Carnegie v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC (In re Carnegie)
Decision Date | 29 September 2020 |
Docket Number | Case No. 14-80536,Ad. Proc. No. 20-09001 |
Citation | 621 B.R. 392 |
Parties | IN RE Clorie CARNEGIE, Debtor. Clorie Carnegie, Plaintiff, v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC d/b/a Mr. Cooper, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Middle District of North Carolina |
Craig M. Shapiro, for Plaintiff Clorie Carnegie.
Brian A. Calub, for Defendant Nationstar Mortgage LLC.
Lena Mansori James, United States Bankruptcy Judge This adversary proceeding comes before the Court upon the motion to dismiss and supporting brief filed by Nationstar Mortgage, LLC d/b/a Mr. Cooper, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as made applicable to this proceeding by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7012, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
On November 22, 2019, Clorie Carnegie (the "Plaintiff") filed a motion to reopen her underlying bankruptcy case to file an adversary proceeding against Nationstar Mortgage, LLC d/b/a Mr. Cooper (the "Defendant"), for violations of the discharge injunction, confirmation order, and other Bankruptcy Code provisions. After a hearing on the matter, the Court granted the motion and reopened the bankruptcy case on December 13, 2019.
The Plaintiff filed the complaint to commence this adversary proceeding on January 15, 2020 (Docket No. 1, the "Complaint").1 The Complaint asserts two claims for relief: (1) violations of the discharge injunction, and (2) violations of the automatic stay. The Plaintiff seeks actual damages, including emotional distress damages as well as reasonable attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses incurred in connection with filing the Complaint. The Plaintiff also requests the imposition of punitive sanctions against the Defendant, in an amount "sufficient to prevent [the Defendant] from continuing to engage in this conduct ... and otherwise to deter such future conduct" from other parties (Docket No. 1, ¶ 114).
After a Court-provided extension of time, the Defendant filed an Answer on March 20, 2020, which included a motion to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, made applicable to this adversary proceeding pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7012(b). On April 6, 2020, the Defendant filed a brief in support of its motion to dismiss (Docket No. 12, 13, collectively, the "Motion"). The Plaintiff filed a response to the Motion on May 25, 2020 (Docket No. 19, the "Response"), and the Court took the matter under advisement on July 16, 2020.
556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
To determine plausibility, all well-pleaded facts set forth in the complaint are taken as true and viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff; however, "legal conclusions, elements of a cause of action, and bare assertions devoid of further factual enhancement" will not constitute well-pleaded facts necessary to withstand a motion to dismiss. Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc. , 591 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009). In other words, the Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Assuming the complaint meets the plausibility standard, the plaintiff is not required "to also rebut other possible explanations for the conduct alleged." 2 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 12.34(1)(b) (2019). See Houck v. Substitute Tr. Servs., Inc. , 791 F.3d 473, 484 (4th Cir. 2015) ( )(quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). On the other hand, dismissal is proper under Rule 12(b)(6) "if the complaint lacks an allegation regarding an element necessary to obtain relief." 2 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 12.34(4)(a) (2019); see also EEOC v. PBM Graphics , 877 F. Supp. 2d 334, 343 (M.D.N.C. 2012) ( )(citing Bass v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. , 324 F.3d 761, 764–65 (4th Cir. 2003) ).
For purposes of assessing the Defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) Motion, facts within the Complaint are accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff. See Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc. , 591 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009). The Court also takes judicial notice of pertinent docket entries and papers within this adversary proceeding and the underlying bankruptcy case. See Anderson v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. , 918 F.2d 1139, 1141 n. 1 (4th Cir. 1990) ( ); see also Brown v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC , No. 14-3454, 2015 WL 5008763, at *1 n. 3 (D. Md. Aug. 20, 2015), aff'd , 639 Fed. App'x. 200 (4th Cir. 2016) ( ).
On May 19, 2014, the Plaintiff filed a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. At all relevant times, the Plaintiff was and remains the owner of record on real property located at 1104 Hazel Street, Durham, North Carolina (the "Property"). The Plaintiff listed the Property in Schedule A, with a purported fair market value of $34,408.00. When the Plaintiff filed her bankruptcy case, the Property was encumbered by a mortgage held by the Defendant, which the Plaintiff listed in Schedule D in the amount of $44,891.00 (Docket No. 1, ¶¶ 18, 19).
On May 22, 2014, the Plaintiff proposed a chapter 13 plan, in which the Defendant's claim was treated under 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) as secured only to the extent of the value of the Property with any remaining balance treated as unsecured (Case No. 14-80536, Docket No. 10, the "Plan"). The Defendant's claim was listed in the section of the Plan labeled as "STD – Secured Debts @ FMV," which the Plan reserves for "creditors [that] have partially secured and partially unsecured claims[,]" with "[t]he secured part of the claim [to] be paid in full over the life of the plan on a pro-rata basis with other secured claims." Pursuant to that proposed treatment, the chapter 13 trustee (the "Trustee") would distribute approximate monthly payments of $809.57 to the Defendant on its secured claim. The Plan projected a 0% dividend to general unsecured, non-priority creditors, which would include the remaining unsecured balance of the Defendant's claim.2 The Plaintiff served the proposed plan on the Defendant at an address the Defendant later listed within its proof of claim as the address for directing all payments.3
On July 16, 2014, the Trustee filed a Notice of Proposed Plan alerting creditors to the filing of the Plan and the deadline by which to file any objection, as well as providing a summary of the Plan through an attached proposed confirmation order (Case No. 14-80536, Docket No. 24). In the proposed confirmation order, the Defendant's claim was listed in Section D(2), labeled as "Partially Secured Claims – Real Property and Personal Property." The proposed confirmation order reflected that the Defendant had yet to file its proof of claim and, consequently, the Defendant's total claim amount was "unknown." The Trustee did, however, list the proposed amount of the Defendant's secured claim as $34,408.00, in accordance with the proposed treatment described in the Plan. The Court served the Trustee's notice on the Defendant at the preferred noticing address listed within the Defendant's proof of claim (Case No. 14-80536, Docket No. 25).
On the same day the Trustee filed the notice, July 16, 2014, the Defendant filed its proof of claim, asserting a claim of $47,336.50, secured by a mortgage on the Property, which the Defendant valued at $44,891.94. The Defendant did not, however, file any objection to the Debtor's Plan. Consequently, the Court entered an order on August 19, 2014, confirming the Plaintiff's Plan (Case No. 14-80536, Docket No. 26, the "Confirmation Order"). The Confirmation Order mirrored the Trustee's language regarding the treatment of the Defendant's claim, including the admonition that "[a]ny objection to value is required to be filed as a formal objection to valuation not later than 60 days from the date of the entry of this [Co...
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