Carnegie-Ill. Steel Corp. v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Division
| Decision Date | 02 May 1947 |
| Docket Number | 17545. |
| Citation | 72 N.E.2d 662,117 Ind.App. 379 |
| Parties | CARNEGIE-ILLINOIS STEEL CORPORATION v. THE REVIEW BOARD OF THE INDIANA EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DIVISION et al. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Proceeding by Beatrice Abraham and others before the Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division for unemployment benefits during the period of the work stoppage which occurred at the Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corporation's works. From the decision rendered, the Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corporation appeals.
Decision reversed with directions.
White, Wright & Boleman, of Indianapolis Paul R. Conaghan, George Venca, and Knapp, Cushing Hershberger and Stevenson, all of Chicago, Ill., for appellant.
Blaz A. Lucas, of Gary, for appellee.
Oliver A. Swizer, of South Bend, amicus curiae.
This is an appeal from a decision of the Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division upon claims filed by a number of employees for unemployment benefits during the period of a work stoppage which occurred at the Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corporation Works at Gary, Indiana.
The facts are not in dispute, and show that the appellant was engaged in the manufacture of steel in its works at Gary Indiana, and that there was a working agreement between the appellant and the United Steel Workers, C. I. O., Local 1014, which was the exclusive certified bargaining agent for the employees. A controversy arose between the appellant and the union over wages and working conditions. Negotiations were carried on between the union and the appellant from October 20, 1945 to January 20, 1946, when a strike was called, picket lines were established, and all production ceased on January 21, 1946. On February 18, 1946 an agreement was concluded between appellant and the union and the picket lines were removed and production resumed. The parties to this cause stipulated that the strike terminated on February 18, 1946. After the work was resumed on February 18, 1946, there was a partial stoppage of work by some of the employees in the mason, billet and blooming departments. The stoppage in the mason department lasted for four days and for eight hours or more in the other departments. The record is not clear as to how many employees were involved in this stoppage of work or whether a labor dispute caused the stoppage. These stoppages, however, had no substantial effect upon the general resumption of production. The evidence also showed that a full resumption of operations could not be had prior to March 16, 1946, and that the company had sufficient orders on hand during the period from January 10, 1946 to April 4, 1946 to provide full time employment for all employees at its Gary Steel Works. The evidence further showed that a substantial curtailment in production operations existed from January 10, 1946 to March 16, 1946. It is uncontradicted that the stoppage of work continued until March 16, 1946. Work was unavailable to appellees because it was necessary to have certain operations performed, such as the repair of coke ovens, hearths of blast furnaces, and other repair items necessary before appellant's works could resume production after the shutdown period of the strike. There were no claims made by appellees that any other causes other than the strike operated to cause the work stoppage up to March 16, 1946. Also, in the brief filed by the State Industrial Union Council affiliated with the C. I. O., the undisputed facts above were conceded in the following statement: 'The question before the court is whether a stoppage of work immediately subsequent to a labor dispute which stoppage of work would not have occurred except (our italics) for the labor dispute disqualifies employees involved in the labor dispute during the subsequent stoppage.'
The Review Board made findings of fact and conclusions of law and held that all employees covered by the bargaining agreements were members of the bargaining unit regardless of their membership or nonmembership in the union involved. That they (including appellees) belonged to a grade or class of workers of which immediately before the commencement of the stoppage, there were members employed at the establishment at which the stoppage occurred who were participating in, financing, and directly interested in the dispute. The Review Board further held that claimant C-1 and all claimants, including appellees (with the exception of certain claimants not involved in this appeal), who were members of the bargaining unit regardless of their membership in the unions which caused the stoppage of work due to a labor dispute were disqualified from January 21, 1946 to the week ending February 23, 1946, and that the labor dispute ended February 18, 1946. This part of the Board's decision is not in question in this appeal.
The Review Board further held that none of the claimants were disqualified for benefits under the provisions of Section 7(f)(3) of the Employment Security Act, after the week ending February 23, 1946. The Board held that the unemployment following the settlement of the labor dispute and resulting from the time required to place all parts of the employer's plant in operation because of its production methods, was not a stoppage of work caused by a labor dispute because under the terms and meaning of the Act, in order that workers may be disqualified under the provisions of Section 7(f)(3), both a labor dispute and a stoppage of work must exist at the same time, or concurrently, before a worker is disqualified. There was a dissent by one member of the Review Board as to the part of the decision which held that the employees were not disqualified for benefits after the week ending February 23, 1946, and until March 16, 1946, the date upon which it was established that full production was resumed. The dissenting member held that the statute requires only a causal connection between the labor dispute and the stoppage of work and not a coexistence.
The issue presented by this appeal involves the claim of the appellees to unemployment benefits during the period immediately following the termination of the strike and labor dispute, the week ending February 23, 1946, and the time when it was established that full production was resumed in appellant's steel works on March 16, 1946.
The errors assigned for reversal are that (1) the final decision is contrary to law; (2) violates the provisions of the Constitution of Indiana; and (3) violates the provisions of the Constitution of the United States and Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment thereto.
The appellees in the instant case did not file briefs in response to appellant's brief, and except as to appellee the Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division, did not appear in person or by counsel at the time that oral arguments were had in this cause. Upon the entry of an order by the court for appellees to file a brief, the Indiana State Industrial Union Council, affiliated with the C.I.O., filed briefs in response and answer to appellant's briefs on behalf of appellees, which briefs were designated as filed as amicus curiae by such organization. The matters in issue have therefore been fully presented, and by reason of the fact that the issues herein are sui generis, they have been carefully and thoroughly considered by this court.
Considering the first assignment of error, did the Review Board err in its interpretation of Section 7(f)(3), Burns' Ind.Stat.Ann.1945 Supp., Sec. 52-1507(f)(3), and was it correct in its legal conclusion that a labor dispute and a stoppage of work must exist at the same time, or concurrently before a worker is disqualified for benefits?
This section provides as follows:
Disqualification for Benefits. An individual shall be ineligible for waiting period or benefit rights: * * *
'(3) for any week with respect to which the boards finds that his total or partial or part-total unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dispute at the factory, establishment, or other premises at which he was last employed; Provided that this subsection shall not apply if it is shown to the satisfaction of the board that: He is not participating in or financing or directly interested in the labor dispute which caused the stoppage of work; and he does not belong to a grade or class of workers of which, immediately before the commencement of the stoppage, there were members employed at the premises at which the stoppage occurs, any of whom are participating in or financing or directly interested in the dispute; and he has not voluntarily stopped working, other than at the direction of his employer, in sympathy with employees in some other establishment or factory in which a labor dispute is in progress; Provided, That if in any case separate branches of work which are commonly conducted as separate businesses in separate premises, are conducted in separate departments of the same premises each such department shall, for the purposes of this subsection, be deemed to be a separate factory, establishment, or other premises.'
We must recognize the fundamental rules of statutory construction. If a statute is plain and unambiguous, courts must give it a literal interpretation without construction limiting its extent or extending its operation. McDaniels v. McDaniels, 1945, Ind.App., 62 N.E.2d 876, 879; State v. Mutual Life Insurance Company, 1910, 175 Ind. 59, 93 N.E. 213, 42 L.R.A.,N.S., 256; Taelman v. Board of Finance, 1936, 212 Ind. 26, 33, 6 N.E.2d 557.
Also, in case of ambiguity, we must, by all aids available, ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature.
The appellant contends that the words used in the statute in question:
'An individual shall be...
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