Caron v. Cranbrook Educ. Cmty.

• Decision Date: 29 November 2012
• Docket Number: Docket No. 305486.
• Citation: 828 N.W.2d 99,298 Mich.App. 629
• Parties: CARON v. CRANBROOK EDUCATIONAL COMMUNITY.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

298 Mich.App. 629

828 N.W.2d 99

CARON

v.CRANBROOK EDUCATIONAL COMMUNITY.

Docket No. 305486.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Sept. 12, 2012, at Detroit.

Decided Oct. 4, 2012.

Approved for publication Nov. 29, 2012, at 9:10 a.m.

Donald M. Fulkerson, Westland, for Katie Martineau Caron and Kevin Caron.

Harvey Kruse, P.C., Troy (by Larry W. Davidson and Stephanie Marino Anderson), for the Christman Company.

Plunkett Cooney, Bloomfield Hills (by Jeffrey C. Gerish and Scott H. Sirich) for David W. Osler, David W. Osler Associates, Inc., Rafael Moneo, and Moneo Brock Studio, L.L.C.

Before: MURPHY, C.J., and MARKEY and WHITBECK, JJ.

MURPHY, C.J.

Plaintiffs Katie Martineau Caron and Kevin Caron appeal as of right the trial court's orders granting summary disposition in favor of defendants The Christman Company; David Osler and David Osler Associates, Inc. (collectively “Osler”); and Rafael Moneo and Moneo Brock Studio, L.L.C. (collectively “Moneo”). We affirm.

On June 22, 2009, plaintiff Katie Martineau Caron (hereafter “Caron”) suffered serious injuries when a T-shaped, three-part portable room partition (PRP) fell on her as she and a graduate student attempted to move the PRP on its casters (wheels) in order to expand the space in which Caron, an art instructor, was going to teach a ceramics class at the Cranbrook Academy of Art. At the time, Caron was employed by defendant Cranbrook Educational Community (Cranbrook). The incident occurred in an “art classroom addition” that had been constructed as part of a larger construction project at the academy known as the New Studios Building project, which was completed in the fall of 2002. Allegedly, Christman designed, manufactured, and sold the PRP itself as well as other PRPs used in the art classroom addition.¹ Moneo and Osler provided architectural design services in connection with the construction project, and the designs included and incorporated the placement and utilization of numerous PRPs. The PRPs are used, as envisioned, to satisfy Cranbrook's ever-changing needs regarding the number, size, and shape of individual rooms employed for art instruction and studio work within the art classroom addition, which itself is a structure containing a large area of open space bordered by standard immovable walls (the parties refer to these walls as the “architectural” walls).

In April 2010, plaintiffs filed a 19–count complaint against Cranbrook, Christman, Osler, and Moneo, alleging various causes of action arising out of the design, construction, sale, and architectural use and incorporation of the PRP and the incident in which the PRP fell on Caron. The claims by plaintiff Kevin Caron were based on loss of services, society, companionship, and consortium in relationship to his injured wife. Cranbrook filed a motion for summary disposition, arguing that plaintiffs' action was barred by the exclusive-remedy provision of the Worker's Disability Compensation Act (WDCA), MCL 418.131(1). The trial court granted Cranbrook's motion, and plaintiffs have not appealed that order. Over time, defendants Christman, Osler, and Moneo filed separate motions for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (10), each arguing that MCL 600.5839 barred plaintiffs' lawsuit. The crux of this case and appeal is whether the PRP that fell on Caron constituted “an improvement to real property” under MCL 600.5839, which provides in relevant part:

(1) A person shall not maintain an action to recover damages for injury to property, real or personal, or for bodily injury or wrongful death, arising out of the defective or unsafe condition of an improvement to real property, or an action for contribution or indemnity for damages sustained as a result of such injury, against any state licensed architect or professional engineer performing or furnishing the design or supervision of construction of the improvement, or against any contractor making the improvement, unless the action is commenced within either of the following periods:

(a) Six years after the time of occupancy of the completed improvement, use, or acceptance of the improvement.

Plaintiffs do not contest that MCL 600.5839 generally applies to defendants, considering their professionalfields, nor do plaintiffs dispute that installation of the PRPs was completed in the fall of 2002. Given that the accident occurred in June 2009, which, in light of plaintiffs' concession, is more than “[s]ix years after the time of occupancy of the completed improvement, use, or acceptance of the improvement,”MCL 600.5839(1)(a), the statute would bar plaintiffs' lawsuit if the PRP constituted “an improvement to real property.”

At the summary disposition hearing, defendants maintained that the PRP, or its installation, constituted an improvement to real property, thereby implicating the statute, and plaintiffs argued to the contrary, focusing on the contention that the PRP was not affixed or annexed to the realty. The trial court found that the PRPs are “substantial” and were “part and parcel” of the art classroom addition and studio construction project completed in 2002. The court ruled that the PRPs “were a capital improvement to the property such that they qualif [ied] under [MCL 600.5839]....” In three separate orders, the trial court granted defendants' motions for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7).² Plaintiffs appeal as of right.

This Court reviews de novo a trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition, a determination that an action is time-barred, and questions of statutory construction. Ostroth v. Warren Regency, GP, LLC, 474 Mich. 36, 40, 709 N.W.2d 589 (2006); Pitsch v. ESE Mich., Inc., 233 Mich.App. 578, 600, 593 N.W.2d 565 (1999). MCL 600.5839 serves as a statute of repose and as a statute of limitations that can result in an action's being time-barred. Ostroth, 474 Mich. at 38–39, 709 N.W.2d 589. Summary disposition is proper when a “claim is barred because of ... [a] statute of limitations....” MCR 2.116(C)(7). In RDM Holdings, Ltd. v. Continental Plastics Co., 281 Mich.App. 678, 687, 762 N.W.2d 529 (2008), this Court, addressing a motion brought pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), observed:

Under MCR 2.116(C)(7) ..., this Court must consider not only the pleadings, but also any affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documentary evidence filed or submitted by the parties. The contents of the complaint must be accepted as true unless contradicted by the documentary evidence. This Court must consider the documentary evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. If there is no factual dispute, whether a plaintiff's claim is barred under a principle set forth in MCR 2.116(C)(7) is a question of law for the court to decide. If a factual dispute exists, however, summary disposition is not appropriate. [Citations omitted.]

This appeal concerns the construction and applicability of MCL 600.5839, and in McCormick v. Carrier, 487 Mich. 180, 191–192, 795 N.W.2d 517 (2010), our Supreme Court recited the governing principles regarding the interpretation of a statute:

The primary goal of statutory construction is to give effect to the Legislature'sintent. This Court begins by reviewing the language of the statute, and, if the language is clear and unambiguous, it is presumed that the Legislature intended the meaning expressed in the statute. Judicial construction of an unambiguous statute is neither required nor permitted. When reviewing a statute, all non-technical words and phrases shall be construed and understood according to the common and approved usage of the language, MCL 8.3a, and, if a term is not defined in the statute, a court may consult a dictionary to aid it in this goal. A court should consider the plain meaning of a statute's words and their placement and purpose in the statutory scheme. Where the language used has been subject to judicial interpretation, the legislature is presumed to have used particular words in the sense in which they have been interpreted. [Citations and quotation marks omitted.]

By enacting MCL 600.5839, the Legislature chose to limit the liability of architects, engineers, and contractors in order to relieve them of the potential burden of defending against lawsuits commenced long after an improvement was completed. Ostroth, 474 Mich. at 43, 709 N.W.2d 589, citing O'Brien v. Hazelet & Erdal, 410 Mich. 1, 14, 299 N.W.2d 336 (1980); see also Ali v. Detroit, 218 Mich.App. 581, 587–588, 554 N.W.2d 384 (1996) (purpose of MCL 600.5839 is to “shield architects, engineers, and contractors from stale claims and relieve them of open-ended liability for defects in workmanship”). In Ostroth, 474 Mich. at 43, 709 N.W.2d 589, our Supreme Court, quoting O'Brien, 410 Mich. at 15, 299 N.W.2d 336, stated:

“[T]he instant statute is both one of limitation and one of repose. For actions which accrue within six years from occupancy, use, or acceptance of the completed improvement, the statute prescribes the time within which such actions may be brought and thus acts as a statute of limitations. When more than six years from such time have elapsed before an injury is sustained, the statute prevents a cause of action from ever accruing.”

We have surveyed the Michigan and federal cases interpreting MCL 600.5839 and specifically the language “an improvement to real property.” As gleaned from the caselaw, the following factors should be examined in determining whether the PRP used in the art classroom addition constituted an improvement to real property: (1) the general nature of the PRPs, (2) whether the PRPs were integral components or essential to the operation of the art classroom addition, (3) whether the purchase, placement, and utilization of the PRPs required the expenditure of labor and money and increased the usefulness of, added value to, bettered, or enhanced the capital value of the art classroom addition in relationship to the structure's intended use and purpose, and (4...