Carolina v. Mack
| Decision Date | 15 November 1951 |
| Docket Number | No. 3443,3443 |
| Citation | 55 So.2d 4 |
| Parties | CAROLINA v. MACK et al. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
L. C. Parker, A. J. Gibbs, Baton Rouge, for appellant.
Huckabay, Seale & Kelton, Baton Rouge, for appellee.
Robert Carolina, at about 2:45 P.M. on July 3, 1949, was driving his Ford automobile in a northerly direction on U. S. Highway 61-65, followed by a car operated by a Mr. Brown who was followed by another car operated by a Mr. Zwaifler. These three cars were preceding a Pontiac driven by Louis Mack. Paul Pino was driving his Plymouth automobile in a southerly direction on the same Highway. As these automobiles neared the intersection of U. S. Highway 61-65 and the old Jefferson Highway, Louis Mack, at a high rate of speed, passed the Zwaifler and Brown automobiles, but nothing the proximity of the on-coming Pino vehicle, pulled back into his right lane of traffic and crashed into the rear of the Carolina car, the force of this impact propelling the Carolina car into the south lane of traffic and into the path of the Pino vehicle. A collision occurred between the Pino and Carolina automobiles.
Plaintiff Robert Carolina brought this suit against Louis Mack, Paul Pino and Pino's liability insurer, General Acceptance Fire & Life Assurance Corporation, Ltd., for damages to his automobile and for personal injuries. No pleadings were ever filed upon behalf of Louis Mack and a judgment was taken by default against him. An exception of vagueness was filed upon behalf of Pino and his insurer, and this exception was sustained. Plaintiff then filed an amended and supplemental petition, and the defendants filed exceptions of no cause and no right of action. These exceptions were referred to the merits and the case was tried. At the conclusion of the trial counsel for the defendants recalled the exceptions of no right and no cause of action whereupon the Court sustained the exceptions and dismissed the suit insofar as Paul Pino and his insurer were concerned. From this judgment plaintiff has appealed.
The trial judge, at the conclusion of the trial in sustaining the exceptions in the case considered all of the evidence and so stated in his reasons for judgment. The record shows that at the beginning of the trial counsel for defendants and exceptor reserved 'the right at the close of the evidence concerning the facts of the accident to recall from the merits the exceptions of no cause and no right of action filed herein. * * *' There was no objection to any testimony and, therefore, the judgment of the trial judge in sustaining the exceptions is before this Court on appeal on the entire record or evidence in the transcript.
There is no doubt the first act of negligence encountered in this cause is that committed by the defendant, Louis Mack, when he caused his automobile to collide with the rear of plantiff's automobile, catapulting it into the south lane of traffic. Of course, judgment by default has already been taken against Mack and he is not represented in this appeal. Therefore, the sole question before this Court is whether Pino was guilty of any negligence whatsoever and, if so, was this negligence of such a nature as to establish legal liability to the plaintiff.
It is not necessary for one to be liable that his negligence or negligent act be the sole cause of the accident, it being sufficient, that his negligence concurs with one or more efficient causes, nor is it necessary that the acts be related one to the other. It is material that each contributed in fact to the consummation of harm, and there must be a legal or proximate cause flowing from a causal connection in fact. This doctrine, which is firmly established in our jurisprudence, has been expressed quite clearly in the case of Mason v. Herrin Transfer & Warehouse Co., La.App., 168 So. 331.
On the other hand if the evidence discloses the sole proximate cause of this accident was the negligence of Louis Mack, and no acts of the defendant Pino contributed as a proximate cause to the accident, then, of course, Pino should be held blameless.
The trial court stated its reasons for sustaining the exceptions and dismissing plaintiff's suit as follows:
'The Court, after listening to the various witnesses as to...
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...So.2d 180; Genovese v. Abernathy, La.App.,135 So.2d 802; Walter v. New Amsterdam Casualty Company, La.App., 130 So.2d 476; Carolina v. Mack, La.App., 55 So.2d 4. The damages claimed by the respective plaintiffs in the four suits were agreed to and stipulated by all counsel. It developed tha......
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Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York v. Talbot
...to the subsequent collision to permit a normally-reacting individual to stop or swerve aside. The principle is illustrated by Carolina v. Mack, La.App., 55 So.2d 4, where Mack, attempting to pass three automobiles on the highway, encountered an oncoming car and was forced to turn back into ......