Carmona v. Division of Industrial Safety

• Decision Date: 13 January 1975
• Docket Number: S.F. 23053
• Citation: 118 Cal.Rptr. 473,13 Cal.3d 303,530 P.2d 161
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 530 P.2d 161, 1974-1975 O.S.H.D. (CCH) P 19,212 Sebastian CARMONA et al., Petitioners, v. DIVISION OF INDUSTRIAL SAFETY et al., Respondents. In Bank

Page 473

118 Cal.Rptr. 473

13 Cal.3d 303, 530 P.2d 161, 1974-1975 O.S.H.D. (CCH) P 19,212

Sebastian CARMONA et al., Petitioners, v. DIVISION OF INDUSTRIAL SAFETY et al., Respondents.

S.F. 23053.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

Jan. 13, 1975.

Maurice Jourdane, Salinas, Martin R. Glick, San Francisco, Derek A. Westen, El Centro, and Fred H. Alshuler, San Francisco, for petitioners.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Elizabeth Palmer, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Asher Rubin, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondents.

Titchell, Maltzman, Mark, Bass & Ohleyer and Richard D. Maltzman, San Francisco, as amici curiae on behalf of respondents.

TOBRINER, Justice.

Petitioners, numerous farmworkers employed in the Salinas Valley, instituted the present proceeding to challenge a decision of the California Division of Industrial Safety (hereafter 'division') which determined that the 'short-handled hoe' is not an 'unsafe hand tool' within the meaning of an administrative regulation prohibiting the use of such unsafe tools. After conducting a series of hearings on the issue, the division concluded that because the harm allegedly caused by the short-handled hoe arises only from the manner in which the tool is used, and not from any inherent physical defect in the tool itself, prohibition of the use of the hoe under the existing regulation 'would be an arbitrary and unreasonable extension of its authority.' Petitioners seek review of the agency's ruling, contending primarily that the decision lacks the support of substantial evidence.

As discussed below, we have concluded that the decision of the agency must be set aside. In interpreting the applicable regulation to prohibit only the use of tools which are unsafe because of some intrinsic flaw in the tool itself, the division has given the regulation an unduly narrow interpretation, supported neither by the language of the regulation nor by the authorizing statutory provisions. As we explain, the governing provisions of the Labor Code speak in broad and generous terms in mandating California employers to do 'every . . . thing reasonably necessary to protect the life and safety of employees' and in authorizing the division to promulgate and enforce regulations implementing the employers' comprehensive responsibility. Because a defectively designed tool which causes injury as a result of the manner in which it must regularly be used can be just as harmful to employees as a defectively manufactured tool or a tool in poor condition, we believe the agency erred in confining the regulation's ban of 'unsafe tools' to improperly manufactured or improperly maintained implements. Accordingly, we remand the matter to the agency so that it can determine the question of whether the short-handled hoe is an 'unsafe hand tool' under the proper legal standard.

Former section 6500 of the Labor Code authorized the Division of Industrial Safety to promulgate regulations prescribing 'what safety devices, safeguards, or other means or methods of protection are well adapted to render the employees of every employment and place of employment safe as required by law or lawful order.' ¹

Pursuant to this authority, the agency promulgated scores of detailed regulations prescribing specifications for all varieties of tools and industrial machinery. One such regulation governs the use of hand tools, providing simply: 'Hand tools shall be kept in good condition and be safely stored. Unsafe hand tools shall not be used. (Emphasis added.) (Cal.Admin.Code, tit. 8, § 3316.)

Beginning in September 1972, petitioner farmworkers sought to have the division apply this 'unsafe hand tool' regulation to prohibit any California employer from requiring his employees to use the 'short-handled hoe. The 'short-handled hoe' is approximately 12 inches long, and because of its truncated length farmworkers who use it must, for much of their working day, continuously bend over and work close to the ground. At three public hearings held before the Industrial Safety Board, ² petitioners produced abundant medical evidence that the working position necessitated by the short-handled hoe results in severe cumulative back injuries for most farmworkers who use it over any appreciable length of time. ³ Many individual farmworkers also testified to the great physical agony and considerable disability which they had personally experienced from their use of the short-handled hoe.

At the hearing petitioners additionally attempted to demonstrate that the physical injuries resulting from the use of the short-handled hoe were largely unnecessary because a traditional, long-handled hoe was an acceptable substitute tool; petitioners submitted evidence demonstrating that a long-handled hoe is used for all crops in most farming regions of the United States. Many growers who appeared at the hearings, however, contested petitioners' claim that a long-handled hoe was an acceptable substitute, contending that specific agricultural problems posed by particular crops required the use of the short-handled hoe. These growers, as well as a few individual farmworkers, asserted that adequate weeding and thinning could not be efficiently accomplished with a long-handled hoe.

Several months after the hearings, the agency issued its decision, concluding that 'the testimony failed to prove that the short-handled hoe was an unsafe tool within the purview of 8 California Administrative Code 3316.' The decision stated in relevant part: 'This safety order (section 3316) bears primarily on the proper maintenance and care of hand tools and the prohibition of unsafe hand tools. The evidence dealt with the use of the short-handled hoe. The tool itself was not proved to be inherently dangerous. The board felt that a general prohibition of the short-handled hoe would be an arbitrary and unreasonable extension of its authority.'

Petitioners thereafter sought judicial review of the agency decision. Having determined that the case presented a significant issue respecting the proper scope of the agency's authority in this field, we issued a writ of review. ⁴ Initially, we must determine the appropriate standard of review applicable in this case. The respondent agency contends that the decision at issue here is a quasi-legislative act and, as such, is subject only to a limited judicial review to determine whether the administrative action was 'arbitrary' or 'capricious.' (See, e.g., Pitts v. Perluss (1962) 58 Cal.2d 824, 834--835, 27 Cal.Rptr. 19, 377 P.2d 83; Ray v. Parker (1940) 15 Cal.2d 275, 310--311, 101 P.2d 665; Brock v. Superior Court (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 594, 603--604, 241 P.2d 283.) In characterizing the agency decision at issue as quasi-legislative, respondents take the position that throughout these proceedings petitioners have been urging the agency to promulgate a New regulation or general order, specifically banning the use of the short-handled hoe throughout California, and that the challenged decision is essentially a determination by the agency not to establish such a regulation. A review of the administrative proceedings and, indeed, of the agency's decision itself, however, reveals the inaccuracy of this portrayal of the relief sought by petitioners.

The original petition filed with the agency did not request the promulgation of a new regulation directed at the use of the short-handled hoe, but instead sought enforcement of the Existing regulation, section 3316--banning the use of 'unsafe hand tools'--to prohibit the hoe's continued use. ⁵ Moreover, during the administrative hearings petitioners' counsel clearly indicated that the relief sought by petitioners in this proceeding was the enforcement of 'the regulation that is on the books' and not the establishment of a new safety order. ⁶ Finally, the language of the administrative decision unmistakably indicates that the division itself viewed the question before it as a matter involving the interpretation and application of an existing regulation, for the decision is framed in terms of the petitioners' failure to prove 'that the short-handled hoe was not an unsafe hand tool Within the purview of 8 California Administrative Code 3316.' (Emphasis added.) Accordingly, the agency decision under review here is not a quasi-legislative judgment declining to promulgate a new regulation, but rather involves the interpretation and application of an existing regulation.

In reviewing such an agency decision a court must determine whether the administrative agency applied the proper legal standard in evaluating the evidence before it. (See, e.g., Covert v. State Board of Equalization (1946) 29 Cal.2d 125, 133, 173 P.2d 545.) The interpretation of a regulation, like the interpretation of a statute, is, of course, a question of law (see, e.g., Merrill v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1969) 71 Cal.2d 907, 917, 80 Cal.Rptr. 89, 458 P.2d 33; Bila v. Young (1942) 20 Cal.2d 865, 867, 129 P.2d 364), and while an administrative agency's interpretation of its own regulation obviously deserves great weight (see, e.g. County of Los Angeles v. Frisbie (1942) 19 Cal.2d 634, 643, 122 P.2d 526; 4 Davis, Administrative Law (1958) § 30.12, pp. 258--259), the ultimate resolution of such legal questions rests with the courts. (See, e.g., Merrill v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 71 Cal.2d 907, 917, 80 Cal.Rptr. 89, 458 P.2d 33; Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California E. Com. (1941) 17 Cal.2d 321, 325--326, 109 P.2d 935; Schild v. Busch (S.D.Tex.1968) 293 F.Supp. 1353, 1354--1355.)

In the instant case, the initial issue turns upon whether the division properly interpreted section 3316's reference to 'unsafe hand tools.' The challenged decision holds that the regulation's prohibition of 'unsafe hand tools' applies only to tools which in themselves are 'inherently dangerous' and not to tools which cause danger from the manner of their 'use.' Although the administrative decision does not clearly explain what...