Caron Found. of Fla., Inc. v. City of Delray Beach

• Decision Date: 04 May 2012
• Docket Number: Case No. 12–80215–CIV.
• Citation: 879 F.Supp.2d 1353
• Parties: CARON FOUNDATION OF FLORIDA, INC., a Pennsylvania Corporation doing business as Caron Renaissance, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF DELRAY BEACH, a Florida municipal corporation, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

879 F.Supp.2d 1353

CARON FOUNDATION OF FLORIDA, INC., a Pennsylvania Corporation doing business as Caron Renaissance, Plaintiff,

v.CITY OF DELRAY BEACH, a Florida municipal corporation, Defendant.

Case No. 12–80215–CIV.

United States District Court, S.D. Florida.

May 4, 2012.

James Kellogg Green, James K. Green, P.A., West Palm Beach, FL, for Plaintiff.

Jamie Alan Cole, Matthew Harris Mandel, Weiss Serota Helfman Pastoriza et al., Fort Lauderdale, FL, Robert H. De Flesco, III, Weiss Serota Helfman, Coral Gables, FL, for Defendant.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

WILLIAM P. DIMITROULEAS, District Judge.

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction [DE 11], filed March 27, 2012. The Court has carefully considered the motion, Defendant's Response in Opposition [DE 17], and Plaintiffs' Reply [DE 23], and is otherwise fully advised in the premises.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

To obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must prove (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) irreparable injury absent an injunction, (3) that the irreparable injury outweighs whatever damage the injunction may cause the opposing party, and (4) that an injunction is not adverse to the public interest. Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1342 (11th Cir.1994). Because a “preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, it is not to be granted until the movant clearly carries the burden of persuasion as to the four prerequisites.” Id. (quotation omitted). Moreover, when the moving party is seeking to have the opposing party perform an affirmative act, the burden is even higher: “A mandatory injunction ... especially at the preliminary stage of proceedings, should not be granted except in rare instances in which the facts and law are clearly in favor of the moving party.” Miami Beach Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Callander, 256 F.2d 410, 415 (5th Cir.1958).¹

In ruling on a preliminary injunction, the Court makes preliminary findings of fact. At this stage, the evidentiary rules are relaxed. See Levi Strauss & Co. v. Sunrise Int'l Trading, Inc., 51 F.3d 982, 985 (11th Cir.1995). A court may rely on affidavits and hearsay materials that would not admissible evidence for a permanent injunction, so long as the evidence is appropriate given the character and purpose of the injunction proceedings. See id. It may utilize written materials that are in the record. See McDonald's Corp. v. Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301, 1310–13 (11th Cir.1998). The findings of fact and conclusions of law made when resolving a preliminary injunction are not binding at the trial on the merits. Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395, 101 S.Ct. 1830, 68 L.Ed.2d 175 (1981).

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff (“Caron”) sued Defendant (the “City”) for violating the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. Caron claims that the City has interfered with Caron's rehabilitation center for individuals recovering from alcoholism and substance abuse. Caron argues that the City denied Caron a reasonable accommodation for a home it purchased in a single-family neighborhood. It also claims that the City is discriminating against Caron through its zoning ordinances. Caron seeks declaratory and injunctive relief as well as monetary damages, costs, and reasonable attorneys' fees. This Court has jurisdiction of these claims under several statutes, including 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343.

Caron has had alcohol and substance abuse rehabilitation facilities in Palm Beach County for more than 20 years. It previously operated housing in the City at an apartment complex. More recently, it acquired two large homes in single-family neighborhoods near the ocean on Ocean Drive, an affluent area. Caron has developed the two Ocean Drive houses to cater to professionals or others with highly successfulcareers. These two homes would only be used to provide room and board for recovering addicts; clinical therapy would occur offsite at separate facilities. Nevertheless, Caron claims that a single-family setting provides important therapeutic benefits. The residents will function as a family household and provide mutual support. Caron has said four or five residents per house is the clinically required minimum to stave off isolation. [DE 10–5 at 5; DE 11 at 2].

In early 2011, Caron purchased its first Ocean Drive residence (the “First Ocean Drive House”). The home was a five bedroom, 6,120 square foot house. Caron wanted seven patients to stay at that location. The City had an ordinance limiting the number of unrelated individuals who could live together. On January 14, 2011, Caron applied for a reasonable accommodation to allow seven (7) unrelated individuals to reside together. The City requested more information on February 3, 2011, which Caron provided. The City granted the accommodation on February 14, 2011.

In January 2012, Caron purchased another home on Ocean Drive (the “Second Ocean Drive House”). This home was larger than the first, with 7,481 square feet. The previous month, Caron had applied for a reasonable accommodation so that the Second Ocean Drive House could also accommodate seven unrelated individuals. The application was essentially identical to the application submitted with the first request.

This time, substantial community opposition developed. For example, a community website opposing Caron's plan stated,

Drug, Alcohol and Sex Addict Rehab Should not be a Vacation!

Just say NO to Transient Housing. These Sober Houses should not be in Residential neighborhoods!

The large Caron Corporation is trying to Bully the City of Delray Beach into providing high class rehabilitation centers for dangerous transient Drug, Alcohol and Sex Addicts in the Beach area.... We urge all Delray Beach residents to be aware of the security risks and take action to stop this large corporate intrusion that threatens our safety, well-being and neighborhood character.

[DE 10–17]. Citizens made many other similar comments. [DE 10–15, 10–18].

Members of the zoning board and the Mayor also commented negatively about sober living facilities. One planning and zoning board member said that Caron's plans threatened the survival of the City. He indicated that Caron posed a risk to the most affluent areas of the city and that such a risk was unacceptable. [DE 10–20 at 7–8].² The chairman of the planning commission called the sober home movement

a cancer in this town and it is metastasizing quicker in ways that not all of us can get our arms around, but we are clearly being taken advantage of.... If it quacks like a duck it is a duck.... It plain stinks, we are being taken advantage of ... There has to be a way ... I don't care if the lawyer has to come from Olympus, there is somebody out there that is smarter than this scourge that is metastasizing in this town. It's not just destabilizing, it denigrates the neighborhood.... In the meantime, we keep them out and maybe they go plague some other place.

[DE 10–20 at 10–16]. The audience applauded after this comment. On a separateoccasion, the mayor said, “We have crafted three ordinances to restrict these operations in our community.... If you have any connections or ideas, we are willing to work with you in curtailing the conversion of single family homes into rehab centers.... We will revisit our three ordinances to see if we can put some more teeth in them, but keep in mind, Boca [Raton] tried, was sued and lost.” [DE 10–21].

The City had been considering what to do with sober living facilities for some time. In August 2002, it attempted to pass an ordinance restricting “substance abuse treatment centers” from locating in residential neighborhoods. Such centers were defined broadly. They included locations only used for room and board even if treatment occurred at another location. On August 16, 2002, the U.S. Department of Justice warned the City that its ordinance would likely violate the FHA. [DE 10–1]. A neighboring city, Boca Raton, had a similar ordinance, which a federal district court judge held violated the FHA. See Jeffrey O. v. City of Boca Raton, 511 F.Supp.2d 1339, 1346–47 (S.D.Fla.2007).

Simultaneously with the surge in community opposition in 2012, the City reviewed its zoning ordinances. One ordinance brought into review was the “transient use” ordinance, which restricted the number of times a home could be leased during the year. The initial version of the ordinance was enacted in 2009. This version allowed dwelling units or tenant slots to be leased six times a year. For example, a five bedroom house could be leased at least 30 times in a year if each bedroom was a tenant slot. During oral argument on the underlying motion, counsel for the City acknowledged that the original transient use statute was passed in response to an Eleventh Circuit opinion that held that a facially neutral transient use statute would not violate the FHA or the ADA, even if it hampered sober living facilities. See Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island, 544 F.3d 1201, 1213–16 (11th Cir.2008).

On February 21, 2012, after public hearings in which citizens expressed outrage over Caron's plans, the City toughened its transient use ordinance, decreasing the number of times an owner could rent a dwelling during a year. The revised ordinance limited turnover to three times a year in single-family zoning districts and clarified that the turnover rate applied to the entire dwelling or any part thereof. This change is significant. Taking the example of a five bedroom house, under the new ordinance it could only be rented 3 times a year, down from 30 times under the old ordinance. That same day, the City also changed its reasonable accommodation ordinance, deleting the reference to 42 U.S.C. § 290dd that would allow applicants to omit the address of the proposed location if disclosure would...