of the foods service, met with clients to determine their needs and implemented sales and marketing programs. In 1997 plaintiff worked as an FSD at the Warner Lambert unit in Fajardo, Puerto Rico. Plaintiff worked at the Warner Lambert unit for a period of approximately a year and a half.

Thereafter, as a result of a mistake made by plaintiff while working in the Warner Lambert cafeteria unit, plaintiff was transferred to the Johnson & Johnson's Janssen ("Janssen") plant in Gurabo, Puerto Rico. Plaintiff worked as an FSD in the Janssen plant. Carmona worked at the Janssen plant for approximately seven (7) months and was then transferred to the Baxter Healthcare Corporation unit ("Baxter") in Carolina, Puerto Rico. While working at the Baxter unit, José Baerga was her immediate supervisor. The Baxter unit ceased its operation in Carolina on December 23, 1998, causing that the contract between Baxter and Aramark be terminated. On December 24, 1998 through the beginning of February 1999, plaintiff was placed on vacation leave as a consequence of the Baxter closing. However, subsequently, plaintiff was laid off as stated in a letter from Aramark dated January 26, 1999, because there were no vacant FSD positions at the time. At the time of her dismissal from employment, Carmona was fifty-seven (57) years of age.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The function of summary judgment is "to pierce the boilerplate of the pleadings and examine the parties' proof to determine whether a trial is actually necessary." Vega-Rodriguez v. P.R.T.C., 110 F.3d 174, 178 (1st Cir.1997). Accordingly, federal courts will grant summary judgment where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c).

To defeat a motion for summary judgment the resisting party will have to show the existence of "a trial worthy issue as to some material facts." Cortes-Irizarry v. Corporación Insular, 111 F.3d 184, 187 (1st Cir.1997). A fact is deemed "material" if the same "potentially affect[s] the suit's determination." Garside v. Osco Drug Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 48 (1st Cir.1990). "An issue concerning such a fact is `genuine' if a reasonable factfinder, examining the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences helpful to the party resisting summary judgment, could resolve the dispute in that party's favor." Cortes-Irizarry, 111 F.3d at 187. Nonetheless, "speculation and surmise, even when coupled with effervescent optimism that something definite will materialize further down the line, are impuissant on the face of a properly documented summary judgment motion." Ayala-Gerena v. Bristol Myers-Squibb Co., 95 F.3d 86, 95 (1st Cir.1996) (citations omitted)

The movant for summary judgment, of course, must not only show that there is "no genuine issue of material facts," but also, that he is "entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Vega-Rodriguez, 110 F.3d at 178. Further, the court is required to examine the record "drawing all reasonable inferences helpful to the party resisting summary judgment." Cortes-Irizarry. 111 F.3d at 187. There is "no room for credibility determinations, no room for the measured weighing of conflicting evidence such as the trial process entails, no room for the judge to superimpose his own ideas of probability and likelihood ..." Greenburg v. Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Auth., 835 F.2d 932, 936 (1st Cir.1987). The facts must be examined under the above criteria because on a potential appeal the appellate court examines "the undisputed facts in the light most congenial to the appellants and adopts their version of any contested facts which are material to our consideration of the issues." Vega-Rodriguez v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 110 F.3d 174, 178 (1st Cir.1997).

Moreover, the test for summary judgment is applied with the highest rigor when a disputed issue turns on a question of motive and intent. "Summary judgment procedures should be used sparingly ... where the issues of motive and intent play leading roles ... It is only when the witnesses are present and subject to cross-examination that their credibility and the weight to be given their testimony can be appraised. Trial by affidavit is no substitute for trial by jury which so long has been the hallmark of `even handed justice.'" Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473, 82 S.Ct. 486, 491, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962); cf Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288-90, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 1790-1791, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (discriminatory intent is a factual matter for the trier of fact); see also William Coll. v. PB Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 50 F.3d 1115, 1121 (1st Cir.1995); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 107 (1st Cir. 1988); Lipsett v. University of P.R., 864 F.2d at 895. "Under such circumstances, jury judgments about credibility are typically thought to be of special importance." Stepanischen v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Corp., 722 F.2d 922, 928 (1st Cir. 1983). In Dominguez-Cruz v. Suttle Caribe, Inc., 202 F.3d 424, 433 (1st Cir.2000), the Court recently stated that "determinations of motive and intent, particularly in discrimination cases, are questions better suited for the jury." Id. (citing Mulero-Rodriguez v. Ponte, Inc., 98 F.3d 670, 677 (1st Cir.1996)). However, "even in cases where elusive concepts such as motive or intent are at issue, summary judgment may be appropriate if the nonmoving party rests merely upon conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation." Ayala-Gerena v. Bristol Myers-Squibb Co., 95 F.3d 86, 95 (1st Cir.1996). See also Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 895.

Further, pursuant to Local Rule 311.12, the proponent of a summary judgment motion shall serve and file "annexed to the motion a separate, short, and concise statement of the material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue to be tried and the basis of such contention as to each material fact, properly supported by specific reference to the record." Local Rule 311.12. Recently, in Ruiz Rivera v. Riley, 209 F.3d 24, 26 (1st Cir.2000), the First Circuit Court of Appeals held that "non compliance [with Local Rule 311.12], as manifested by a failure to present a statement of disputed facts ... justifies the court's deeming the facts admitted and ruling accordingly." Id. The importance of this rule is to "lay [] out the material facts in dispute clearly for a district court that is swamped with an overwhelming number of civil and criminal dispositive motions." Dominguez v. Eli Lilly and Co., 958 F.Supp. 721, 727 (D.P.R. 1997). "Without such a rule, the Court would have to search through the record with or without the assistance of counsel, for lurking evidence of a genuine issue of material fact. Local Rule 311.12 prevents `the recurrent problem of ferreting through the record' and `the specter of district judges being unfairly sandbagged by unadvertised factual issues.'" Id. (quoting Stepanischen v. Merchants Despatch Transportation Corp., 722 F.2d 922, 930-31 (1st Cir.1983). (internal citations omitted)).

III. DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE AND PLAINTIFF'S VIOLATION OF THE ANTI-FERRET RULE

As previously stated, "[t]he anti-ferret rule serves one crucial purpose. It lays out material facts in dispute clearly for a district court that is swamped with an overwhelming number of civil and criminal dispositive motions." Dominguez, 958 F.Supp. at 727. Local Rule 311.12, in pertinent part states that "[t]he papers opposing a motion for summary judgment shall include a separate, short and concise statement of the material facts as to which it is contended that there exists a genuine issue to be tried, properly supported by specific reference to the record." (emphasis added). Without a short and concise statement of material facts, the Court would have to ferret...