Caron v. Old Reliable Gold Min. Co.

• Decision Date: 13 September 1904
• Citation: 78 P. 63,12 N.M. 211,1904 -NMSC- 016
• Parties: CARON et al. v. OLD RELIABLE GOLD MIN. CO. et al.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

78 P. 63

12 N.M. 211, 1904 -NMSC- 016

CARON et al. v. OLD RELIABLE GOLD MIN. CO. et al.

Supreme Court of New Mexico

September 13, 1904

Syllabus by the Court.

1. In this territory probate courts are without jurisdiction to determine contested claims of title to property as between an estate and a stranger.

Appeal from District Court, Santa Fé County; before Justice McFie.

Action by Telesphore E. Caron and others against the Old Reliable Gold Mining Company and others. Judgment of dismissal, and plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.

The material facts in this case are that on or about the 6th day of July, 1892, the New Mexico Mining Company leased to Leon Caron and others by six specific leases certain mining claims known as "Alpine," "Pat. Cullen," and "Maverick," and also known by other names, which said leases were to run for a period of 99 years, and provided for the payment of certain rents and certain obligations, with reference to the amount of work to be done etc. Leon Caron died intestate on the 15th day of September 1892. All of the plaintiffs and four of the defendants, named Demarais, are heirs of Leon Caron. The defendant Alfred N Randall applied for letters of administration of the estate of Leon Caron, which letters were granted, and the said Randall was duly qualified as such administrator. At the time of the institution of this suit said Randall had not rendered his final report as administrator. The title to the property described in the leases was in the New Mexico Mining Company at the time said leases were made. On or before the 2d day of April, 1895, one Patrick Cullen filed his petition in the probate court of Santa Fé county, N. M., the object and purpose of which was to have said probate court decree that the interest of the said Leon Caron, deceased, in and to said leases belonged to said petitioner. Said petitioner, Cullen alleged in his petition "that on or about the 22d day of September, 1889, he deeded to said Leon Caron and Alfred N. Randall the property described in said leases, to wit, the Alpine, Pat. Cullen, and Maverick mines." Plaintiff further says: "Complainant would further show that said transfer was made for the purpose of authorizing said Caron and Randall to act as his agents in the sale of said property, and as his attorneys in fact in the management and control thereof, and for the further purpose of securing from the Ortiz mining grant a lease or quitclaim to said property. Complainant would further show that there was no other consideration whatever for the execution of said deed; that since the execution thereof the said Leon Caron departed this life, without having, as the agent, sold or disposed of the property; as the records now stand, the deed is an incumbrance upon said property." The petitioner further alleged that the leases procured by Caron and others hereinbefore mentioned were procured in pursuance of said deed of conveyance and for the uses and benefit of the petitioner. On the day that said petition was presented to the probate court of Santa Fé county, without the issuance of any process, without the appearance of any one for the plaintiffs in this case, save and except the administrator, the said probate court proceeded to hear and determine the said cause upon the petition, no other pleading being filed, and thereupon entered judgment in favor of complainant against Alfred N. Randall, administrator of the estate of Leon Caron, deceased, which judgment or decree was, in effect: "That whereas, the said Patrick Cullen, complainant, comes into court and presents his petition praying that Alfred N. Randall, administrator of Leon Caron, deceased, convey to said complainant a quitclaim deed of all the interest which said Leon Caron, deceased, had in and to the following mining claims [here describing the property in controversy], and it appearing to the court that the interest now in the name of Leon Caron, deceased, was obtained by him as agent for Patrick Cullen, to be sold, and the proceeds to go to Patrick Cullen, as it appears by written and verbal testimony offered and by the written contracts executed on the 15th day of December, 1889, it is therefore ordered that the said administrator, Alfred N. Randall, execute to Patrick Cullen a quitclaim deed for the interest in the mining claims and leases which stand in the name of Leon Caron, deceased." From this judgment or decree of the probate court no appeal was taken, and more than 90 days elapsed before the filing of the complaint in this cause. On the day following the rendition of the judgment or decree of the said probate court the said Randall, administrator of said Caron, deceased, in pursuance of said decree, executed and delivered to Patrick Cullen a quitclaim deed of the premises described in the said leases. On the 8th day of April, 1895, Patrick Cullen died, and said Alfred N. Randall was appointed administrator of his estate. Subsequently the said probate court decreed that Mathew Cullen was the sole heir of the said Patrick Cullen, deceased, and that all the rights which the said Patrick Cullen had, if any, in the property, inured to him. On the 7th day of March, 1898, Mathew Cullen conveyed the property described in the said leases to Joseph B. Mayo, Wilson S. Chapman, and the Old Reliable Gold Mining Company. On the 27th of September, 1900, the petition of Telesphore E. Caron and others was filed in the district court of Santa Fé county, N. M., setting forth all the facts hereinbefore stated. This petition concluded with the prayer that all of the proceedings had in the probate court of Santa Fé county as hereinbefore mentioned be set aside and declared to be null and void, and that the conveyance made by said Randall, as administrator of the estate of Leon Caron, in pursuance of the decree of the said probate court, be declared to be null and void, and that the plaintiffs in this case, as well as the four named defendants, Lucille, Philorum P., Estelle, and Ethel M. Demarais, be adjudged and decreed to be the sole owners and beneficiaries of whatever interest in the property rights and privileges the said Caron, deceased, was vested under and by virtue of the six leases hereinbefore specified, and that all assignments and conveyances made by the said Randall, administrator of the estate of said Patrick Cullen, and Mathew Cullen to Joseph B. Mayo, William Chapman, and the Old Reliable Gold Mining Company, defendants, be set aside and declared for naught. To this complaint the defendants filed a demurrer, alleging: That it appears upon the face of said complaint that said complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, in that the said complaint shows that the title in and to the subject-matter of said action claimed by plaintiffs in said complaint is not, and never was, in plaintiffs and said minor defendants, or any of them, at any time; "that said complaint shows that the title sued on in this cause was property and lawfully disposed of by the probate court of the county of Santa Fé, New Mexico, before the commencement of this suit"; that the title to the property in controversy was lawfully vested in the Old Reliable Gold Mining Company, and that the plaintiffs and four defendants named had no title therein; that the said complaint shows that no appeal had been taken from the probate court from the decree or judgment thereof. Second. That the court had no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of said action, in that said complaint shows that the exclusive jurisdiction over the subject-matter of this suit is in the probate court of Santa Fé county, N. M.; and prayed that the said action be dismissed. The court sustained the demurrer, and the plaintiffs refused to plead further. Judgment of dismissal was thereupon entered, and an appeal prayed and allowed.

A. B. Renehan and Albert L. Teele, for appellants.

E. A. Fiske and Robert C. Chapman, for appellees.

BAKER, J. (after stating the facts).

Had the probate court jurisdiction to determine the title to the property in dispute in the suit of Patrick Cullen against Alfred N. Randall, administrator of the estate of Leon Caron deceased, commenced in the probate court of Santa Fé county? This is the only question in the case. The probate court was created by the organic act, section 10 of which provides "that the judicial power of the territories shall be vested in the Supreme Court, district courts, probate courts, and in justices of the peace." Said act further provides that "the jurisdiction of the several courts herein provided for, both appellate and original, and that of the probate courts and justices of the peace, shall be as limited by law." It further fixes the limitations of the jurisdiction of justices of the peace, and further provides that "the said Supreme Court and district courts respectively shall possess chancery as well as common-law jurisdiction." This act is the creation of our judiciary. The jurisdiction of the several courts cannot be enlarged by the Legislature. Ferris v. Higley, 20 Wall. 375, 22 L.Ed. 383; Robinson v. Fair, 128 U.S. 53, 9 S.Ct. 30, 32 L.Ed. 415; Clayton v. Utah Territory, 132 U.S. 641, 10 S.Ct. 190, 33 L.Ed. 455; Arellano v. Chacon, 1 N. M. 269. The organic act expressly conferring upon the Supreme Court and district courts chancery as well as common-law jurisdiction, and not expressly conferring such jurisdiction upon the probate courts, it is equivalent to expressly denying probate courts such jurisdiction. Clayton v. Utah Territory, supra. The organic act simply creating probate courts, and not defining their powers and jurisdiction, we must look elsewhere to find the powers and jurisdiction of such courts. Probate courts in this territory have such power and jurisdiction as was given...