Carney v. Heinson
| Decision Date | 27 August 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 24362.,24362. |
| Citation | 133 Idaho 275,985 P.2d 1137 |
| Parties | Mert and Carol CARNEY, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Darrin and Wendy HEINSON, husband and wife, Defendants-Respondents. |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Racine, Olson, Nye, Budge & Bailey, Pocatello, for appellants. John A. Bailey, Jr. argued.
Ronald J. Jarman, Pocatello, for respondents. Ronald J. Jarman argued.
This is an appeal from an order by the district judge denying the appellants, Mert and Carol Carney (the Carneys), an injunction against the construction of a garage by the respondents, Darrin and Wendy Heinson (the Heinsons). The judge also denied the Carneys' later request in their motion for reconsideration that the garage be moved.
In July, 1975, Robert and Phyllis Smuts (the Smuts) purchased Lots No. 13 and No. 1, Block 63 in American Falls, Idaho. In April of 1978, the Smuts requested that the City of American Falls' planning and zoning department close a portion of the alley in Block 63 between Lots No. 1 and No. 13 to enable them to construct a retaining wall. Later that month, the American Falls city council accepted the recommendation of the planning and zoning department to close the alleyway and started proceedings to do so. In May, the city council read Ordinance No. 350 which stated:
[A]n Ordinance vacating a portion of the alley in Block 63 of the Reclamation Addition to the Townsite of American Falls, Idaho, and providing for the reversion of the vacated portion of said alley to the abutting property owners.
The Ordinance was never recorded with the Power County recorder's office. However, a second Ordinance, Ordinance 353, enacted by the city council and signed by the Mayor in August of 1978, provided that all property rights of the vacated portion of the alley in Block 63 were to revert to the abutting property owners except that the City of American Falls would retain a perpetual easement for various utility services.
After the alleyway was vacated, the Smuts completed construction of their home on Lot No. 13 and poured a cement driveway on a portion of the vacated alleyway and constructed a cement retaining wall adjacent to the boundary line of Lot No. 1. Because they were the owners of both lots, the Ordinance essentially gave the Smuts ownership of the entire alleyway.
In April, 1989, the Carneys obtained a Special Warranty Deed from Crossland Mortgage Corporation for Lot No. 13. The deed did not contain a description of the one-half of the vacated alleyway adjacent to Lot No. 13; however, the three previous transfers of the property, beginning with the initial transfer of the property by the Smuts, had included a description of one-half of the vacated alleyway adjacent to Lot No. 13. On February 28, 1997, Crossland Mortgage Corporation quitclaimed the one-half of the alleyway abutting Lot 13 to the Carneys. Additionally, on March 17, 1997, the Smuts quitclaimed the entire portion of the vacated alley lying between Lots No. 1 and 13 to the Carneys.
The Heinsons received a Warranty Deed for Lot No. 1 on September 22, 1994. The deed contained no description of the one-half of the alleyway abutting Lot No. 1 and no prior transfer, including the initial transfer of the land from the Smuts, and contained no description or mention of the one-half of the alleyway adjacent to Lot No. 1.
The dispute in question arose when the Heinsons obtained a building permit from the City of American Falls to construct a twenty-four by thirty foot garage on their property. The permit approved construction of the garage within the applicable setback limits, which required sideyard setbacks of 7.5 feet and rearyard setbacks of 7.5 feet where an alley had been platted. At the time the district court proceedings began, the garage had been nearly completed and was situated on the property boundary line of Lot No. 1, immediately adjacent to the vacated alleyway.
The Carneys filed a complaint requesting a temporary restraining order, a permanent injunction against construction of the Heinsons' garage, and title to the entire alleyway. The Carneys asserted that the entire vacated alleyway was their property and as such, the Heinsons were not in compliance with the required setbacks when constructing the garage immediately adjacent to the vacated alleyway. The Carneys also argued that the garage blocked their previous view and that because of the garage, they were having difficulty exiting and entering their driveway. The Carneys claimed ownership of the vacated alleyway under various legal bases. After a court trial on the issues, the district judge issued a Memorandum Decision and Order, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment on August 20, 1997. The judge determined that the Smuts did not retain ownership of the one-half of the vacated alleyway adjacent to Lot No.1 and, thus, their quitclaim deed to the Carneys dated March 17, 1997 purporting to give the entire vacated alleyway was null and void. The district judge also determined that the Carneys had not obtained title to the land through adverse possession because they had not paid taxes on the property. However, the district judge found that the Carneys had a prescriptive easement over the one-half of the vacated alleyway adjacent to Lot No.1. Accordingly, the judge determined that the Heinsons were in compliance with their building permit and denied the Carneys' request for an injunction.
The Carneys then filed a motion to reconsider on September 2, 1997, arguing that the Smuts' attempt to quitclaim the entire vacated alleyway was valid because Idaho law provides that a vacated alleyway reverts to the owner of the adjacent real estate. Therefore, the Carneys argued, the alleyway reverted to the owners of the adjacent property, not the property itself, and thus the Smuts had retained ownership of the property. The Carneys also argued that they had adversely possessed the entire alleyway because payment of taxes was not a requirement for adverse possession where no taxes had been assessed. The district judge again held that the Smuts had no ownership in the one-half of the vacated alleyway adjacent to Lot No. 1 when they attempted to quitclaim the land to the Carneys. The judge applied the common law presumption that upon vacation of an alleyway, a subsequent conveyance of the abutting lot includes one-half of the alleyway up to the center line unless there is a clear intention otherwise from the granting instrument or the surrounding circumstances. The judge also determined that the Carneys had not obtained title through adverse possession, this time basing his decision on a lack of exclusivity in possession of the property and a finding that the use was permissive. The judge went on to determine that the Carneys had an implied, not prescriptive, easement over the one-half of the vacated alleyway. Again, the judge held that the construction of the garage was legal. The Heinsons had also filed their own motion for reconsideration requesting attorney fees, which the court denied. The Carneys appeal the district judge's decision.
Initially, we note that this Court exercises free review over the district court's conclusions of law. Marshall v. Blair, 130 Idaho 675, 679, 946 P.2d 975, 979 (1997).
On appeal, the Carneys argue that the Smuts remained in possession of the one-half of the alleyway adjoining Lot 1 and thus, they were able to convey the alleyway to the Carneys through the quitclaim deed executed on March 17, 1997. The Heinsons urge this Court to adopt the common law presumption that a conveyance of land abutting a vacated alley conveys title to the center of the alleyway, unless the granting instrument or surrounding circumstances illustrate a contrary intent. The district judge relied on the common law presumption in determining that, at the time of their March 17, 1997 attempt to convey the entire alleyway to the Carneys, the Smuts had no interest in the vacated alleyway adjacent to Lot 1. The district judge determined that "the one-half of the vacated alleyway abutting Lot 1 was conveyed with said Lot by Mr. and Mrs. Smuts even though it was not mentioned in the deed of conveyance." We agree that the one-half of the vacated alleyway adjacent to Lot 1 was conveyed with Lot 1 and affirm the decision of the district judge.
In determining ownership of the portion of the vacated alleyway in question, both I.C. § 50-311 and Ordinance 353 support the position that one-half of the vacated alleyway was conveyed with Lot 1 as of the initial transfer of the lot by the Smuts. First, I.C. § 50-311 states that "whenever any street, avenue, alley or lane shall be vacated, the same shall revert to the owner of the adjacent real estate, one-half (½) on each side thereof, or as the city council deems in the best interests of the adjoining properties...." (emphasis added). Similarly, Ordinance 353 states that "all property rights in the aforesaid vacated portion of the alley in the aforesaid Block 63, are hereby declared to revert to the abutting property owners...." Although both provisions provide that when an alleyway is vacated it reverts to the abutting property owners, an examination of the statute and the ordinance illustrates that the primary intent of both is to settle ownership of the property after vacation and provide that the newly vacated parcel becomes part of the adjoining property rather than becoming an independent parcel owned by the landowner. Indeed, I.C. § 50-311 makes this clear when it states "whenever any ... alley ... shall be vacated, the same shall revert to the owner of the adjacent real estate, one-half (½) on each side thereof, or as the city council deems in the...
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