Carnahan v. Campbell
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
| Writing for the Court | BAKER |
| Citation | Carnahan v. Campbell, 59 N.E. 1054 (Ind. 1901) |
| Decision Date | 29 March 1901 |
| Parties | CARNAHAN et al. v. CAMPBELL. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from superior court, Madison county; Henry C. Ryan, Judge.
Action by Bartlett H. Campbell, as receiver of the Union Land & Improvement Company, against James R. Carnahan and others. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendants appeal. Affirmed.
McBride & Denny and Lovett & Holloway, for appellants. Goodykoontz, Ballard & Campbell and Thomas J. Study, for appellee.
Appellee, as receiver of an insolvent domestic corporation, recovered judgment against the ten corporators upon unpaid stock subscriptions. Three defaulted. The others jointly and severally assigned that the court erred (1) in sustaining appellee's demurrer to each appellant's plea in abatement, (2) in overruling each appellant's demurrer to the complaint, (3) in sustaining appellee's demurrer to the several answers of each appellant, and (4) in rendering judgment against each appellant. The plea in abatement was based upon the facts that all of the subscribers, except one, lived in counties other than Madison, the county in which the suit was brought; that the corporation had its home office in Marion county; and that the stock subscriptions were several, and not joint. It is settled in this state that a receiver of an insolvent corporation, being duly authorized thereunto by the court, may sue all delinquent subscribers together in any county where a part of them reside. Herron v. Vance, 17 Ind. 595;Gainey v. Gilson, 149 Ind. 58, 48 N. E. 633. The alleged distinctions stated by counsel, namely, that in the Gainey Case a majority of the stockholders resided in the county where the suit was commenced, that the suit was begun in the county where the corporation had its home office, and that the corporation was a manufacturing company, while in this case only one stockholder resided in the county where the suit was commenced, the suit was not begun in the county where the corporation had its home office, and the corporation was a land improvement company organized under the voluntary associations act, are untenable. The rule stated in the cases cited is general, and its validity was not conditioned upon the existence of the particular circumstances then before the court. The complaint alleges: That appellee was duly appointed receiver. That under orders of the court he has sold all the tangible property of the company, and applied the proceeds upon the indebtedness. That there remains unpaid an indebtedness of $10,000. That no assets remain except the unpaid stock subscription of the defendants. That he has been authorized by the court to sue the defendants thereon. That each defendantsubscribed for 10 shares of stock. That the subscription is as follows: That each defendant paid $105 upon his subscription. That there remains unpaid of the subscriptions $8,950, which the defendants have failed and refused to pay. That the corporation is insolvent, and that it will take all of the unpaid subscriptions and more to pay the indebtedness in full.
Appellants contend that the complaint is bad because the contract of April 10, 1893, which is referred to in the subscription of April 25, 1893, is not set out. The complaint is not sufficient, if the subscription contract, which is the foundation of the cause of action, shows on its face that the liability of the subscribers is made to depend upon the terms of an undisclosed agreement; but if, under the circumstances alleged in the complaint, the terms of the contract of April 10th could not possibly limit or condition the liability to pay for the stock, the complaint is sufficient. Insurance Co. v. Monninger, 18 Ind. 352;Insurance Co. v. Cannon, 48 Ind. 264;Titlow v. Hubbard, 63 Ind. 6;Cassaday v. Insurance Co., 72 Ind. 95;Busch v. Association, 75 Ind. 348;Insurance Co. v. Kessler, 84 Ind. 310;Association v. Thompson, 88 Ind. 405;Borchus v. Association, 97 Ind. 180; Newman v. Association, Id. 295; Insurance Co. v. Wiler, 100 Ind. 92;Insurance Co. v. Hazelett, 105 Ind. 212;Insurance Co. v. Stark, 120 Ind. 444, 22 N. E. 413;Insurance Co. v. Byrkett, 9 Ind. App. 443, 36 N. E. 779;Machine Co. v. Irons, 10 Ind. App. 454, 36 N. E. 862, 37 N. E. 1046;Williams v. Markland, 15 Ind. App. 669, 44 N. E. 562. The first sentence in the subscription contract is, “We hereby subscribe for the number of shares set opposite our names.” From this the law imports the liability to take and pay for the shares. The remaining words in the subscription contract do not limit or condition this liability. The liability to pay the full face value stands unqualified, but only the manner of payment, as to installments and times, is spoken of. “We further agree to pay as assessments are made and payments are called for by the board of directors in accordance with the contract of April 10th.” There is nothing in the subscription contract of April 25th to indicate that the contract of April 10th related to anything further than provisions as to the times and proportions in which the directors should call for payments of the entire stock subscribed. Since the complaint shows that the company was insolvent; that its affairs were taken out of the directors' hands, and put in a receiver's; that there were no assets remaining except the unpaid subscriptions; and that the full amount of unpaid subscriptions was inadequate to pay the past due indebtedness of the company,-it was competent for the court to direct or authorize the receiver to sue the subscribers, without alleging the making of an assessment and demand for payment. 1 Cook, Corp. § 106; 2 Mor. Priv. Corp. § 821; Tayl. Priv. Corp. § 543; 2 Thomp. Corp. § 1703; Washington Sav. Bank v. Butchers' & Drovers' Bank, 107 Mo. 133, 17 S. W. 644, 28 Am. St. Rep. 405;Thompson v. Bank, 19 Nev. 103, 7 Pac. 68, 3 Am. St. Rep. 797;Id., 19 Nev. 171, 7 Pac. 870, 3 Am. St. Rep. 881;Id., 19 Nev. 242, 9 Pac. 121, 3 Am. St. Rep. 883;Sagory v. Dubois, 3 Sandf. Ch. 466;Armstrong v. Danahy, 75 Hun, 405, 27 N. Y. Supp. 60;Henry v. Railroad Co., 17 Ohio, 187;Trust Co. v. Gillespie, 115 Pa. 564, 9 Atl. 73;Lewis' Adm'r v. Glenn, 84 Va. 947, 975, 6 S. E. 866; Wilbur v. Stockholders, 18 N. B. R. 178, Fed. Cas. No. 17,636; Holmes v. Sherwood (C. C.) 16 Fed. 725;Ross-Meehan Brake-Shoe Foundry Co. v. Southern Malleable Iron Co. (C. C.) 72 Fed. 957;Hatch v. Dana, 101 U. S. 205, 25 L. Ed. 885;Potts v. Wallace, 146 U. S. 689, 13 Sup. Ct. 196, 36 L. Ed. 1135. Therefore the limitation upon the manner of paying for stock, namely, only upon the call of the directors as provided for in the contract of April 10th, is without any effect upon the receiver's suit for the unpaid subscriptions.
Appellants filed separate answers in seven paragraphs. These paragraphs, all designed to raise the same question, progressively state additional facts, so that the seventh presents the alleged defense most favorably to appellants' contention. In that paragraph it is averred: That on April 10, 1893, Jesse C. Heller owned certain lots in Madison county, Ind. That he desired to procure the formation of a corporation under the voluntary associations act of Indiana, to engage generally in the business of dealing in real estate in Indiana, and particularly to purchase his lots. That, as an inducement to appellants to unite with him in the formation of such a corporation, he proposed to them that, if such a corporation should be organized, and should purchase his lots at the price of $10,000, and if the corporators should pay in cash at the organization of the corporation a sufficient sum upon their several stock subscriptions to enable the corporation to pay him $1,000 upon the purchase price, he would convey his lots to the corporation for $1,000 cash and the corporation's three notes of $3,000 each, payable in 6, 12, and 18 months from May 1, 1893, secured by the corporation's mortgage of the lots, and that there should be no personal liability upon the part of the corporation or of appellants on account of the deferred payments; and, further, that a stipulation should be put into the stock subscription to the effect that, upon the corporation's payment of the $1,000, the stock of appellants should be considered and treated as paid in full, and there should be no personal liability of the corporation or of the appellants on their several subscriptions on account of the deferred payments. That appellants accepted Heller's proposition, and agreed to unite with him in the formation of the corporation. That they thereupon made their certain written agreement with Heller, as follows: ...
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