Carnahan v. Argon Med. Devices
| Decision Date | 01 July 2022 |
| Docket Number | 6:22-cv-080-JDK |
| Parties | ANGELA CARNAHAN, Plaintiff, v. ARGON MEDICAL DEVICES, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas |
This is a workplace discrimination dispute. Plaintiff Angela Carnahan sued her former employer Defendant Argon Medical Devices Inc. for age and sex discrimination, wrongful termination and retaliation in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, and the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act. Docket No. 1.
Argon moves to dismiss on various grounds. Docket No. 3. As explained below, the Court GRANTS the motion in part and dismisses the suit without prejudice for failure to state a claim.
The factual allegations in Carnahan's complaint are sparse.
Carnahan alleges that she was employed by Argon for nineteen years most recently as a production supervisor in guidewires. Docket No. 1 ¶¶ 8-9. At some point in her tenure, Carnahan's supervisor was Tyson Baker, “who would regularly curse Carnahan and created a hostile environment.” Id. ¶ 10. “Carnahan complained of the abuse by Tyson Baker without success.” Id. ¶ 11.
Carnahan also alleges that she was “ridiculed” for missing a “business unit meeting” due to illness on September 3, 2019. Id. ¶¶ 13-14, 16. “Thereafter Argon began to ‘paper' the file of Carnahan to create a decision to terminate for pre-textual reasons.” Id. ¶ 15. Carnahan alleges she was “regularly denied time off, vacation time, and ordinary job benefits without reason” in an attempt to get her to quit and that “Riley Henson, a male, took over the department [Carnahan] had previously organized.” Id. ¶¶ 12, 17. On September 9, 2019, Carnahan was terminated “for alleged insubordination.” Id. ¶ 17-18.
Carnahan later filed a charge of employment discrimination with the Texas Workforce Commission (“Commission”) and the U.S. Equal Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Id. ¶ 20. After exhausting her administrative remedies, Carnahan filed the present suit on February 28, 2022. Id.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a claim may be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” “[C]laims may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) ‘on the basis of a dispositive issue of law.'” Walker v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 938 F.3d 724, 734 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989)). Claims may also be dismissed if the plaintiff fails to plead sufficient facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Such “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, and must “make relief plausible, not merely conceivable, when taken as true.” United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 180, 186 (5th Cir. 2009).
In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must “accept as true all well pleaded facts in the complaint.” Campbell v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 781 F.2d 440, 442 (5th Cir. 1986). “All questions of fact and any ambiguities in the current controlling substantive law must be resolved in the plaintiff's favor.” Lewis v. Fresne, 252 F.3d 352, 357 (5th Cir. 2001).
Argon moves to dismiss for failure to (1) satisfy the statutes of limitations, (2) exhaust administrative remedies, and (3) plead sufficient facts to raise a plausible claim for relief. As explained below, the Court rejects the first and second arguments but concludes that Carnahan has failed to plead enough facts to state a plausible claim.
Argon argues that Carnahan's claims are untimely under two separate statutes of limitations.
Argon first cites the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (“TCHRA”), which requires that suits under the Act be filed within two years of filing a charge of discrimination with the Commission. TEX. LABOR CODE § 21.256. Argon argues that Carnahan's charge was dated February 6, 2020-more than two years before this lawsuit was filed on February 28, 2022.
But Carnahan has submitted an affidavit from her counsel stating that he did not file the charge until March 9, 2020. Docket No. 7, Ex. A ¶ 2. And “[t]he text of the Texas Labor Code is clear: the statute of limitations begins running on the day that ‘the complaint relating to the action is filed.'” Sharma v. Amazon Web Servs., Inc., 2022 WL 1643961, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 24, 2022) (quoting TEX. LABOR CODE § 21.256). Argon cites Bourgeois v. Nalco Chemical Company, in which the court presumed that a charge was filed on the date it was signed. 2002 WL 31001792 (E.D. La. Sept. 3, 2002). But in that case, “there [was] no evidence of the filing date.” See id. at *3 n.2. Not so here.
Accordingly, because Carnahan filed her lawsuit here within two years of March 9, 2020, the suit is timely under the TCHRA.
Argon next cites 41 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1), which requires a plaintiff asserting a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) or Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC “within [300] days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” § 2000e-5(e)(1); see also 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1) (); Dao v. Auchan Hypermarket, 96 F.3d 787, 789 (5th Cir. 1996) ().[1] Because Carnahan filed her charge on February 6, 2020, Argon argues, “any claims based on alleged actions occurring before April 12, 2019 (300 days prior to the Charge) are time-barred.” Docket No. 3 at 7-8.[2]
The 300-day time bar applies to each “discrete act” of discrimination. See Tillman v. S. Wood Preserving of Hattiesburg, Inc., 377 Fed.Appx. 346, 349 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). “Discrete acts” are “easily identifiable incidents, including termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, and refusal to hire.” Id. (citing Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114 (2002)). Here, the only identifiable incidents in the complaint are the September 3, 2019 business unit meeting and Carnahan's September 9, 2019 termination. See Docket 1 ¶¶ 13, 18. Carnahan filed her charge within 300 days of both incidents.
Argon acknowledges that it is unable to determine when any other “alleged adverse actions supposedly occurred.” Docket No. 3 at 8. Insofar as Carnahan's claims may be based on additional discrete acts not specified in the complaint, the problem is not untimeliness but a failure to allege sufficient facts, which the Court discusses below. See Neal v. Malakoff Indep. Sch. Dist., 2021 WL 3828698, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 4, 2021), R & R adopted, 2021 WL 3824809 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2021) ( that a complaint must include sufficient factual allegations to show an EEOC charge was timely).
Argon's motion to dismiss based on the statutes of limitations is DENIED.
Argon next argues that any claims arising out of alleged disparate treatment, a hostile work environment, or discrimination in job benefits should be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies because Carnahan did not include these allegations in the charge filed with the EEOC and the Commission. Docket No. 3 at 9. But the exhaustion requirement is not so strict.
To be sure, a plaintiff may not bring an employment discrimination suit before filing a charge with the EEOC or the Commission and exhausting administrative remedies. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1) (ADEA); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Title VII); TEX. LABOR CODE § 21.202(a) (TCHRA). “For this reason, the scope of the charge determines the scope of any subsequent litigation.” Gilbreath v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 400 F.Supp.3d 580, 588 (E.D. Tex. 2019) (citing McClain v. Lufkin Indus., Inc., 519 F.3d 264, 273 (5th Cir. 2008)). But the requirement to “exhaust is not a procedural ‘gotcha' issue.” McClain, 519 F.3d at 272. Instead, a charge must be filed to “trigger the investigatory and conciliatory procedures of the EEOC, in attempt to achieve non-judicial resolution of employment discrimination claims.” Pacheco v. Mineta, 448 F.3d 783, 788-89 (5th Cir. 2006).
Because most complaints are initiated pro se, moreover, “the scope of an EEOC complaint should be construed liberally.” Id. at 788. Thus, an employment discrimination “cause of action ‘may be based, not only upon the specific complaints made by the employee's initial EEOC charge, but also upon any kind of discrimination like or related to the charge's allegations.'” Fine v. GAF Chem. Corp., 995 F.2d 576, 578 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting Fellows v. Universal Restaurants, Inc., 701 F.2d 447, 451 (5th Cir. 1983)). A charge is related if it “could reasonably be expected to grow out of the initial charges of discrimination.” Id. (quoting Fellows, 701 F.2d at 451). Determining what claims could grow out of the EEOC investigation requires “fact-intensive analysis of the statement given by the plaintiff in the administrative charge, and [a] look slightly beyond its four corners, to its substance rather than its label.” Pacheco, 448 F.3d at 789 (citing Fellows, 701 F.2d at 451).
Carnahan's administrative charge states generally that she was “discriminated against due to [her] sex, age[,] and for opposing unlawful employment practices.” Docket No. 3 Ex. A. Carnahan's more specific factual allegations include that “[a] male named Riley Henson was treated more favorably” and that Tyson Baker “would constantly curse” at Carnahan. Id. The charge also states that the reason for her termination was “not true.” Id. Argon contends that Carnahan's...
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