Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v. Arkansas Transit Homes, Inc.
| Decision Date | 11 April 2012 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 7:10-CV-1614-VEH |
| Parties | CAROLINA CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. ARKANSAS TRANSIT HOMES, INC., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama |
The magistrate judge filed a Report and Recommendation on December 22, 2011 (Doc. 69), recommending that the Summary Judgment Motions filed by the Defendants, Max B. Ward ("Ward") and Elizabeth Ward ("Mrs. Ward") (collectively, "the Wards") and by the Defendant, Arkansas Transit Homes, Inc. ("Arkansas Transit") be GRANTED and that the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff, Carolina Casualty Insurance Company ("Carolina Casualty") be DENIED.1 On that same date, this case was reassigned to the undersigned judge. (Doc. 70). The Motions, briefs, and evidentiary materials submitted by the parties are found at documents 35—40, 42—43, 45, 48—49, 53, and 66-68. On January 6, 2012, Carolina Casualty filed Objections (doc. 71) to the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation. No response has been filed to the Objections. The Motions, the Report and Recommendation, and Carolina Casualty's Objections are now under submission.
For the reasons explained below, the magistrate judge's report is due to be ACCEPTED, and his recommendations are due to be ADOPTED as modified hereinafter. Likewise, Carolina Casualty's Objections are due to be OVERRULED. Accordingly, the Motions for Summary Judgment filed by the Wards and by Arkansas Transit are due to be GRANTED and the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Carolina Casualty is due to be DENIED.
The Eleventh Circuit has summarized the summary judgment burden, including when a defendant seeks judgment as a matter of law on the basis of an affirmative defense, as follows.
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions,answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Once the moving party has properly supported its motion for summary judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to "come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986) (quotations and emphasis omitted). If the movant bears the burden of proof on an issue, because, as a defendant, it is asserting an affirmative defense, it must establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to any element of that defense. See Martin v. Alamo Community College Dist., 353 F.3d 409, 412 (5th Cir. 2003).
Int'l Stamp Art, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 456 F.3d 1270, 1273-74 (11th Cir. 2006).2
Although there are cross-motions for summary judgment, each side must still establish the lack of genuine issues of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Chambers & Co. v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of the U.S., 224 F.2d 338, 345 (5th Cir. 1955) ().3 The court considers each motion independently, and inaccordance with the Rule 56 standard. See U.S. v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962) (). "The fact that both parties simultaneously are arguing that there is no genuine issue of fact, however, does not establish that a trial is unnecessary thereby empowering the court to enter judgment as it sees fit." WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, FED. PRACTICE & PROC. § 2720, at 327-28 (3d ed. 1998).
After conducting a "careful and complete" review of the findings and recommendations, a district judge may accept, reject, or modify the magistrate judge's report and recommendation. Williams v. Wainwright, 681 F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1982) (quoting Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404, 408 (5th Cir. 1982))4 ; see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The district judge may also receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).
A district judge "shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). This requires that the district judge "give freshconsideration to those issues to which specific objection has been made by a party." Jeffrey S. v. State Bd. of Educ., 896 F.2d 507, 512 (11th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). In contrast, those portions of the report and recommendation to which no objection is made need only be reviewed for clear error. Macort v. Prem, Inc., 208 Fed. App'x 781, 784 (11th Cir. 2006).5
"Neither the Constitution nor the statute requires a district judge to review, de novo, findings and recommendations that the parties themselves accept as correct." United States v. Woodard, 387 F.3d 1329, 1334 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation and quotation marks omitted). It is incumbent upon the parties to timely raise any objections that they may have regarding a magistrate judge's findings contained in a report and recommendation, as the failure to do so subsequently waives or abandons the issue, even if such matter was presented at the magistrate judge level. See, e.g., U.S. v. Pilati, 627 F.3d 1360, 1365 (11th Cir. 2010) ( ). However, the district judge has discretion to consider or to decline to consider arguments that were not raised before the magistrate judge. Stephens v. Tolbert, 471 F.3d 1173, 1176 (11th Cir. 2006); see also Williams v. McNeil, 557 F.3d 1287, 1292 (11th Cir. 2009).
Nettles, 677 F.2d at 410 n.8. "This rule facilitates the opportunity for district judges to spend more time on matters actually contested and produces a result compatible with the purposes of the Magistrates Act." Id. at 410. Indeed, a contrary rule "would effectively nullify the magistrate judge's consideration of the matter and would not help to relieve the workload of the district court." Id. (quoting United States v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615, 622 (9th Cir. 2000)).
In order to frame the matter for the reader, the court will first set out the unobjected-to factual and legal background of this declaratory judgment insurance coverage dispute.
The underlying state action arises from a single-vehicle accident in whichDouglas Edward Upton ("Upton"), the driver of an 18-wheeler truck ("the truck"), suffered fatal injuries and Max B. Ward ("Ward"), the passenger in the truck, suffered severe injuries. At the time of the accident, Upton and Ward were returning from a trip in which they had delivered a mobile home for Arkansas Transit. Ward escorted the truck as Upton drove it to transport the mobile home and, after delivery of the home, Ward loaded his escort vehicle onto the truck and rode as a passenger in the truck. Only Upton drove the truck in relation to this trip. Approximately 20 months after the accident, Ward and his wife, Elizabeth (hereinafter collectively "the Wards"), sued Shirley Upton, as representative of Upton's estate, in the Circuit Court of Marion County, Alabama, seeking damages for Upton's alleged negligence and wantonness, including loss of services, companionship, society, and consortium. The Wards later amended their state-court complaint to allege the same claims against Arkansas Transit. Because Arkansas Transit had commercial-vehicle insurance coverage from Carolina Casualty at the time of the accident, Carolina Casualty commenced the present action to obtain a declaration that it owes no duty under the policy to defend or indemnify Arkansas Transit or Upton in the state action.
The Commercial Transportation Policy ("the Policy") issued by Carolina Casualty to Arkansas Transit that was in effect at the time of the accident provides liability coverage for commercial-trucks owned or leased by Arkansas Transit.Carolina Casualty seeks to invoke exclusions four and five on the ground that, under the terms of the Policy, Ward and Upton were employees of Arkansas Transit.
The Wards and Carolina Casualty all assert that Upton was an employee of Arkansas Transit, and Arkansas Transit does not take a position on the issue in its briefing. However, the Wards and Arkansas Transit assert that Ward was not an employee of Arkansas Transit, while Carolina Casualty argues that Ward was an employee of Arkansas Transit. The magistrate judge found that Ward was not an employee of Arkansas Transit and that, therefore, the Policy exclusions relied upon by Carolina Casualty do not exclude the claims asserted in the underlying state court action.
Carolina Casualty has raised 18 objections. However, Carolina Casualty has pointed to no evidence (or lack of evidence) that controverts the magistrate judge's detailed factual findings in the Report and Recommendation (hereinafter the "R&R"). Additionally, for the reasons set out below, Carolina Casualty's arguments that the magistrate judge's legal conclusions are also wrong6 are not persuasive.
The court will set out Carolina Casualty's objections and respond to eachobjection,...
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